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Ambassador Roger G. Harrison  
Editor’s Note 
 
After a one-year hiatus, Space & Defense is back 
with a fresh format.  We still have the peer-
reviewed feature articles.  In this issue, a team 
from Science Applications International 
Corporation (SAIC)—Walt Conrad, Justin 
Anderson, and Sarah Jacobs—offers a framework 
for evaluating potential arms control agreements 
in space during a period when the domain is 
becoming more contested, competitive, and 
congested (the “three C’s”).  Despite the need for 
greater cooperation between the United States and 
emerging space powers, the authors conclude that 
both the Chinese-Russian sanctuary proposal on 
the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in 
Outer Space (PPWT) and the European Union 
Code of Conduct fall short of their criteria for a 
robust international agreement. 
 
On the other side of the coin from pursuing the 
benefits of coordination, Jonathan Mazur 
examines U.S. policy documents and U.S. 
behavior to argue that a deterrence regime, 
structured by American redlines in space, may 
have already formed.  Allies and adversaries have 
every reason to pay attention, and available data 
hints at a strong U.S. reaction should a foreign 
power interfere with command and control 
platforms or cause the permanent loss of 
American government payloads for navigation, 
communications, or remote sensing.  Launch 
facilities, ground stations, and intentional creation 
of permanent orbital debris are also likely to be on 
“the other side” of U.S. redlines—though urgent 
questions remain for assets such as weather and 
scientific satellites as well as commercial 
platforms without U.S. Government payloads. 
 
Again in keeping with the tradition of Space & 
Defense, we have published a report on a high-
profile conference in the field—Space Security 
through the Transatlantic Partnership—co-
organized by the European Space Policy Institute 
(ESPI) and the Prague Security Studies Institute 
(PSSI) during June 2011.  Our reporters are Jana 
Robinson of ESPI and Michael Romancov of 
Charles’ University’s Department of Political 
Science at the Faculty of Social Sciences, Prague.  
Their article illustrates how both arms control and 
deterrence are ascendant on the policy agenda of 
the international space community and that 
stakeholders are best served discussing and 
planning for these issues now, before the next 
major crisis involving outer space. 
 
Finally, we have included two new features with 
this issue.  Recent U.S. Air Force Academy 
graduates Fumiko Hedlund and Daniel Hughes 
produced outstanding papers in their Grand 
Strategy capstone course last spring.  Their 
research on Afghanistan and Thailand reminds us 
of the connections between comparative political 
development on the one hand and both grand 
strategy and U.S. defense policy.  It also occurs to 
us that policy makers or analysts who prefer to see 
international norms and standards of conduct in 
space emerge out of multilateral negotiations have 
an interest in how the next generation of leaders 
are updating the old country models for political 
stability and modernization.  Our last addition—
and in some ways the perfect dessert to cap all our 
articles—is Publisher’s Corner.  The Eisenhower 
Center’s own Roger Harrison provides two very 
useful reviews, served with generous helpings of 
wit and wisdom, on important, recent 
contributions to the growing literature on Space & 
Defense.     
 
Whether you are working in government, industry, 
consulting, or academe, we hope you enjoy this 
first issue of Volume 6 and that you consider 
capitalizing on your interest in space by sending 
us your thoughts—as an article for peer review, a 
report, or a critical essay.  Until then, look for our 
next installment at the beginning of summer 2013! 
 
      
Damon Coletta 
USAFA 








 Article  
Arms Control in the Third Space Age:  
Assessing International Efforts to Regulate Military Operations  
in Outer Space in the “3 C’s” Era 
 
Walt Conrad, Ph.D., Justin Anderson, Ph.D., and Ms. Sarah Jacobs1 
 
Preserving1and protecting the free and open use of 
outer space benefits all space-faring nations and is 
vital to U.S. national interests.  U.S. military and 
civil space operations, however, face a number of 
growing challenges.  Several countries possess or 
are developing means to disrupt or destroy space 
systems; space debris threatens the safe passage of 
spacecraft; and outer space is an environment 
where the United States now competes with a 
rapidly growing number of other space-faring 
nations.  To remain the world’s preeminent 
military space power, the United States must 
consider a variety of means and strategies to 
address these challenges. 
A number of foreign states and nongovernmental 
organizations have proposed addressing threats to 
the safe and secure use of outer space by drafting 
new international treaties, agreements, and codes 
of conduct.  In public statements and international 
forums, major space powers such as Russia and 
China, and major multilateral organizations such 
as the European Union (EU), describe space as an 
increasingly dangerous, lawless frontier.  These 
actors suggest that expanding rules and 
regulations for state use of outer space, to include 
negotiating and implementing new space arms 
control agreements, could prevent future accidents 
and armed conflicts in this domain.   
Current U.S. space policy strongly supports 
developing multilateral mechanisms to address 
issues that represent common challenges to all 
space-faring nations, to include the potential 
negotiation of space arms control and confidence-
1 This article is based on “Air Force Space Equities and 
Future International Space Agreements,” an Air Force 
Strategic Plans and Policy Divisions (AF/A5XP) 
“Emerging Issues” report completed by an SAIC 
contract support team comprised of Walt Conrad, 
Justin Anderson, Sarah Jacobs, Troy Wilds, and James 
Mazol.  The views expressed in this article are solely 
those of the authors, and do not represent the views of 
SAIC, AF/A5XP, the Air Force, or any SAIC client. 
building measures.  U.S. policy also clearly states, 
however, that it will only consider space arms 
control treaties and agreements that are “equitable, 
effectively verifiable, and enhance the national 
security of the United States and its allies.”2  
Obama administration officials have repeatedly 
stated that Washington will not accept any 
negotiations that fail to protect outer space as a 
free and open environment, or that will have a 
negative impact on current military space 
operations.   
The present threat environment, U.S. policy 
imperatives, and the critical importance of the U.S. 
Armed Forces’ space assets, operations, and 
missions to U.S. national security are all factors 
highlighting the importance of providing a 
national security perspective on foreign and 
international proposals regarding outer space law 
and space arms control.  This article suggests a 
possible framework for analyzing the potential 
impact of space arms control proposals on the U.S. 
armed forces.  It also provides an international 
“state of play” for space arms control, briefly 
discussing the civilian and military space 
programs and policies of Russia, China, and the 
EU, and their proposals for addressing present 
challenges to the free and open state use of space.  
It concludes with an assessment of these proposals, 
which may reflect broader future trends in terms 
of multilateral efforts aimed at regulating the 
military use of space or promoting new space 
arms control agreements. 
 
ARMS CONTROL AND THE THIRD SPACE 
AGE 
During the first space age, the state use of outer 
space was dominated by the competition between 
the two Cold War superpowers, perhaps best 
2 White House, National Space Policy of the United 
States of America, June 28, 2010, p. 7. 
                                                          
                                                          
5 Space & Defense  
characterized by the race to the moon. Despite this 
fierce rivalry, however, Washington and Moscow 
were able to reach a remarkable degree of 
consensus on a number of founding principles 
forming the basis of an international legal 
framework for state use of outer space.3  The 
United States and Soviet Union, joined by other 
states concerned outer space might become a key 
battleground during the Cold War, worked 
through the United Nations to draft an accord that 
became known as the Outer Space Treaty (OST). 
The OST entered into force in 1967 as the first 
major multilateral treaty on outer space.  More 
than four decades later, it continues to represent 
the primary foundation of international space law. 
As of January 2011, 101 countries have ratified 
the OST, to include all major space-faring 
nations.4  The treaty articulated a number of 
fundamental principles regarding the state use of 
space, to include the inherent right of all states to 
freely access, use, and explore outer space.5  State 
Parties to the treaty also agreed that space, and all 
celestial bodies, cannot be claimed as the territory, 
property, or exclusive zone of any State.6  
In addition to articulating key concepts 
establishing space as a global commons, the OST 
is the only international treaty containing 
provisions expressly addressing the military use of 
space.  Significantly, instead of making broad 
statements attempting to regulate or restrict all 
3 The treaty also discusses non-governmental activities 
in outer space within Articles VI, but the text specifies 
that any actions by a non-governmental entity in space 
are the responsibility of state governments. State 
parties are granted authority and oversight over all non-
governmental activities in space: “State Parties to the 
Treaty shall bear international responsibility for 
national activities in outer space … whether such 
activities are carried on by governmental agencies or 
by non-governmental entities … [t]he activities of non-
governmental entities in outer space, to include the 
Moon and other celestial bodies, shall require 
authorization and continuing supervision by the 
appropriate State Party to the Treaty.”  
4 Status of International Agreements relating to 
Activities in Outer Space. United Nations Office for 
Outer Space Affairs. 
http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/oosa/SpaceLaw/treatyst
atus/index.html, accessed 25 Sep 2012. 
5 Outer Space Treaty [OST], Art I. 
6 OST, Art II. 
military activities in space, the military provisions 
of the OST take the form of specific, limited 
prohibitions of certain weapons and operations: 
• No Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(WMD) in Orbit or on Celestial 
Bodies: The OST prohibits the 
placement of nuclear weapons or 
other WMD in orbit, on the moon, or 
on other celestial bodies.7  The treaty 
does not, however, expressly define 
the terms “weapon” or “WMD.” 
• Prohibitions of Certain Military 
Activities on Celestial Bodies:  The 
treaty also prohibits the 
establishment of military bases, 
installations, or fortifications on any 
celestial body.  State Parties to the 
treaty also agree to forego 
conducting military maneuvers, or 
testing any kind of weapon, on 
celestial bodies.8  The OST does not, 
however, prohibit any of the above 
military activities within outer space. 
The OST does not prohibit the general military 
use of space.  It does not limit or ban, for 
example, the placement of non-WMD military 
systems into orbit, nor does it prohibit members of 
the military from joining civilian crews for space 
missions.  
The OST provided an international legal 
framework for outer space and marked an 
important rapprochement between the two Cold 
War superpowers, with the treaty’s Preamble 
declaring “the exploration and use of outer space 
should be carried on for the benefit of all 
peoples.”9  The OST also prevented either 
superpower – or any other space-faring nation – 
from seeking to control or claim areas of space or 
celestial bodies through use or occupation.  Outer 
space was an arena for state competition during 
the Cold War, but as a result of the negotiation of 
the OST it was not an arena without boundaries or 
rules. 
7 OST, Art. IV. The treaty does not preclude the transit 
of these types of weapons – or any weapons – through 
outer space.  
8 Ibid. 
9 OST, Preamble. 
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The collapse of the Soviet Union ushered in the 
second space age.  The United States and the 
Soviet Union’s successor, the Russian Federation, 
remained the world’s two most significant space 
powers, but a number of areas formerly marked 
by hostile competition were replaced by mutual 
cooperation.  Other technologically-advanced 
states, whose space initiatives often operated in 
the shadow of the massive American and Russian 
space programs during the Cold War, became 
increasingly important independent players in 
outer space.  With space increasingly recognized 
as a critical domain for civil, commercial, and 
military operations, several states began devoting 
serious resources to the development of military 
space programs.  Even as advanced militaries 
began using space for communications, 
surveillance, and other tasks, the prospects of any 
kind of conflict involving attacks upon (or from) 
assets, operations, or platforms in outer space 
appeared increasingly remote.  Although there 
was little progress on building upon the 
foundation laid by the OST, and no successful 
multilateral initiatives were completed on space 
arms control, there were no major areas of 
disagreement between major space-faring states in 
regard to the state use of space. 
China’s successful test in January 2007 of an anti-
satellite weapon, resulting in the destruction of a 
defunct Chinese satellite by a ground-based 
missile, marked the end of an era characterized by 
a lack of friction between space-faring nations and 
a general acceptance of norms governing the 
common use of space.  The destruction of the 
satellite, and the creation of a hazardous debris 
field, confirmed the relative safety and security of 
the second space age was a thing of the past.10  
The third space age features a number of serious 
10 China is the third state to test an anti-satellite system 
in outer space.  The United States and Soviet Union 
conducted anti-satellite tests in space during the Cold 
War. U.S. Congress Office of Technology Assessment, 
“Anti-Satellite Weapons, Countermeasures, and Arms 
Control,” report, October 1985, pp. 5-7; Hunter, Maj. 
Roger C. “A US ASAT Policy for a Multipolar 
World,” Air University thesis, 1992, pp. 21-22 and 
Grier, Peter “The Flying Tomato Can,” AirForce-
Magazine.com, February 2009, http://www.airforce-
magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2009/February
%202009/0209tomato.aspx 
threats to the sustainable use of space.  The 2011 
U.S. National Security Space Strategy describes 
three major challenges to the free and open state 
use of space, stating space is increasingly 
contested, competitive, and congested 
(sometimes referred to as the 3 C’s). 11  Described 
in further detail below, the 3 C’s together 
encompass a range of pressing threats to the U.S. 
ability to maintain space primacy, and, more 
broadly, to the ability of all states to safely operate 
within the outer space domain.  U.S. support for 
future space arms control agreements will depend 
heavily on how these accords propose to tackle 
the 3 C’s. 
In the third space age, outer space increasingly 
represents a contested domain where the free 
operation of national assets cannot be assumed.  
Potential adversaries in future conflicts may 
attempt to challenge or even overturn U.S. space 
superiority by attacking U.S. civilian or military 
space systems.  Multiple states (including Iran and 
North Korea) have already carried disputes or 
conflicts into the space arena, covertly employing 
means to blind the satellites of opposing states and 
disrupt the information they transmit.12  Russia, 
China, and India openly profess an interest in 
developing anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon systems, 
arguing they must field these weapons because 
future conflicts are likely to include military 
attacks physically destroying state assets in outer 
space. 
The third space age is also characterized by the 
proliferation of outer space actors beyond 
technically-advanced states.  For example, more 
than fifty nations now have a presence in space.13   
Several states can now design and build, with 
little or no assistance from the traditional major 
space powers, satellites or space launch vehicles.  
International interest in space has spurred the 
11 Director of National Intelligence, National Security 
Space Strategy, 2011, p. 1.  
12 Ferster, Warren and Colin Clark, “NRO Confirm 
Chinese Laser Test Illuminated U.S. Spacecraft,” 
Space News, October 3, 2006; Butler, Robert, 
“Statement … Before the House Armed Services 
Committee Strategic Forces Subcommittee,” April 21, 
2010, p. 3, and; “N. Korea Stops Sending Out Jamming 
Signals to S. Korea: Source,” Korea Herald, May 15, 
2012. 
13 "First time in History". The Satellite Encyclopedia.   
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growth of an international space industry, to 
include the marketing of launch capabilities. 
Globally, there are now twenty-two launch sites 
operated by eleven different countries.14  The 
recent successful launch, voyage to the 
International Space Station (ISS), and return to 
Earth of the SpaceX Dragon spacecraft also 
underlines the fact that corporations are 
increasingly important and independent actors in 
outer space, developing and fielding capabilities 
that were once the exclusive preserve of states.  
Whether measured in terms of state activities in 
outer space, the market for space assets and 
operations, or interest in exploiting the resources 
of outer space, space is a far more competitive 
environment in the 21st century. 
The third space age has also observed the 
“shrinking” of outer space, once considered so 
vast that no number of space missions or space 
actors could possibly impede the ability of future 
generations to use and explore space.  While the 
cosmos remain infinitely large, there is a growing 
realization that those parts of outer space most 
critical to state use are increasingly – and 
dangerously – congested.  At present there are 
over 1,100 active systems in orbit and an 
additional 21,000 pieces of debris littering the 
skies.  The 2007 Chinese ASAT test, for example, 
generated an estimated 3,500 pieces of space 
debris.15  The area of space near Earth is now so 
cluttered with debris that accidental collisions, 
such as the 2009 collision between the defunct 
Russian satellite Cosmos 2251 and the U.S. 
commercial communications satellite Iridium 33, 
are increasingly likely.16  This condition could put 
certain orbital planes in jeopardy of becoming 
unusable for decades. Congestion will only 
increase in the future as more consortia, states, 
non-state actors, and commercial providers launch 




15 Wright, David, “Debris in Brief,” Physics Today, 
October 2007, pp. 35-40. 
16 “Satellite Collision Leaves Significant Debris 
Clouds,” Orbital Debris Quarterly News, April 2009, 
pp. 1, 2.  
and operate space objects, particularly in low 
Earth orbit.17 
To date, the third space age has yet to see the 
major space powers reaching any significant 
consensus on how to address the common – but 
also complex – threats represented by the 3 C’s.  
As a result, whether this era will represent one of 
cooperation or competition remains to be seen.   
 
ASSESSING SPACE ARMS CONTROL 
PROPOSALS: A DRAFT FRAMEWORK 
Tackling the 3 C’s will likely require a range of 
creative solutions carried out by individual states 
and coalitions of space-faring states.  A number of 
state governments and non-governmental 
organizations argue that military competition in 
space, and the threat of a possible armed conflict 
either spilling into space or being fought in the 
domain itself, represent pressing issues either 
causing or contributing to space as a contested, 
competitive, and congested environment.  
Countries such as China and Russia believe the 
time is ripe for negotiating new space arms 
control agreements, asserting the limited 
prohibitions on weapons and military operations 
found in the OST are out-of-date and cannot 
address present military developments in outer 
space.   
As noted above, the U.S. government is prepared 
to consider space arms control proposals, but its 
support for any accord is conditional on the 
agreement: 1) meeting standards articulated by the 
2010 National Space Policy (NSP) – the proposal 
must be “equitable, effectively verifiable, and 
enhance the national security of the United States 
and its allies;” and 2) addressing the challenges 
(the 3 C’s) identified by the 2011 National 
Security Space Strategy (NSSS).  Using these 
concepts as initial building blocks, the authors 
developed an assessment framework of six 
questions for space arms control proposals 
presented in Figure 1 on page 20.  The authors 
17 If current trends in the use of space continue, and no 
solution is reached for removing space debris, the Air 
Force  assesses it may track upward of 60,000 
individual space objects by 2030. Shelton, General 
William L., Address, 27th annual National Space 
Symposium, April 11, 2011. 
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view this draft framework as a possible point of 
departure for developing more detailed analyses 
of the potential impact of proposed space arms 
control agreements on specific branches of the 
Armed Services. 
 
KEY SPACE-FARING STATE 
PERSPECTIVES ON THE MILITARY USE 
OF SPACE AND SPACE ARMS CONTROL 
Outside of the United States the most significant 
space-faring actors – in terms of systems, 
operations, and space research and development – 
are Russia, China, and the European Union 
(EU).18  They also represent key players in recent 
efforts to amend international space law, to 
include discussions regarding bans on space 
weapons and establishing new norms for the 
military use of space.  Russia and China’s joint 
proposal of a draft treaty to ban the 
“weaponization” of space, and the European 
Union’s proposal of a draft “Code of Conduct” for 
space-faring nations, represent two fundamentally 
different approaches to addressing several of the 
challenges embedded within the 3 C’s.  These 
differing approaches are strongly shaped by each 
actor’s space policies, programs, and views on the 
potential development of space weapons.       
 
Russia 
For many years Russia and the United States 
represented the two space superpowers.  Russia 
continues to play a central, albeit reduced, role in 
the outer space domain.  With the suspension of 
the U.S. space shuttle program, Russia is currently 
the only state capable of transporting human 
passengers to the ISS.  The Russian space 
program, however, currently faces a number of 
major structural challenges.  Six Russian space 
launches have failed over the last two years, 
destroying a number of costly satellites and other 
18 The United States and Russia, for example, possess 
over eighty percent of the world’s payloads in orbit.  
Watts, Barry D., “The Implications of China’s Military 
and Civil Space Programs,” CSBA Testimony, May 11, 
2011, p. 2. 
space hardware.19  Internal investigations and 
outside analysts have found the country’s space 
programs hobbled by graft and corruption.20  
Russia’s military space programs also appear to 
be in trouble, with Russian experts arguing the 
country’s space defenses are obsolete.  At a May 
2010 air and space event in Moscow, former 
Russian Air Force commander Anatoly Kornukov 
stated Russia’s military space programs were “25-
30 years” behind the United States, an opinion 
echoed by a number of prominent Russian non-
government military analysts.21   
In an effort to shore up Russia’s civil and military 
space programs, Russian President Vladimir Putin 
recently pledged approximately 150 billion rubles 
($4.6B USD) for the Russian 2012 space budget.22  
Moscow has also announced plans to launch one 
hundred military satellites over the next ten years 
to boost the Russian military’s global positioning, 
mapping, and missile detection capabilities.23 
Russia is reportedly working to develop anti-
satellite capabilities to match similar efforts by 
other nations.  Asked to comment on recent 
foreign ASAT tests, then-Deputy Defense 
Minister Vladamir Popovkin (now head of 
Roscosmos) told reporters in May 2009 “we can’t 
sit back and quietly watch others doing that; such 
work is [also] being conducted in Russia.”   
Popovkin did not, however, offer specific details 
about Russian research or testing of an ASAT 
weapon, or key components of such a weapon.24  
Russia developed a co-orbital ASAT during the 
Cold War and conducted several tests of the 
system in space, but declared a moratorium on 
19 Amos, Jonathan, “Phobos-Grunt,” BBC News, 
January 15, 2012. 
20 Flintoff, Corey, “For Russia’s Troubled Space 
Program, Mishaps Mount,” NPR, March 12, 2012 and 
“Russian Space Program Brought Down by 
Embezzlement,” RT.com, September 8, 2011. 
21 Razbakov, S. And Belogurov, I., “Russia's Space 
Defenses in Shambles,” RIA Novosti, May 13, 2010. 
22 “Putin Calls for Space Launch Development 
Strategy,” RIA Novosti, April 13, 2012. 
23 Zhitenev, A., “Russia to Launch 100 Military 
Satellites in Next Decade,” RIA Novosti, February 22, 
2012. 
24 “Russia Pursuing Anti-Satellite Capability,” Global 
Security Newswire, March 6, 2009. 
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testing in 1983.25  Moscow may have also 
investigated the use of lasers for ASAT 
applications.26  It is unclear if Popovkin’s 2009 
comments were referencing research based on 
long-dormant Cold War programs, more recent 
space and missile defense programs, or some 
other technology or platform.  Russia likely 
already fields systems capable of disrupting 
enemy satellites, to include jamming capabilities 
and “dazzling” lasers.27 
Some Russian officials believe their space 
systems have already faced direct foreign attacks.  
Following a failed February 2011 attempt to 
launch a military mapping satellite, news reports 
featured quotes from an unnamed Russian space 
official speculating a foreign power may have 
used an electromagnetic pulse to deliberately 
interfere with the rocket’s controls.28  In an 
interview after the November 2011 failure of a 
rocket intended to launch a satellite to the Martian 
moon of Phobos, Popovkin suggested deliberate 
interference from a foreign “device” might have 
caused the rocket to malfunction.29  
For decades, Russia has actively lobbied for a 
treaty prohibiting the deployment of “weapons” in 
space.  Since 2004, Russia has publicly stated it 
will not be the first state to deploy space weapons, 
and has strongly encouraged other nations to 
make the same pledge.30  In February 2008, China 
and Russia proposed the Treaty on the Prevention 
of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the 
Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space 
Objects (PPWT), a draft treaty whose stated intent 
is to prevent arms races and the use of force in 
outer space (further PPWT discussion begins on 
25 “Anti-Satellite Weapons, Countermeasures, and 
Arms Control,” pp. 5-7. 
26 Ibid. p. 6.  
27 Air University Space Primer, Chapter 18, Rest of 




28 “Russia Says Foreign Power May Have Caused Spy 
Satellite Loss,” AFP, February 14, 2011. 
29 Kramer, Andrew E. “Russian Official Suggests 
Weapons May Have Caused Spacecraft Failure,” New 
York Times, January 10, 2012.   
30 Loshchinin, Ambassador Valery, “Peaceful Uses of 
Outer Space,” Address, Geneva, November 11, 2010.  
page 13). In the event another state chooses to 
place weapons in space, however, Russia reserves 
the right to take whatever measures are necessary 
to protect its space assets.31   
Russia’s current position in favor of space arms 
control may reflect its concerns regarding the 
costs of attempting to match the military space 
capabilities of other states.  In addition, its 
willingness to consider a ban on space-based 
weapons and offensive operations in space may 
stem from its tests of ASAT systems, and studies 
of the potential consequences of a conflict in 
space, conducted during the Cold War.  Moscow’s 
decision in the 1980s to halt Soviet ASAT 
programs may have reflected a conclusion they 
lacked military utility.  Beyond the considerable 
fiscal and technical hurdles associated with ASAT 
development, Soviet scientists and strategists 
studying the results of their ASAT tests likely 
recognized any attack using these systems could 
generate large amounts of debris potentially 




China believes the development of space 
technology is critical to the country’s continued 
economic growth and future ability to compete 
with military powers such as the United States.32  
Beijing has devoted considerable resources in 
recent years to building up its space program.  
China does not make its space budget public, but 
one estimate by a U.S. non-government expert in 
late 2011 placed the figure at upwards of $5 
billion.33 A 2008 Congressional Research Service 
(CRS) overview of China’s space program noted 
its rapid development over the course of the 
preceding decade, to include fifty consecutive 
31 “Russia Issues Warning on Space-Based Weapons,” 
New York Times, September 27, 2007. 
32 Smith, Marcia S. “China’s Space Program,” 
Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report, 
October 18, 2005, and Watts, pp. 4-6.  
33 Hennigan, W.J. and Ralph Vartabedian, “Foreign 
Nations Push Into Space,” Los Angeles Times, July 22, 
2011.   
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successful space launches by the country’s “Long 
March” family of SLVs.34   
China is moving forward with a broad range of 
sophisticated satellite and rocket programs, to 
include significantly expanding its space-based 
ISR, navigation, and communications satellite 
constellations.35  China is scheduled to test its 
Long March-V SLV in 2014, a heavy-launch 
space platform with double the payload capacity 
of its current rocket fleet.36  It has also developed 
a robust manned space program.  China put its 
first taikonaut in space in 2003, and has started 
planning for a future manned mission to the 
moon.37  
China’s military space programs also appear to be 
making steady progress.  Efforts to match the 
United States and other advanced states in 
military space capabilities likely reflect the 
People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) strategic 
assessment of the critical importance of space 
assets to recent U.S. and coalition military 
operations.  At present Chinese strategists do not 
regard outer space as a distinct theater of 
conflict.38  They emphasize, however, the critical 
inclusion of space assets and operations in plans 
for all other domains, and advocate taking steps to 
disable, seize, or destroy enemy satellites in order 
to gain the upper hand on a technically-advanced 
adversary.39  The PLA is committed to 
establishing “space dominance” in future 
conflicts, with a particular focus on developing 
the capability to “sustain the uninterrupted 
operation of space information collection and 
34 Logan, Jeffrey, “China’s Space Program,” CRS 
Report, September 29, 2008, p. 1.  
35 Ibid, p. 7.  
36 Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Military 
and Security Developments Involving the People’s 
Republic of China, 2011, p.5 
37 Smith, Marcia, “China’s Space Program,” CRS 
Report, October 21, 2003 and Kluger, Jeffrey, “China’s 
Going to the Moon,” Time, January 4, 2012.   
38 OSD, Military and Security Developments, 2011, pp. 
23-24. 
39 OSD, Military and Security Developments, 2011, pp. 
23-24 and Pillsbury, Michael, “An Assessment of 
China’s Anti-Satellite and Space Warfare Programs, 
Policies, and Doctrines,” U.S.-China Economic and 
Security Review Commission report, pp. 10-12. 
transmission systems.”40  Establishing the 
necessary conditions for “space dominance” 
requires a range of space assets to coordinate 
different branches of the military, and the PLA 
has organized many of its space operations around 
the achievement of three key missions – 
observations/intelligence, navigation/positioning, 
and communications.41  
In addition to these enabling capabilities to boost 
the performance of its land, sea, and air forces, 
China has also invested in systems allowing it to 
carry future offensives into outer space itself.  
China is developing and fielding capabilities to 
jam, dazzle, and destroy satellites, to include both 
kinetic and directed-energy systems.42  On 
January 11, 2007, China destroyed a non-
operational Fengyun-1C weather satellite with a 
ground-based ballistic missile.43  Traveling at 
nearly 18,000 miles per hour, the missile 
functioned as a kinetic kill vehicle, striking and 
shattering the satellite.  According to a U.S. 
National Security Council official, the Chinese 
ASAT weapon was a medium-range ballistic 
missile that destroyed the satellite at an altitude of 
537 miles.44  An April 2003 Congressional 
Research Service report, citing a range of 
government and media sources, stated the missile 
was an SC-19 fired from a transporter-erector-
launcher operating near China’s Xichang Space 
Center.45  Launched without prior notification or 
warning, the test (which, as noted above, 
generated thousands of pieces of dangerous space 
debris), was immediately protested by the United 
States and a number of other space-faring 
nations.46  Although China has not conducted 
40 Cheng, Dean, “China’s Military Role in Space,” 
Strategic Studies Quarterly (Spring 2012): 68. 
41 Smith, Lt Col Steven, “Chinese Space Superiority?,” 
Air University paper, February 17, 2006, p. 3 
42OSD, Military and Security Developments, 2011, p. 
37. 
43 Covault, Craig “Chinese Test Anti-Satellite 
Weapon,” Aviation Week, January 17, 2007.  
44 Kaufman, Mark and Dayna Linzer, “China Criticized 
for Anti-Satellite Missile Test,” Washington Post, 
January 19, 2007.   
45 Kan, Shirley, “China’s Anti-Satellite Weapon Test,” 
CRS report, April 23, 2007, p. 1. 
46 China labeled the test an “experiment” and asserted 
the event did not change its official position against the 
“weaponization of space and an arms race in space.” 
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additional space tests of this ASAT weapon, it 
continues to improve this system and appears 
intent on including it as part of its arsenal.47  
While the Chinese military devotes resources to 
developing its space capabilities, Chinese 
diplomats call for an international agreement to 
ban the deployment of weapons in space.  China 
joined Russia in 2008 in proposing the PPWT, 
and continues to advocate for its ratification.  In a 
government-issued white paper released in 2011, 
China reaffirmed its commitment to the 
prevention of space weaponization, stating: 
The Chinese government has advocated from 
the outset the peaceful use of outer space, and 
opposes any weaponization of outer space and 
any arms race in outer space.  China believes 
that the best way for the international 
community to prevent any weaponization of 
an arms race in outer space is to negotiate and 
conclude a relevant international legally-
binding instrument.48 
China is working assiduously to match – and in 
regard to its development of ASAT weapons, 
counter – the current military space capabilities of 
technologically-advanced states.  Beijing’s 
interest in space arms control may reflect its 
concern the United States and other countries 
could remain ahead of China with next-generation 
military space systems, forcing the expenditure of 
considerable resources in order to keep up.  As 
such, China may view space arms control as a 
means to put a “ceiling” on global military space 
capabilities and prohibit capabilities currently 
beyond China’s reach, while continuing to allow 
China to pursue parity in military space 
technologies – and, with the development of 
ground-based ASAT weapons, perhaps even gain 
a strategic edge.  
 
Kahn, Joseph, “China Confirms Anti-Satellite Test,” 
International Herald Tribune, January 23, 2007.   
47 OSD, Military and Security Developments, 2011, p. 
37. 
48 White Paper on Arms Control and Disarmament, 
China’s National Defense in 2010, March 31, 2011. 
European Union 
The European Union (EU) has increasingly sought 
to advance European space interests through 
harmonizing the space policies and programs of 
its twenty-seven member states.  European states 
have long recognized no single space-faring 
nation in Europe can compete with the range of 
space programs fielded by countries such as the 
United States, Russia, or, in the 21st century, 
China.  In recent years, however, concerns that 
Europe may be falling behind in space prompted 
EU member states to consider taking steps to 
more closely align their national space policies, 
strategies, and decision-making.  In 2007 the EU’s 
Council (the EU’s guiding political body of 
member heads of state or government) jointly 
drafted a “Resolution on the European Space 
Policy” with the European Space Agency (ESA).  
The European Space Policy provides a common 
space policy framework and roadmap for the ESA, 
EU, and EU member states, coordinating their 
efforts to ensure Europe can “stay a major player 
[internationally], solve global problems and 
improve quality of life.” 49  
Significantly, the European Space Policy also 
called for the EU to consider how to pursue civil-
military “synergies” in space.50  The language 
represented an important change from earlier 
European efforts to coordinate space activities, 
which did not involve national military space 
programs and were often deliberately focused on 
non-military applications.51  The European Space 
Policy was followed in July 2008 by the passage 
of a European Parliament resolution titled “Space 
and Security” calling for EU states to work 
together to develop a range of space programs 
focused on addressing current and future security 
needs, to include developing satellite capabilities 
for navigation, reconnaissance, surveillance, and 
49 Dordain, Jean-Jacques and the European 
Commission, Resolution on the European Space 
Policy, May 22, 2007, p. 9. 
50 Ibid., p. 11. 
51 The ESA’s mandate, for example, expressly limits 
cooperation between its members’ space programs to 
“exclusively peaceful purposes.” Article II, Convention 
of Establishment of a European Space Agency, SP-
1271(E), 2003. 
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missile warning.52  Even as the Parliament called 
for the EU to forge “a common approach … for 
defending European interests in space,” however, 
it also cautioned that the organization must 
simultaneously avoid taking any steps that might 
“contribute to the overall militarisation and 
weaponisation of space.”53   
Given these caveats, the EU’s Galileo satellite 
program may represent a model for the future 
pursuit of space capabilities meeting the political, 
policy, and strategy needs of an organization 
whose twenty-seven member states have widely 
varying national space and military capabilities.54  
Once Galileo is complete (currently two of the 
system’s four satellites are in orbit) it will provide 
the EU with satellite navigation/positioning 
capability similar to the U.S. Global Positioning 
System (GPS).  As with GPS, Galileo will provide 
a capability with a host of potential civilian and 
military applications.  The EU has decided the 
Galileo constellation of satellites represent 
“civilian systems under civilian control” but has 
also provided policy and institutional mechanisms 
to allow member state militaries to access and 
leverage the information provided by the system’s 
satellites.55  This approach of developing a system 
that is civilian controlled but also provides vital 
capabilities to the militaries of EU member states 
may represent the organization’s long-term 
approach for equipping Europe with the means to 
address a range of space defense challenges 
through civilian/military partnerships.   
The EU voices strong support for new multilateral 
initiatives to ensure space remains a domain free 
of armed conflict.  The organization, however, has 
taken a different approach from Russia and China 
in attempting to address the potential security 
challenges and risks associated with the increasing 
use of – and competition over – outer space by 
52 European Parliament, “Space and Security,” 
resolution, July 10, 2008, 2008/2030(INI) 
53 Ibid. 
54 Silvestri, Stefano, “Space and Security Policy in 
Europe,” EU Institute for National Security Studies, 
Occasional Paper no. 48, December 2003, pp. 5, 12-13 
and Pasco, Xavier, “A European Approach to Space 
Security,” AAAS Reconsidering Rules of Space Paper 
Series, pp. 12-14. 
55 Dordain and the European Commission, p. 11 and 
Pasco, “A European Approach,” pp. 12-14. 
state militaries.  Rather than propose a legally-
binding space arms control treaty, the EU believes 
the first step toward addressing the security 
challenges currently facing space-faring states is 
the establishment of additional “rules of the road” 
for state conduct in outer space that build on the 
principles of the OST.  As discussed on page 15, 
the EU’s Draft Code of Conduct for Outer Space 
Activities (EU CoC) suggests the best means for 
preventing provocative military actions in space is 
to embed guidelines and restrictions on the 
national military use of space within a broader 
framework that covers all state activities in outer 
space.   
 
EVALUATING THE PPWT AND EU CoC 
The United States has stated its official opposition 
to the PPWT and the EU CoC.  U.S. officials have 
described the PPWT as “fundamentally flawed.”56 
The United States has consistently opposed the 
draft treaty at the UN Conference on 
Disarmament (CD) since its introduction by 
Russia and China in 2008.  The United States has 
also rejected the EU CoC, stating in January 2012 
that the text was “too restrictive.”57 The United 
States, however, did not reject the EU CoC in its 
entirety, viewing the draft accord as a “good 
foundation” for a future agreement.58  At the time 
of this writing, the United States, European Union, 
and other states are currently engaged in 
discussions regarding the development of an 
“International Code of Conduct” based on the EU 
text. 
A thorough assessment and understanding of both 
proposals is important for national security 
practitioners, analysts, and scholars.  The PPWT 
and EU CoC represent two poles bounding a 
range of proposals aimed at regulating the state 
and military use of outer space.  The former is a 
legally-binding treaty attempting to ban weapons 
and the “use of force” in space; the latter is a 
56 Kennedy, Ambassador Laura, Statement, UN 
Conference on Disarmament, February 8, 2011. 
57 Herb, Jeremy, “U.S. Won’t Sign EU Space Treaty,” 
The Hill, January 12, 2012. 
58 Rose, Frank, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State 
Address, 15th Annual FAA Commercial Space 
Transportation Conference, February 16, 2012. 
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politically-binding agreement that seeks to 
articulate normative standards for state conduct 
that will prevent actions or practices precipitating 
conflicts in outer space.  As such, understanding 
the theoretical underpinnings and potential impact 
of these two agreements can provide valuable 
insights into broader efforts to apply arms control 
measures to outer space or otherwise regulate the 
military use of this strategic domain.  In addition, 
evaluating the shortcomings of the PPWT and EU 
CoC can underscore the importance of existing 
U.S. Government (USG) and U.S. Armed 
Services’ significant concerns in the area of space 
arms control, while also potentially raising new 
issues and questions that may prove valuable in 
future reviews of proposed agreements.  
 
PPWT 
In February 2008 China and Russia tabled a draft 
treaty at the United Nations CD titled the Treaty 
on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in 
Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against 
Outer Space Objects (PPWT).59  The PPWT grew 
out of longstanding efforts by several states at the 
UN General Assembly to pass resolutions banning 
weapons from space, often under the title 
“Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space” 
(PAROS).  The United States has consistently 
opposed PAROS resolutions in their various 
iterations and, as noted above, has also stated its 
firm opposition to the PPWT.60  
PPWT represents the most significant draft accord 
on weapons in outer space currently under 
consideration within international negotiating 
59 Loschinin, Ambassador Valery and Ambassador 
Wang Qun, letter, February 12, 2008, CD/1839.   This 
official letter to the CD presented the Russian and 
Chinese delegation’s draft text of the treaty (hereafter 
referred to as PPWT).  
60 In August 2008 the U.S. delegation to the CD 
provided a detailed analysis of U.S. concerns regarding 
the PPWT to other CD members.  Rocca, Ambassador 
Christina B., CD/1847, August 26, 2008, pp. 3-4.  U.S. 
officials have stated in subsequent CD sessions that 
this analysis continues to represent the USG’s views on 
the PPWT.  United States Mission to the UN and Other 
International Organizations, “Press Conference: 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Frank A. Rose,” 
July 13, 2010.    
forums.  The stated intention of the PPWT is to 
prevent states from deploying weapons in outer 
space and ensure space remains a peaceful domain 
free from the use of force.  The proposed treaty’s 
major provisions include: 
• Proposing the first international legal 
definition of the terms “weapon in outer 
space,” “use of force” in outer space, and 
“threat of force” in outer space61 
• Prohibiting the placement of weapons in outer 
space62 
• Prohibiting the threat or use of force against 
outer space objects63 
Analysis of the key provisions of the PPWT raises 
a number of issues and questions for the United 
States and, indeed, any space-faring nation whose 
military has interests or involvement in outer 
space.   
The PPWT and the 3 C’s: The PPWT purports 
to address concerns that space, as an increasingly 
contested domain, will someday become a 
battleground, with space-faring nations deploying 
and using weapons in outer space.  Article VIII of 
the PPWT calls for the formation of an “executive 
organization” to address a range of issues related 
to implementation of, and compliance with, the 
treaty.  The executive organization’s 
responsibilities would include adjudication of 
disputes and addressing charges of 
noncompliance.64  The structure and authority of 
the executive organization, however, is left for 
negotiation within a separate protocol.  Neither 
the exact nature of the organization or its 
adjudication processes are specified; the PPWT 
does not discuss, for example, whether the 
executive organization would refer treaty 
enforcement issues pertaining to international 
peace and security to the UN Security Council.  In 
the event of serious breaches, the executive 
organization can “take steps to put an end to the 
61 PPWT, Art I (c). 
62 PPWT, Art II. 
63 Ibid. 
64 PPWT’s Article VII states that when a dispute arises 
between States Parties, the parties should attempt to 
resolve disputes through consultations. If there is no 
resolution, the situation may be referred to the 
executive organization.  Article VIII discusses the 
executive organization. 
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violation”, but what these steps might entail is not 
specified.65  The lack of description in regard to 
the executive organization also raises questions as 
to whether it is a permanent entity staffed by 
international civil servants (similar to the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization) or 
a joint commission bringing together diplomats 
and officials from participating states to address 
treaty matters (such as New START’s Bilateral 
Consultative Commission).  With little offered in 
the text regarding the form and function of the 
executive organization, it is unclear what mandate 
– if any – it would have for investigating treaty 
violations or sanctioning member states failing to 
comply (or deliberately violating) key provisions 
of the treaty.66   
The draft PPWT thus provides no clear recourse 
for States Parties complying with its standards 
who discover a second State Party placing objects 
that are weapons – or, importantly, could be 
weapons – into orbit.  Past experience with other 
arms control accords underscores the critical 
importance of providing a forum and process for 
addressing “suspect” objects that may fall under 
the restrictions of a treaty.  Given that the 
introduction of even one “space weapon” into a 
space domain currently free of any weapons 
systems would represent an extremely 
destabilizing event, the PPWT’s failure to provide 
clear mechanisms or processes for adjudicating 
questions of compliance, disputes regarding 
potential violations, or for sanctioning violators, 
represents a major flaw within the draft treaty.  
The PPWT’s stated intent of addressing the 
particulars of the executive organization within an 
additional protocol to be negotiated at a later date 
is not an acceptable solution to this problem.  
Electing to leave an essential requirement of 
effective treaties to later negotiations will leave 
PPWT signatories with fundamental doubts about 
future implementation, and unanswered questions 
regarding whether the treaty ultimately serves 
their national interests.  Furthermore, the history 
of treaty negotiations reveals that significant 
issues left unfinished at major negotiating rounds 
or within principal drafting sessions prove 
65 PPWT Article VIII 
66 Rocca, CD/1847, pp. 3-4.   
difficult to impossible to resolve in later 
consultations.     
Overall, the PPWT does little to change the 
assessments or incentives that might lead states to 
consider developing weapons – particularly 
ground-based weapons with space applications – 
or compete to develop offensive space systems.  
The PPWT is a flawed draft treaty that fails to 
clearly incentivize compliance or protect states 
acting in good faith from potential treaty violators.  
It does not address the challenges posed by outer 
space representing an increasingly contested and 
competitive environment. 
Impact on U.S. Military Space Assets, 
Operations, or Strategies:  The PPWT seeks to 
ban the placement of weapons in space, with 
Article 1(c) advancing the following definition of 
“weapon in outer space”: 
Any device placed in outer space, based on 
any physical principle, which has been 
specially produced or converted to destroy, 
damage or disrupt the normal functioning of 
objects in outer space, on the Earth or in the 
Earth’s atmosphere, or to eliminate a 
population or components of the biosphere 
which are important to human existence or 
inflict damage on them. 
This definition, however, is not accompanied by 
any means to inspect or verify that a space object 
is (or is not) a “weapon.” As the properties of 
weapons and the effects of weapons purportedly 
covered by the treaty are extremely wide-ranging, 
States Parties could attempt to claim that a broad 
variety of non-kinetic military space systems 
would either be captured under this definition, or 
should at the very least be subject to some form of 
negotiation to prove that they were not covered by 
the treaty.  The treaty’s lack of clarity could lead 
states to argue that U.S. space systems such as 
GPS satellites are “weapons,” because they are 
“devices placed in outer space” that are integral to 
guiding a range of land- and sea-based weapons to 
their targets (as the definition includes destruction 
of targets both in space and “on Earth”).  
Furthermore, the treaty completely fails to make 
any provision for ground-based weapons that can 
destroy objects in space.  The PPWT would not,                                                           
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for example, limit or ban the Chinese medium-
range ballistic missile ASAT.67   
Another problem with the PPWT’s definition of 
“weapon” is that it makes no distinction between 
offensive and defensive systems.  While the 
PPWT’s Article V acknowledges a State’s 
inherent right to individual or collective self-
defense, this language appears to be in tension 
with its Article II prohibition against the use of 
force in space.  The draft treaty fails to address 
what actions a state is permitted to take, or what 
systems it is permitted to deploy (if any), to face a 
threat from an adversary’s space systems.68 
In general, the experience of U.S. negotiators of 
arms control accords, and of delegations 
addressing questions of treaty compliance, 
demonstrates that treaty definitions of weapons or 
other military objects should be written in specific 
language that accurately defines the intended 
system(s) and clearly separates these systems 
from other objects.  The treaty’s vague definition 
of “weapon” does not meet either standard, and 
may provide a means by which other states could 
question, criticize, and even attempt to ban many 
U.S. military space systems. 
Equitable, Verifiable, and in the Best Interests 
of the United States?:  The PPWT fails each of 
the three tests provided by the 2010 NSP: it is not 
equitable, it is not verifiable, and it is not in the 
best interests of the United States.  The draft 
treaty is not equitable, giving a free hand to states 
wishing to project power into space using ground-
based systems, while potentially prohibiting the 
deployment of defensive systems – whether for 
land or space-based missions – in space.  It thus 
favors a particular force posture and force 
structure for states interested in controlling or 
denying access to outer space.  PPWT recognizes 
the importance of establishing an executive 
organization to address disputes that arise under 
the treaty, but fails to include vital implementation 
language necessary to create a body that could 
play a critical role in ensuring the fair application 
of treaty provisions to all participating parties.  
67 Kennedy, Ambassador Laura, Statement, UN 
Conference on Disarmament, February 8, 2011. 
68 Rocca, CD/1847, pp. 3-4. 
The PPWT is also inherently unverifiable.  
Although the PPWT’s text suggests States Parties 
could negotiate an additional protocol addressing 
verification and compliance issues, the treaty 
itself has no verification regime, only calling for 
participating states to engage in voluntary 
confidence building measures.69  The PPWT does 
not provide a mechanism for authenticating the 
technical aspects of space systems to determine 
compliance with the treaty, leaving unanswered 
how signatories could “prove” to other states that 
equipment onboard objects such as satellites 
would not, or could not, be used as a weapon. 
Overall, as detailed in Figure 2 on page 21, 
accession to the PPWT is not in the best interests 
of the United States.  The United States, for 
example, would probably interpret a term such as 
“space weapon” within a space arms control 
agreement more narrowly than many other states.  
If the United States acceded to the PPWT, it 
would likely face repeated accusations of treaty 
violations for allegedly fielding and/or developing 
space-based weapons.   Moreover, the treaty is 
flawed in its apparent focus on space-based 
weapons – a type of weapon that remains confined 
to the realm of science fiction.  As a result, it fails 
to address ground-based systems, such as the 
ASAT capabilities currently under development 
by states like China and India, which appear more 
likely to either precipitate a regional or 
international arms race in weapons with space 
applications or be used in a potential future 
conflict in space. 
 
European Union Code of Conduct for Outer 
Space Activities 
In December 2008, the Council of the European 
Union officially released its Draft Code of 
Conduct (EU CoC) for Outer Space Activities.70  
Following a series of EU deliberations, the 
organization released a revised draft in October 
2010, using this second text in its consultations 
with third-party states.71  In creating the EU CoC, 
69 PPWT, art VI. 
70 Council of the European Union, “European Union 
Draft Code of Conduct,” December 17, 2008.   
71 Council of the European Union, “Revised Draft 
Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities,” October 
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the EU had two goals: 1) to strengthen existing 
UN space treaties and agreements; and 2) to 
complement these agreements by codifying best 
practices for state use of outer space.  The 
politically binding agreement seeks to “strengthen 
the safety, security and predictability of all space 
activities” by promoting norms of responsible 
conduct across the entire community of space-
faring nations.  The EU CoC also promotes means 
and mechanisms for improving communication 
and encouraging transparency within this 
community.  In an attempt to build on key 
principles of space law found in the OST and 
provide more detailed “rules of the road” for state 
activities in outer space, the EU CoC includes 
provisions requesting Subscribing States: 
• “Refrain” from “intentional” actions that 
damage or destroy outer space objects72 
• “Take reasonable measures” to prevent 
collisions in space73 
• Commit to not taking actions causing long-
lived debris74 
• Commit to a wide range of notifications 
regarding state activities in space75 
• Commit to sharing national space policies and 
procedures76 
The EU CoC is not an arms control treaty; it does 
not attempt to balance the space military systems 
of states, nor does it feature provisions expressly 
limiting or banning either the placement or use of 
armaments in space.  In articulating a “set of best 
practices aimed at ensuring security in outer space 
[that] could become a useful complement to 
international space law,”77 however, it attempts to 
provide a framework providing guidelines for 
national security activities in space, to include the 
military use of space. 
The 3 C’s: The EU CoC proposes to address the 
challenge of space representing an increasingly 
11, 2010.  This article’s citations to the Code refer to 
the October 2010 revised text. 
72 EU CoC, Article II, Section 4.2. 
73 EU CoC, Article II, Section 4.3. 
74 EU CoC, Article II, Section 5. 
75 EU CoC, Article III, Section 6. 
76 EU CoC, Article VIII, Section 8.1. 
77 EU CoC, Preamble. 
contested environment by promoting norms of 
behavior that will preempt or reduce potential 
sources of friction between space-faring states.  It 
does not provide means to encourage compliance 
with its suggested “rules” or sanction violators, 
preferring to promote dialogue to address 
disagreements.  A potential weakness of the EU 
CoC is that all states that subscribe to its 
principles “resolve … to take all appropriate 
measures to prevent outer space from becoming 
an area of conflict.”78  The vagueness of this 
clause – found within the EU CoC’s “General 
Principles”– is a double-edged sword.  On the one 
hand, the statement correctly recognizes the 
importance of states considering whether planned 
activities in outer space might be perceived as 
destabilizing or provocative by other space-faring 
nations.  But the statement is so broad (using 
“conflict” rather than “armed conflict”, for 
example) that any state agreeing to abide by the 
EU CoC could be open to criticism for any level 
of military involvement in space.  Some states, for 
example, might argue that outer space will only be 
a peaceful domain if it is “demilitarized” – that is, 
free of military systems of any kind – and that the 
placement of any military asset in space, even if 
its only role is communications or surveillance, is 
a potential catalyst for turning space into an “area 
of conflict.”   
A related issue is the EU CoC’s choice of words 
within a clause asking subscribing states to 
commit to follow-on discussions regarding 
“security guarantees,” to include measures for the 
“prevention of an arms race in outer space.”79 The 
choice of language in the latter clause is similar to 
that employed by PAROS initiatives proposed at 
the United Nations that the United States regularly 
opposes, and its lack of definition again opens a 
potential avenue for U.S. military space assets and 
operations to come under criticism.  One state’s 
legitimate efforts to stay a step ahead of potential 
adversaries in military space capabilities – even if 
these capabilities do not include placing offensive 
78 EU CoC, Article I, Section 2. 
79 EU CoC, Article II, Section 4.5. 
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weapons systems in orbit – may in the eyes of 
other states represent a dangerous desire to launch 
an “arms race” in the cosmos. 
The EU CoC clearly recognizes the inherent right 
to self-defense with the UN Charter, and its 
voluntary nature would not preclude the United 
States or any space-faring state from taking the 
actions in space it deemed necessary to defend 
itself from aggression.  The discussion of the 
clauses above, however, points to the current 
tension between space-faring states over what 
represents acceptable actions to undertake in 
space in promotion of national defense objectives.  
The EU CoC recognizes that this tension – and 
lack of consensus – is a problem, but it arguably 
fails to communicate a concept of what actions in 
terms of militaries or armaments are destabilizing 
or dangerous because of the threat they pose to 
space as a domain free and open to all states.  
Communicating this concept would not be a 
simple task, but it could create a point of 
departure for discussing possible norms regarding 
the military use of space.  Including a discussion 
or understanding of the role of armaments, or 
more broadly, state militaries, in stabilizing (or 
destabilizing) the outer space environment within 
the text could lead to an agreement better 
equipped to address outer space as an increasingly 
contested environment.  
The EU CoC is on firmer ground with its attempt 
to address the “congested” dimensions of the 3 
C’s challenge.  The problem of space debris is 
addressed in a number of ways by the EU CoC, 
which asks Subscribing States to commit to 
sharing information on debris-mitigating policies 
and procedures, and refrain from actions likely to 
generate debris.  The Code frames actions 
destroying space objects as only acceptable in the 
context of national security or attempting to 
reduce debris.80  If short on specifics, the EU 
CoC’s effort to address space debris as a multi-
dimensional problem requiring information-
sharing and the establishment of a norm that 
would prevent states from carrying out actions 
such as China’s 2007 ASAT test likely represents 
an approach that can be built on during the 
drafting of an International CoC.    
80 EU CoC, Art. II, Sec. 4.2. 
Impact on U.S. Military Space Assets, 
Operations, or Strategies:  The EU CoC does 
not expressly limit or ban any military space 
systems or operations.  The discussion regarding 
its attempt to address outer space as a contested 
environment, however, is relevant to U.S. military 
space operations.  If the United States signed the 
EU CoC, it would need to internally address (and 
probably externally, in terms of responding to 
questions from other Subscribing States) the 
following questions, whose answers might impact 
its own conduct of space operations: 
• What actions lead to space “becoming an area 
of conflict”?81 
• What actions represent “harmful interference 
in outer space activities”?82  
• What actions enhance (or detract) from space 
security?83 
• Under what circumstances is it acceptable to 
destroy an outer space object?84 
The United States is a responsible state actor in 
outer space, and its military space assets, 
operations, and strategies are both vital to the 
country’s national defense and critical to 
international stability – on Earth and in outer 
space.  This set of questions, directly linked to 
clauses within the EU CoC, brings forward 
important issues regarding the military use of 
space that are increasingly important for all space-
faring states to address and answer.  Given the EU 
CoC’s politically binding nature, and the fact that 
United States’ military operations in space adhere 
to both international space law and the law of war, 
a legal review of the EU CoC and any given U.S. 
military space operation would likely conclude 
that the action in question would be entirely 
compliant with the space security provisions of 
the Code.  Nevertheless, similar to the PPWT, if 
the United States were to sign on to the EU CoC it 
would need to prepare to address a range of 
questions and demarches on the issues highlighted 
above; as the world’s largest space power, the 
United States would likely field both in the event 
it signed on to the EU CoC.   
81 EU CoC, Art. I, Sec. 2. 
82 Ibid. 
83 EU CoC, Art. II, Sec. 4.5. 
84 EU CoC, Art. II, Sec. 4.2. 
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The EU CoC’s provisions regarding exchanges of 
information might have an impact on U.S. 
military space operations.  The EU CoC seeks to 
cover “all outer space activities conducted by a 
Subscribing State”, calls for information to be 
exchanged on activities “relevant for the purposes 
of the Code”, and includes a broad range of 
examples of the types of activities that should 
generate notifications to other participating 
states.85  This could lead to the interpretation that 
essentially all state activities in space should 
result in some type of notification being sent to all 
of the Code’s Subscribing States.   
Although the form (and level of detail) of 
information to be exchanged is not specified, such 
an interpretation would raise issues for U.S. 
military space operations.  While the voluntary 
nature of the agreement would always allow the 
United States to opt out of sharing sensitive 
information on its military space activities, this is 
a much more broad-brush approach to 
transparency than that employed by arms control 
agreements the United States has negotiated in the 
past.  In general, the EU CoC’s discussion of 
information exchanges lacks clarity on a number 
of key points, including: when, where, and how 
information is exchanged; whether these 
exchanges are similar to, or more expansive than, 
information exchanged under other outer space 
accords (and if so, whether duplication is 
necessary); and what exceptions, if any, are 
allowed, or whether the Code intends states to 
exchange information on all activities aside from 
occasional exceptions citing reasons of “national 
interest” or “force majeure”.  
Equitable, Verifiable, and in the Best Interests 
of the United States?:   The EU CoC appears 
broadly equitable in regard to its treatment of 
space-faring states, although its stipulation that 
the agreement cover “all space activities” would 
place a larger reporting burden on major space 
powers.  Some foreign critics of the draft accord, 
however, have advanced arguments that the EU 
CoC is unfairly biased toward European practices 
and space programs.86   
85 EU CoC, Art I, Sec 2 and Art. III, Sec 6.  
86 Victoria Samson, “India and Space Security” May 9, 
2011; Rajagopalan, “The Space Code of Conduct 
The EU CoC did not attempt to establish a 
verification regime; Subscribing States would 
have to rely on national assets and whatever 
information other governments chose to share 
under the auspices of the agreement’s notification 
provisions to determine if participating states were 
complying with the Code.  The EU CoC also does 
not establish a formal body to adjudicate disputes 
over compliance, or resolve other questions 
related to the agreement, suggesting that 
Subscribing States engage in consultations to 
address these types of issues.87  Similar to the 
PPWT, this lack of an institutional mechanism 
(such as New START’s Bilateral Consultative 
Commission) for addressing questions of 
compliance or disputes between participating 
states is a potential weakness of the accord. 
As with all politically binding accords, the impact 
of an agreement like the EU CoC on the United 
States would vary depending on the diplomatic 
and political capital the USG wished to invest 
within it.  The EU CoC articulates and attempts to 
address the 3 C’s within a broad framework that 
seeks to add depth and fidelity to current 
international space law – law that, in many cases, 
was negotiated during a fundamentally different 
era for the state use of space.  As such, it 
represents an important effort to rally 
governments behind a common approach to 
address the 3 C’s as multilateral threats to all 
space-faring states.  It is important to note that the 
EU CoC draws principles from the United Nations 
Debris Mitigation Guidelines, adopted in 2008. 
These guidelines outline space debris mitigation 
measures for the planning, design, manufacture, 
and operational phases of spacecraft and launch 
vehicles, and call for limiting the long-term 
presence of spacecraft in low Earth orbit at the 
end of their useful life. The EU CoC falls short, 
however, in regard to its execution, as it identifies 
challenges and proposes cooperative approaches 
without clearly specifying what state actions are 
negative or destabilizing, or what recourse good 
actors have for dealing with actors that violate 
(whether willfully or unintentionally) its 
provisions. As shown in Figure 3 on page 21, the 
Debate,” Strategic Studies Quarterly (Spring 2012): 
142-145. 
87 EU CoC, Art. III, Sec. 9. 
                                                                                                                                                    
19 Space & Defense  
EU CoC promotes the safe use of space.  Since it 
is politically binding with no verification regime, 
it would have little direct impact on the current 
U.S. military space operations or damage U.S. 
national security interests in outer space. However, 
such a Code would do little to deter countries 
from pursuing weapons in space. 
 
SPACE ARMS CONTROL IN THE 21st 
CENTURY: A NEW HOPE OR LOST IN 
SPACE? 
The significant challenges faced by space-faring 
nations in the third space age are too large for any 
single state to fully address alone.  The future 
safety of space will likely require state 
governments, international organizations, and the 
private sector to collaborate in exchanging 
information, respecting established procedures 
regarding navigation, and, in some cases, 
discussing the possible development of new 
norms or rules to address an increasingly 
competitive, contested, and congested space 
environment.  These efforts must account for, and 
will impact, both the civilian and military use of 
space. 
U.S. policymakers confronted with the 3 C’s 
problem set have stated their interest in 
multilateral approaches, to include space arms 
control, to address the present reality that outer 
space is an area of military operations for multiple 
States and a possible theater of conflict in future 
wars.  Space arms control long remained dormant 
in large part due to a lack of space arms or 
weapons deployed in other environments 
possessing an ability to strike space assets.  
However, with China testing ASAT systems and 
states such as India signaling an interest in 
developing these capabilities, in the near future 
multiple actors may field weapons capable of 
threatening objects in space. All of these 
developments open the possibility that a State or 
States may propose a future space arms control 
treaty or an agreement addressing some aspect of 
the military use of space that is in the best 
interests of the United States. The authors agree 
with the assessment of U.S. policy makers that 
neither the PPWT nor EU CoC enhances U.S. 
national security.  Future progress in space arms 
control or confidence building measures (CBMs) 
will require an agreement that can balance the 
significant space security needs of states against 
the legitimate threat posed by weapons (whether 
based on Earth or in space) that can range space 
systems. 
In providing a draft framework for assessing the 
potential impact of space arms control proposals 
on the United States, the authors hope to shed 
light on several of the key military and strategic 
requirements that future arms control agreements 
or CBMs must address when attempting to resolve 
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Figure 1: Assessment Criteria for Space Treaties and Agreements 
Based on current USG guidance (e.g. 2010 NSP and 2011 NSSS), does the treaty or agreement 
under consideration … 
Freedom of 
Action 
preserve or enhance space as an open, free, and safe operating environment?  
• Maintaining space as a free domain for all states remains a core principle 




ensure the United States maintains access to space?  
• U.S. access to space requires reliable, responsive, and cost-effective 
launch capability; access to data from space systems; and access to the 
radio frequency spectrum. 
Transparency  
 
include acceptable transparency measures?  
• Transparency measures should apply equitably to all space-faring nations, 
should not create onerous reporting requirements, and should not include 
the exchange of information with the potential to compromise the 
operational security of U.S. space systems. 
Verification and 
Enforceability 
include means of verification and enforcement mechanisms?  
• Agreements should include means/mechanisms for adjudicating and 
resolving disputes, and for referring violators whose actions threaten 
international peace and security to the UN Security Council.   
Affordability impose (significant) monetary costs on the United States? 
• Given current resource constraints, the possible costs of implementing and 
complying with any agreement must be carefully considered by the USG. 
U.S. Military & 
Space  
negatively or positively impact U.S. military space assets, operations, or 
strategies? 
• The United States must have the freedom to design, build, launch, operate, 
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Figure 3: Assessment of the Draft European Union Space Code of Conduct (EU CoC) 
Freedom of 
Action 
The EU CoC would have little direct impact on current U.S. military space 
operations.  The draft has no definition of weapons and does not prohibit placing 
military systems in space.  
Access The EU CoC endorses the principle of free access, stating it seeks to protect “the 
freedom of access [to space] without interference.”881 
Transparency The EU CoC could marginally increase transparency regarding other state space 
programs depending on the type of information other governments elect to share.  
The information-sharing clauses, however, do not specify the level of detail of 
notifications exchanged under the Code.  Strict adherence with the EU CoC’s 
provisions on information sharing could raise issues regarding some military space 
operations. Much of the information requested by the EU CoC appears similar to 
information the United States exchanges due to other agreements. 
Verification and 
Enforceability 
The EU CoC does not have a verification regime.  Signatories can request 
consultations to discuss possible violations.  The United States would rely on 
existing capabilities to detect violations.  The EU CoC does not have an 
enforcement mechanism. 
Affordability Little additional costs associated with the code.  The United States is already 
meeting most EU CoC reporting and notification requirements through the OST. 
U.S. Military & 
Space  
The EU CoC would not damage U.S. national security interests in outer space or 
limit research and development of classified programs relating to outer space 
activities. It also includes a right to self-defense clause. 
88 EU CoC, Art. I, Sec. 2. 
 
 
Figure 2: Assessment of the PPWT 
Freedom of 
Action 
The PPWT is overly restrictive of U.S. freedom of action. The lack of clarity in the 
PPWT could force the United States into providing lengthy explanations and 
justifications for many of the space assets and operations of the Armed Forces.   
Access The PPWT’s ban on “weapons” in space could potentially complicate or preclude 
access to space by U.S civil and military platforms. 
 
Transparency The PPWT would not enhance transparency. Although it does encourage States’ 
Parties to implement transparency and confidence-building measures on a voluntary 
basis, these would be difficult to implement.   
Verification and 
Enforceability 
The current draft of the PPWT does not contain a verification regime.  The United 
States would be forced to rely on something like national technical means (NTM) to 
determine compliance.   
Affordability The PPWT does not appear to levy any new requirements in terms of costs.  
U.S. Military & 
Space  
Treaty terms are vague, complicating questions of compliance/noncompliance. 
Treaty fails to address what actions a state is permitted to take, or what systems it is 
permitted to deploy (if any), to face a threat from an adversary’s space systems. 
Other states could question, criticize, and even attempt to ban many U.S. military 
space systems. 
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Past U.S. Actions: 




This paper examines the boundaries of possible 
United States redlines in space.   A redline in 
space is a “marker” that when crossed would 
result in a military or strong diplomatic 
response—such as what might occur if a foreign 
actor temporarily or permanently interfered with 
any aspect of a U.S. space system. The United 
States has not published or possibly even defined 
its redlines in space—as recently noted during the 
2010 U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) 
Deterrence Symposium by the then Commander 
for STRATCOM’s Joint Functional Component 
Command (JFCC) for Space in reference to the 
Schriever 2010 Wargames.1  The CDR JFCC 
Space noted the difficulties in addressing 
questions such as “How does an adversary 
understand what our redlines are….?  Is jamming 
a satellite a redline?  Is destroying a satellite a 
redline?” and further commenting that “There was 
a lot of debate that there was no loss of life when 
we lose a satellite, so what does that mean in 
terms of how the national policy apparatus would 
respond….?”   
This paper attempts to define possible redlines by 
exploring public perception of U.S. investments 
and actions in space.  The methodology of 
exploring these points of focus is used for two 
reasons.  First, foreign actors’ military policies or 
decisions to disrupt or destroy U.S. space 
capabilities would almost certainly take into 
consideration how the United States may respond 
to their actions.  Foreign national counterspace 
strategies, if they exist, or foreign judgments of 
U.S. reactions are almost certainly not publicly 
available information.  Second, I would contend 
that the majority of U.S. adversaries that may be 
capable of disrupting or destroying a U.S. satellite 
rely on the abundance of publicly available 
1 “2010 Strategic Deterrence Symposium”, Panel 1 
discussion regarding the Schriever 10 Wargame,  4:50 
into video, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ooOwchbjezo.  
information discussing U.S. space policies, 
programs, capabilities, and mishaps to inform, if 
only partially, their decision-making calculus. 
In support of this methodology, this paper 
introduces three high-level themes and 
summarizes a likely perception that could be 
derived from each theme.  These summaries 
inform my assertion of what perceived U.S. 
redlines might look like to a foreign adversary that 
analyzes U.S. actions in space.  The first theme 
examines U.S. investments in space, our reactions 
to losses and delays of these capabilities, and our 
reactions to foreign disruptions of U.S. space 
capabilities.  This first theme attempts to provide 
some insight into how important space capabilities 
are to the United States and to scope what a U.S. 
reaction to losing a satellite may look like.  The 
second theme looks at perceived U.S. 
counterspace capabilities, our reaction to foreign 
counterspace capabilities, and U.S. views of 
orbital debris that can result from some 
counterspace capabilities.  This second theme 
provides some insight into what a foreign actor 
could interpret as what the U.S. views as 
acceptable norms of provocative actions in space.  
The last theme covers perceived U.S. space 
protection efforts, specifically examining U.S. 
space policy, protection priorities, and 
investments in attribution capabilities.  
Perceptions of U.S. space protection priorities 
could provide the most noteworthy insight into 
which satellites or space-enabled capabilities the 
United States considers most important, which if 
disrupted or destroyed may cross a U.S. redline in 
space. 
The majority of publicly available data providing 
insight into the three themes noted above cover 
relative peaceful periods of time.  A few data 
points were established during periods of crisis, 
and one example of counterspace capabilities used 
against the United States was during a time of war 
by a non-space faring nation.  Because of the 
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relatively small amount of data on U.S. reactions 
to foreign disruptions and the range of potential 
foreign actors that could disrupt or destroy U.S. 
space capabilities, I cannot make a confident 
argument with any fidelity about how a potential 
U.S. redline may change during a time of peace, 
crisis, or war.  Or, how the U.S. may react to a 
disruption in space capabilities by different 
countries, such as China, Iran, or North Korea.   
Therefore, my assertion of possible U.S. redlines 
in space could be used as a first reference for 
reaction during a scenario or a real loss of a U.S. 
space capabilities while the U.S. policy apparatus 
considers further dynamics such as our state-of-
relations with the offending foreign nation or their 
space or military capabilities.    
Finally, an important assertion for this research is 
that even though U.S. administrations have 
changed over the decades, and because our 
redlines are not stated, a foreign actor probably 
will view the totality of U.S. actions in and 
statements about space when analyzing how the 
United States may react to various situations such 
as the loss of its space capabilities or when 
engaging in space-related diplomatic exchanges.   
 
U.S. INVESTMENTS IN SPACE 
CAPABILITIES 
The United States has spent over one trillion 
dollars since the late 1950s on space-related issues, 
a staggering amount of money that has provided 
significant advantages to U.S. national security 
while benefiting the world economy, international 
relationships, and scientific research.2  Our 
interest and use of space has not gone unnoticed 
or uncopied.  Currently, there are over fifty 
nations and government consortia operating their 
own satellite capabilities.3  Having access to space 
capabilities has become more than a statement of 
national pride, it has evolved into a literal 
2 “The U.S. Government Space Budget by Paul 
Shawcross, October 14, 2008”, Office of Management 
and Budget. 




necessity; U.S. space investments provide some 
insight into U.S. redlines in space. 
According to a 2011 report by the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO), over the past two 
decades, the Department of Defense (DoD) “has 
had difficulties with nearly every space 
acquisition program, with years of cost and 
schedule growth, technical and design problems, 
and oversight and management weaknesses. 
However....DoD continues to make progress on 
several of its programs and is expecting to deliver 
significant advances in capability as a result.” 4  
Despite persistent issues with cost, schedule, and 
complexity lasting decades, the United States 
continues to lean forward in its space investments, 
and successive administrations continue to fund 
new space capabilities. 
One notable aspect of U.S. investments in space is 
the breadth and depth of different capabilities—
which far surpass the capabilities of all other 
counties—and how they have affected practically 
every part of the United States Government, its 
policy makers, and its citizens.  To say that space 
is very important to the United States is easily a 
true statement that has been reinforced over the 
years monetarily and emotionally, but the public 
interest has not been consistent.  When Apollo 1 
and the Challenger and Columbia Shuttles ended 
in failure, the United States mourned, and 
exhaustive investigations followed.  When Apollo 
13 suffered its failure in space, U.S. citizens 
watched on the edge of their seat.  One will be 
hard pressed to find such an equal reaction by the 
U.S. Government or its citizens when an 
unmanned satellite goes out of service that affects 
the whole country, such as the 1998 PanAmSat’s 
Galaxy IV communication satellite failure that 
affected millions of users but resulted in press 
reactions such as “inconvenience” and “some 
people rejoiced...others bemoaned”.5   
4 “SPACE ACQUISITIONS: DOD Delivering New 
Generations of Satellites, but Space System 
Acquisition Challenges Remain”, GAO-11-590T. 
5 “Satellite Trouble Cuts Out Pagers; Millions Lose 
Remote Contact”, Associated Press, 
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/SATELLITE+TROUB
LE+CUTS+OUT+PAGERS%3B+MILLIONS+LOSE
+REMOTE+CONTACT.-a083823092; “Out of Touch; 
Millions Feel Isolated by Pager Loss”,  Daily News, 
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Even though we relish our space capabilities, 
there may be certain satellites or space capabilities 
that the U.S. Government or its citizens might 
react to differently if lost or disrupted, and the 
public reaction to these failures may provide some 
insight into possible U.S. redlines in space.   
 
U.S. REACTIONS TO LOSSES AND 
DELAYS 
The U.S. Government has suffered a number of 
satellite losses since 1980, which did not appear to 
be reconstituted immediately.6  A core assumption 
is that these satellites would not have been 
planned and launched unless they were needed at 
some point in the near future.  These losses, 
mostly due to launch failures, have crossed all 
major capabilities.  The United States lost two 
missile early warning satellites, also known as 
Defense Support Program (DSP) satellites, which 
are vital to support our nuclear deterrence 
posture.7  The National Reconnaissance Office 
(NRO), generally perceived to launch the nation’s 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
(ISR) satellites, has had multiple launch failures 




6 For this research, I assumed a thirty year time span of 
U.S. satellite launches would be an appropriate 
duration for an adequate representation of U.S. losses 
in space. 
7 “US Still Probing Security Satellite Failure”, Reuters, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/01/06/us-
northrop-satellite-idUSTRE5055DW20090106; 
“DSP”, Encyclopedia Astronautica, 
http://www.astronautix.com/craft/dsp.htm. 
8 “NOSS-1”, Gunter’s Space Page, 
http://space.skyrocket.de/doc_sdat/noss-1.htm; “KH-
11”, Gunter’s Space Page, 
http://space.skyrocket.de/doc_sdat/kh-11.htm; “KH-9”, 
Gunter’s Space Page, 
http://space.skyrocket.de/doc_sdat/kh-9.htm; “Chalet”, 
Gunter’s Space Page, 
http://space.skyrocket.de/doc_sdat/chalet.htm; 
“SLDCOM”, Gunter’s Space Page, 
http://space.skyrocket.de/doc_sdat/sldcom.htm; 
“Mercury”, Gunter’s Space Page, 
http://space.skyrocket.de/doc_sdat/mercury.htm;  
A number of military communications satellites 
have failed to provide services to include a 
military strategic and tactical relay (MILSTAR)9, 
an ultra-high frequency (UHF) satellite10, two 
fleet satellite communication (FLTSATCOM) 
satellites11, and a NASA tracking and data relay 
satellite (TDRS)12.  Most recently, the new 
advanced extremely high frequency (AEHF) 
satellite, launched in 2010, had trouble getting to 
its intended orbit, delaying its anticipated use.13  
These satellites provide communications support 
for a wide range of customers from the President 
to the warfighter to manned space missions.   
Two global positioning system (GPS) satellites 
were lost during launch failures, and a recently 
launched GPS satellite is beset by a permanent 
signal problem.14  In addition to the vast 
commercial applications, GPS has revolutionized 
U.S. warfare, enabling such capabilities as 
precision guided weapons.15  Additionally, two 
NASA climate observation satellites were 
destroyed during launch in 2009 and 2011.16  
Climate change is a significant global issue that 
“NROL-21”, Gunter’s Space Page, 
http://space.skyrocket.de/doc_sdat/nrol-21.htm. 
9 “Milstar”, Wikipedia, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Milstar. 
10 “Hughes Delays Naval UHF Satellite Launch”, 
Spacedaily, http://www.spacedaily.com/news/satcom-
98g.html. 




12 “TDRS-B”, Wikipedia, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TDRS-B. 
13 “ULA Atlas V Successfully Launches with AEHF 
Satellite”, Nasa Spaceflight, 
www.nasaspaceflight.com/2010/08/ula-atlas-v-launch-
with-aehf-gps-satellte/. 
14 “List of GPS Satellite Launches”, Wikipedia, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_GPS_satellite_lau
nches; “GPS Satellite Beset by Permanent Signal 
Problem”, spaceflightnow, 
http://spaceflightnow.com/news/n0911/02gps/.  
15 “Information Operations”, Air Force, Air Force 
Doctrine Document 2-5. 
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has divided citizens and politicians across the 
world, and the latest satellite contained advanced 
capabilities to provide new sources of data to 
climatologists.17 
From an acquisition perspective, according to a 
2011 GAO report, significant schedule delays of 
as much as nine years have resulted in potential 
capability gaps in missile warning, military 
communications, and weather monitoring. These 
problems persist, with other space acquisition 
programs still facing challenges in meeting their 
targets and aligning the delivery of assets with 
appropriate ground and user systems.18  
Furthermore, according to a 2009 GAO report on 
GPS acquisition problems, there was an increased 
likelihood that GPS may fail to provide the level 
of service that the U.S. Government commits to 
by 2010.19 
To those not aware of the large numbers of U.S. 
satellites—though always aging—already on orbit 
with similar capabilities, these losses or delays 
could appear quite detrimental.  But I cannot find 
a sense of U.S. public anxiety or significant 
fallout, such as Congressional investigations or 
Presidential statements regarding degraded space 
capabilities, other than GAO reports on space 
acquisition problems or short news statements 
citing disappointment with a particular failure or 
problem.  In fact, when the most recent NASA 
climate satellite was lost during launch, it did not 
even make the front page of The Washington Post 
or The New York Times.20  Furthermore, the only 
investigation that I found was to evaluate the 
17 “NASA’s Glory Mission Will Study Key Pieces of 
the Climate Puzzle”, NASA, 
http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/Glory/news/climat
e-puzzle.html. 
18 “SPACE ACQUISITIONS: DOD Delivering New 
Generations of Satellites, but Space System 
Acquisition Challenges Remain”, GAO, GAO-11-
590T. 
19 “Global Positioning System: Significant Challenges 
in Sustaining and Upgrading Widely Used 
Capabilities”, GAO, GAO-09-670T. 
20 Based on a 4 through 10 March 2011 search of the 
Washington Post and New York Times and search of 
worldwide newspapers using ProQuest and Factiva. 
cause of the rocket failure, not the effect of losing 
the satellite’s capabilities for scientific research.21   
There is mention of some redundancy in a few 
space systems which could explain some of the 
lack of reaction to losses.  Around the time of the 
most recent DSP failure, experts estimated that the 
U.S. Government had twice the number of DSP 
satellites on orbit needed to watch the entire 
Earth.22  As for GPS, the same 2009 GAO report 
warning of possible failures of service also 
mentioned there are measures the Air Force and 
others can take to plan for and minimize possible 
GPS service impacts, which was further reiterated 
by the Air Force command lead for GPS.23  As of 
2009, there were seven more global positioning 
satellites on orbit than required for optimum 
operations.24  It does not appear that GPS has 
failed to provide services resulting in a negative 
public reaction. 
The losses of U.S. satellite capabilities noted 
above occurred because of actions taken by the 
United States.  There would likely be a 
noteworthy negative public reaction if they had 
happened purposefully at the hand of another 
country, but there is no precedent for that. There 
is, however, a precedent of foreign disruption of 
U.S. satellites which, though U.S. reactions were 
inconsistent, may provide some insight into U.S. 
redlines in space. 








23 “Global Positioning System: Significant Challenges 
in Sustaining and Upgrading Widely Used 
Capabilities”, GAO, GAO-09-670T; “Air Force 
Responds to GPS Outage Concerns”, PCWorld, 
http://www.pcworld.combusinesscenter/article/165305/
air_force_responds_to_gps_outage_concerns.html. 
24 “GPS Satellites Not Falling Out of the Sky: Air 
Force”, Physorg,  
http://phys.org/news162133400.html. 
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U.S. REACTIONS TO FOREIGN 
DISRUPTION OF U.S. CAPABILITIES 
In the 1970s, it was suspected that a U.S. maritime 
communications satellite was turned off by the 
Soviets when it was outside of the range of U.S. 
tracking stations.25  There does not appear to be 
any documented U.S. reaction, and I suspect there 
was none.  In the mid-1990s, satellite hackers in 
Brazil began hijacking U.S. military 
communication satellite signals to broadcast their 
own information, though it took until 2009 for 
Brazil to crack down on the illegal activity with 
the support of the DoD.26  In 1998, a U.S.-German 
satellite known as ROSAT was rendered useless 
after it turned suddenly toward the sun.  NASA 
investigators later determined the accident was 
possibly linked to a cyber-intrusion by Russia.  
The fallout?  Though there was an ongoing 
criminal investigation as of 2008; NASA security 
officials have seemed determined to publicly 
minimize the seriousness of the threat.27  In 2003, 
a signal originating from Cuba—later determined 
to be coming from Iranian embassy property—
was jamming a U.S. communications satellite that 
was transmitting Voice of America programming 
over Iran, which was publicly referred to as an 
“act of war” by a U.S. official. 28  Press reporting 
indicates the U.S. administration was “paralyzed” 
about how to cope with the jamming that 
continued for at least a month, even after U.S. 
diplomatic protests to Cuba.29   In 2005, U.S. 
diplomats protested to the Libyan government 




26 “The Great Brazilian Sat-Hack Crackdown”, Wired, 
http://www.wired.com/politics/security/news/2009/04/f
leetcom. 
27 “The Taking of NASA’s Secrets”, Businessweek,  
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/08_4
8/b4110072404167.htm. 
28 “Iran, Cuba Zap U.S. Satellites”, WorldNetDaily, 
http://www.wnd.com/news/article/asp?ARTICLE_ID=




29 “Iran, Cuba Zap U.S. Satellites”, WorldNetDaily, 
http://www.wnd.com/news/article/asp?ARTICLE_ID=
33957. 
after two international satellites were illegally 
jammed disrupting American diplomatic, military, 
and FBI communications.30  In 2006, press 
reporting indicates that China hit a U.S. spy 
satellite with a ground-based laser.  This action 
was acknowledged by the then director of the 
NRO, though the DoD remained tight lipped 
about the incident.31   
“We’re at a point where the 
technology’s out there, and the 
capability for people to do things to 
our satellites is there.  I’m focused on 
it beyond any single event.” 
– Air Force Space Command Commander, 
General Chilton, 200632 
In 2009, a U.S. commercial Iridium 
communications satellite—extensively used by 
the DoD—was accidently destroyed by a collision 
with a dead Russian satellite.33  The U.S. 
company, Iridium, was able to minimize any loss 
of service by implementing a network solution 
within a few days.34  As of early 2011, no legal 
action had been taken by the company either 
because it is not clear who was at fault or because 
it might be politically problematic for the United 
States, which is trying to enter into bi-lateral 




31 “China Jamming Test Sparks US Satellite 
Concerns”, USA Today, 
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2006-10-05-
satellite-laser_x.htm. 
32 “China Jamming Test Sparks US Satellite 
Concerns”, USA Today, 
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2006-10-05-
satellite-laser_x.htm. 
33 “DISA Establishes Portal for Telecom Satellite 
System”, GCN, 
http://gcn.com/articles/1998/11/09/disa-establishes-
portal-for-telecom-satellite-system.aspx; “Iridium Says 
Space Collision Risk Low”, Reuters, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/09/us-arms-
aero-summit-iridium-idUSTRE78809J20110909; “US 
Satellite Destroyed in Space Collision”, Space.com, 
http://www.space.com/5542-satellite-destroyed-space-
collision.html.  
34 “US Satellite Destroyed in Space Collision”, 
Space.com, http://www.space.com/5542-satellite-
destroyed-space-collision.html. 
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transparency and confidence-building measures 
(TCBM) with Russia regarding space activities.35  
Since August of 2010, North Korea has been 
intermittently using GPS jamming equipment, 
which reportedly has been interfering with U.S. 
and South Korean military operations and civilian 
use south of the North Korean border.36  
Reportedly, only South Korea and the United 
Nations International Telecommunications 
Union—at the request of South Korea—have 
issued letters to Pyongyang demanding the 
cessation of disruptive communications signals in 
South Korea.37  
It appears that the only time the U.S. military has 
responded with force to a disruption in U.S. space 
capabilities was in 2003, a few days after the start 
of the Iraq war.38  According to U.S. officials, Iraq 
was using multiple GPS jammers—which 
supposedly did not affect military GPS 
functionality.  However, the U.S. military bombed 
the jammers anyway after a diplomatic complaint 
to Russia.39  The use of military force against the 
GPS jamming threat was possibly because the 
35 “Iridium Satellite Collision: Are Legal Consequences 




36 “S. Korea Blames North for GPS, Phone Jamming”, 
Defense News, 
http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=5883068; 




37 “North Korea Upgrades its Military Jamming 
Devices”, MSN, 
http://www.arabia.msn.com/Technology/News/DS/201
1/September/8985162.aspx; “DPRK Attempts to Block 
ROK GPS Signals”, North Korean Economy Watch, 
http://www.nkeconwatch.com/2011/03/20/dprk-
attempts-to-block-rok-gps-signals/. 
38 “Russian Dealers Provide Iraq with Supplies, 
Electronics”, Fox News, 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,81917,00.html. 
39 “CENTCOM Charts Operation Iraqi Freedom 
Progress”, Defense.gov, 
http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle/aspx?id=292
30; “In Iraq, GPS Is Surviving Jamming Threat, 
Pentagon Says” Aviation Week, 
http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/jsp_includes/articleP
rint.jsp?headLine=null&storyID=news/gps.xml. 
United States was already intervening in Iraq, and 
the bombing probably would not have occurred if 
the United States was not at war. 
A foreign actor researching U.S. investments in 
space and observing that (a) failed U.S. satellites 
appeared not to be reconstituted immediately, (b) 
U.S. public reaction to the losses was minimal, 
and (c) U.S. reactions to foreign disruptions were 
inconsistent could come to the judgment that 
there appears to be some redundancy in 
capability in the U.S. space architecture and/or 
a tolerance of loss within the U.S. Government.  
The President is still making his phone calls, 
missiles are still finding their targets, and satellites 
are still taking pictures of North Korea’s nefarious 
efforts.40 
 
U.S. INVESTMENTS IN COUNTERSPACE 
According to my review of publicly available 
information, the United States has tested and/or 
deployed a number of counterspace capabilities 
over the years that could incapacitate or destroy a 
satellite (see Figure 1).  These capabilities go back 
to the start of the U.S. space program and range 
from high-altitude nuclear explosions,41 direct-
ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) tests,42 directed 
energy ASAT tests,43 rendezvous operations,44 
electronic negation,45 to radio-frequency 
40 “Satellite images fuel intrigue over North Korea 
Intentions”,  CNN, http://articles.cnn.com/2010-11-
18/world/north.korea.nuclear_1_yongbyon-siegfried-
hecker-new-nuclear-reactor?_s=PM:WORLD. 
41 “High-altitude nuclear explosion”, Wikipedia, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/High_altitude_nuclear_ex
plosion. 
42 “Bold Orion”, Encyclopedia Astronautica, 
www.astronautix.com/lvs/bolorion.htm;  
ASM-135 ASAT”, Wikipedia, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ASM-135_ASAT. 
43 Secretary of Defense Approves Laser Experiment to 
Improve Satellite Protection, US DoD, 
http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid
=1431. 




45 “U.S. favors stealthy anti-satellite strategy”, MSNBC, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/18023834/ns/technolog
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jamming.46  In 2004, the U.S. Air Force even 
published its doctrine on counterspace operations 
that states it will take any action necessary to 
achieve space superiority to include operations to 
deceive, disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy any 
adversary’s capabilities.47  This doctrine which is 
very clear in its intentions certainly comes across 
as dominating in tone and potentially unpalatable 
for a U.S. administration in office during 
peacetime.  Additionally, I have yet to see how it 
has been applied to the previous section’s 
discussion of disruptions of U.S. satellites, except 
in substance when the United States was at war 
with Iraq.  Furthermore, I would contend that the 
way the U.S. Air Force implements its 
counterspace doctrine appears to be influenced by 
the U.S. Congress, which has publicly expressed 
its discontent about U.S. efforts to build ASAT 
weapons.48  Additionally, it has been reiterated 
multiple times by U.S. officials that the United 
States is focusing its counterspace efforts on 
reversible capabilities such as jamming.  The 
United States admits to possessing such 
y_and_science-space/t/us-favors-stealthy-anti-satellite-
strategy. 
46 “4th Space Control Squadron, fact sheet”, US Air 
Force, 
http://www.peterson.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.
asp?id=4707; “US Deploys Warfare Unite to Jam 
Enemy Satellites”, Washington Times, 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2005/sep/21/2
0050921-102706-1524r. 
47 “Counterspace Operations”, Air Force, Air Force 
Doctrine Document 2-2.1. 
48 “China Jamming Test Sparks US Satellite 
Concerns”, USA Today, 
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2006-10-05-
satellite-laser_x.htm; “Near Field Infrared 
Experiment”, Wikipedia, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NFIRE; “All’s Fair in 
Space War”, Wired,  
http://www.wired.com/science/space/news/2004/10/65
151?currentPage=2; “China’s Satellite Jamming test 
Creates International Concerns”, Aviation Today, 
http://www.aviationtoday.com/regions.usa/Chinas-
Satellite-Jamming-Test_Creates-International-
Concerns; “A history of anti-satellite programs 
“Congress banned ASAT testing December 1985””, 
Union of Concerned Scientists, 
http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nwgs/a-
history-of-ASAT-programs_lo-res.pdf. 
capabilities, and they run counter to the Air Force 
doctrine’s concept of destruction.49  
Though the United States appears to be moving 
towards less destructive perhaps more reversible 
counterspace capabilities, the precedent has been 
set for foreign countries that counterspace 
capabilities are acceptable to possess. 
 
REACTIONS TO U.S. AND FOREIGN 
COUNTERSPACE ACTIVITIES 
According to open source information, China 
tested a direct-ascent ASAT multiple times, but 
the United States did not formally protest until 
China intercepted a satellite and created the single 
worst contamination of orbital debris in fifty 
years, threatening U.S. satellites.50  Also, 
according to press reporting, China, Iran, Libya, 
Turkey, and non-government organizations 
(NGO) have used jamming against non-U.S. 
communication satellites.  Taiwan claims to have 
the ability, and China has proliferated 
communication jamming technology to other 
countries, but I could not identify any U.S. official 
protests.51  Hackers in England reportedly took 
49 “All’s Fair in Space War”, Wired,  
http://www.wired.com/science/space/news/2004/10/65
151?currentPage=2; “US Deploys Warfare Unite to 
Jam Enemy Satellites”, Washington Times, 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2005/sep/21/2
0050921-102706-1524r. 
50 “China’s Anti-Satellite Weapon Test”, CRS Report 
for Congress RS22652, 
http://opencrs.com/document/RS22652/; “Satellite Kill 
Likely to Have Equal Impact on Terra Firma”, 
Financial Times, www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9a943dac-a82a-
11db-b448-0000779e2340.html; “China’s AntiSatellite 
Test: One Year Later – Troubling Aftermath”, 
Newswise, http://www.newswise.com/articles/chinas-
anti-satellite-test-one-year-later-troubling-aftermath.  
51 “Firedrake – The Source of China’s Radio Jammer 
Found on Chinasat 6B”, satdirectory, 
http://www.satdirectory.com/firedrake.html; “Iran 
Government Jamming Exile Satellite TV”, Iran News 
Focus News and Analysis, 
http://www.iranfocus.com/en/?option=com_content&ta
sk=view&id=2852; “Protests to Libya After Satellites 
Jammed”, The Guardian, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2005/dec/03/politics.liby
a; “China to Launch its First Anti-jamming Satellite 
Next Year”, People Daily, 
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control of a British military communication 
satellite in 1999.  Though the British Government 
denied it, they supposedly investigated, with the 
help of the U.S. Government, to make arrests.52  
In 2008, Russia used satellite communications 
jamming during the Russo-Georgian war and 
reportedly has proliferated GPS jamming 
equipment to North Korea and Iraq. 53  
The 2010 U.S. National Space Policy (NSP) states 
the United States will adhere to a number of 
principles to include considering the space 
systems of all nations to have the rights of passage 
through space without interference and that 
purposeful interference is an infringement on a 
nation’s rights.54  The NSP also promises to 
“demonstrate U.S. leadership in space-related fora 
and activities...,” so why is there little U.S. 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200403/04/eng20040
304_136475.shtml; “Roj TV, Kurdish Satellite 




+Turkey; “Military Says That it Can jam China’s 
Signals, but Won’t”, Taipei Times, 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/200
2/10/02/0000170369; “Ethiopian Satellite Television 
(ESAT) Accuses China of Complicity in Jamming 
Signals”, ECADF News, 
http://ecadforum.comethiopian-news/8661/.   
52 “SkyNet Satellite Hacked?”, dailywireless.org, 
http://www.dailywireless.org/2007/05/08/skynet-
satellite-hacked/; “Security: British “Skynet” Satellite 
Hacked!!!”, Black Falcon Software Technical News, 
http://blackfalconsoftware.wordpress.com/2007/05/09/
security-british-military-satellite-hacked/; “Satellite 
Hack Raises Security Questions”, CNET News, 
http://news.cnet.com/Satellite-hack-raises-security-
questions/2100-1033_3-222516.html.  
53 “S. Korea Blames North for GPS, Phone Jamming”, 
Defense News, 
http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=5883068; 
“GPS Jammers in Action”, Strategy Page, 
http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htecm/articles/201
10913.aspx; “Georgia Eager to Rebuild Its Defeated 
Armed Forces”, The New York Times, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/03/world/europe/03g
eorgia.html.  




reaction greater than U.S. officials expressing 
“concerns” over foreign counterspace actions?  
Either these actions do not meet the threshold for 
a U.S. diplomatic or military response, or a U.S. 
reaction may come across as hypocritical with 
respect to current U.S. counterspace actions. 
The public perception of U.S. counterspace 
capabilities and U.S. reactions to foreign 
counterspace activities is important when 
considering possible U.S. redlines in space; 
however, perceptions of the United States using 
these capabilities against other countries is even 
more insightful.  According to my review, the 
United States has only used reversible 
counterspace capabilities against foreign satellites, 
specifically jamming, and it appears to have 
avoided using counterspace capability resulting in 
the permanent loss of a foreign satellite.55 
A foreign country following U.S. actions in space 
may perceive that U.S. counterspace actions are 
within acceptable norms and, having noted an 
inconsistent U.S. response to foreign counterspace 
activities, may come to the judgment that U.S. 
actions suggest a foreign adversary could safely 
test a counterspace system, deploy it and use it, 
possibly denying some U.S. space capabilities 
temporarily, but not cause permanent loss of a 
U.S. satellite.  It should be noted that this 
perception of a possible U.S. redline runs counter 
to the 2011 National Security Space Strategy 
(NSSS), which states that “We seek to enhance 
our national capability to dissuade and deter the 
development, testing, and employment of 
counterspace systems and prevent and deter 
aggression against space systems...that support 
U.S. national security.” 56 
It is further noted that more recent U.S. 
counterspace capabilities, the 2010 NSP, and the 
U.S.A-193 shoot-down appear to emphasize 
minimizing orbital debris.  The U.S. reaction to 
China’s ASAT test only after it created an orbital 
55 “Army Official Says U.S. Is Blocking Terrorist 
Signals”, Space News, 
http://www.spacenews.com/archive/archive07/campbel
l_0827.html. 
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mess, creates the perception of a possible U.S. 
redline that a foreign actor should not create 
extensive, permanent debris in orbit. 
 
U.S. INVESTMENTS IN SPACE 
PROTECTION 
Protecting U.S. space capabilities has been a 
concern since almost as long as the first satellites 
were orbited, with early investments being made 
in anti-jamming for communications and later in 
nuclear hardening.57  Many statements can be 
found throughout the decades by U.S. officials 
expressing concern over the vulnerabilities of U.S. 
satellite capabilities, and a number of U.S. 
Government organizations have been created to 
research or implement solutions.58  But the 
overarching issue of protecting the U.S. space 
architecture has not risen to the highest levels of 
sustained attention until more recently with the 
proliferation and use of foreign anti-satellite 
capabilities, the increasingly visible reliance of 
the U.S. Government and its citizens on space 
systems, and the mounting warnings of a coming 
“space Pearl Harbor”, as noted by the incoming 
Secretary of Defense in 2001.59 
57 “Thirty Years of Space Communication Research 
and Development at Lincoln Laboratory, Chapter 8”, 
NASA, http://history.nasa.gov/SP-4217/ch8.htm; “Can 
You Hear Me Now?”, Talking Shop, US Army, 
http://www.smdc-
armyforces.army.mil/Pic_Archive/ASJ_PDFs/ASJ_VO
L_10_NO_2_011.pdf.    
58 “C41 For the Warrior – Global Command and 
Control System”, US Army; “Rumsfeld Commission 
Warns Against “Space Pearl Harbor””, Spacedaily, 
http://www.spacedaily.com/news/bmdo-01b.html; “US 
Space System Survivability”, Robert B. Giffen, 
National Defense University; “16th Space Control 
Squadron, Factsheet”, US Air Force, 
http://www.peterson.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.
asp?id=8403; “76th Space Control Squadron, Factsheet, 
US Air Force, 
http://www.peterson.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.
asp?id=4808; “US Air Force, Spy Agency team up for 
Space Protection”, Space.com, 
http://www.space.com/5224-air-force-spy-agency-
team-space-protection.html.  
59 “Rumsfeld Commission Warns Against “Space Pearl 
Harbor””, Spacedaily, 
http://www.spacedaily.com/news/bmdo-01b.html. 
U.S. SPACE POLICIES AND PROTECTION 
PRIORITIES 
In 2008, the U.S. Government created a joint 
DoD/Intelligence Community National Space 
Protection Program (SPP) to protect all defense, 
intelligence, civil, commercial, and allied space 
systems and articulate vulnerabilities and 
recommend solutions.60  This program appears to 
have recommended funding and tasks according 
to an FY11 SPP Program Element, which is 
designed to convey key information about a 
budget request.61  The technical assessment study 
tasks listed in the funding request provide insight 
into possible high-priority space-related 
capabilities that the U.S. Government wants to 
protect. 
The tasks were listed as follows: 
SPP TASK A 
• PNT Recommendations62 
• Assured C2 Study Protection63 
• Assured C2 Cyber Assessment 
• Critical Infrastructure Protection Assessments 




60 “RDT&E Budget Justification Item, PE 0603830F 
Space Protection Program”, DoD, 
http:www.dtic.mil/descriptivesum/Y2011/AirForce/06
03830F_PB_2011.pdf; “US Air Force, Spy Agency 
team up for Space Protection”, Space.com, 
http://www.space.com/5224-air-force-spy-agency-
team-space-protection.html. 
61 “RDT&E Budget Justification Item, PE 0603830F 
Space Protection Program”, DoD, 
http:www.dtic.mil/descriptivesum/Y2011/AirForce/06
03830F_PB_2011.pdf. 
62 I assume PNT to mean positioning, navigation, and 
timing, which is usually related to GPS satellites and 
related systems 
63 I assume C2 to mean command and control of U.S. 
nuclear strategic deterrence capabilities. 
64 I assume a hosted payload is the capability to support 
secondary payloads to potentially support back-up 
capabilities for other sensors on orbit as opposed to the 
commercial satellite itself. 
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“We’re not trying to save satellites.  We’re 
trying to preserve our national space… 
imagery, communications networks, and 
positioning signals the U.S.…rely on.” 
– Director, Space Protection Program, 2008 65 
Additionally, a review of the 2010 NSP provides 
guidance and key concepts that could provide 
foreign actors insight into which space capabilities 
the United States considers most important.  The 
only satellite system specifically noted is GPS, but 
other capabilities are alluded to such as 
communications and national security systems—
which could appear to be almost any type of 
satellite.  The absence of specific space systems is 
further noted in the NSP with statements such as 
“ensure...survivability of space capabilities”, 
instead of stating something like ensure the 
survivability of satellite X. 66  
The NSP provides guidelines on how to 
implement its goals, which are written into 
different sections.  The section header does not 
provide a description of what it means, so I have 
provided my own comments (after the *) of what 
could be interpreted based on what the heading 
and its section discuss.  The following are the 
most relevant examples of those guidelines 
relating to possible U.S. redlines in space from the 
NSP.67 
• Foundational Capabilities (*ensure basic 
capability?) 
– Mitigate and increase resiliency to 
harmful interference to GPS...and 
implement...redundant and back-up 
systems 













• RF...Interference Protection (*appears related 
to communications) 
– Identify, locate, and attribute sources of 
RF interference...sustain the RF 
environment in which critical U.S. space 
systems operate 
• ...Mission-Essential Functions (*are there any 
missions that can only be done from space?) 
– Assure space-enabled mission-essential 
functions 
• National Security Space Guidelines (*could 
be anything but I assume communications, 
ISR, or weather satellites because allied, 
foreign, and/or commercial capabilities are 
limited to only those capabilities.) 
– ...operate space systems...to 
support...defense and intelligence 
operations during peace, crisis, and 
conflict...ensure... survivability of space 
capabilities...and the availability of other 
means to perform the mission...options 
may include...leveraging ...allied, foreign, 
and/or commercial...capabilities 
Furthermore, the 2011 NSSS states that the United 
States needs to “fight through a degraded 
environment...ensure the timely continuity of 
services...strengthen the resilience of our 
architectures...achieved in a variety of ways, to 
include...cross-domain solutions, hosting payloads 
on a mix of platforms...international and 
commercial partners, and developing...responsive 
space capabilities.”68 
A foreign actor examining U.S. space policies and 
researching U.S. investments in satellite 
protection may conclude that the temporary loss 
of C2 or the permanent denial or loss of 
communication capabilities, commercial 
satellites hosting U.S. Government payloads, 
GPS, launch facilities and ground stations, and 
possibly ISR and weather capabilities may 
represent U.S. redlines.  Both the NSP and the 
NSSS appear to concede the probable loss of 
satellites by stating, “ensure... other means to 
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perform the mission” or “fight through a degraded 
environment...in a variety of ways.” 69  It appears 
the United States may accept the permanent loss 
of some individual U.S. satellites but not the 
capabilities they provide. 
 
ATTRIBUTION 
There would be little use for the United States to 
have redlines in space if it cannot attribute an 
attack.  U.S. investments in space situational 
awareness (SSA) indicate an interest in threat 
attribution and may add credibility to support 
possible U.S. redlines in space.   
The 2011 NSSS notes that “SSA and foundational 
intelligence will continue to be top priorities, as 
they underpin our ability to maintain awareness of 
natural disturbances and the capabilities, 
activities, and intentions of others.” 70 
The 2010 NSP also acknowledges the need for 
attribution, as stated by “...develop...use space 
situational awareness information...to detect, 
identify, and attribute actions in space”. 71 
Furthermore, the U.S. Government appears to be 
acting on its policy statements by investing in 
attribution, increasing funding for SSA 
capabilities (see Figure 2). 
Guidance in current space policy documents plus 
investments in U.S. SSA capabilities indicate an 
interest in threat attribution, and U.S. investments 
in attribution may yet add credibility for possible 
U.S. redlines in space. 
69 “National Space Policy of the United States of 
America”, USG, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/national_













CONCLUSION: PERCEIVED U.S. 
REDLINES? 
The majority of examples that I cite of U.S. 
investments, policies, or statements about space, 
counterspace, and space protection, as well as 
U.S. reactions to foreign counterspace actions 
have occurred during relatively peaceful times.  
As such, redlines based on prior U.S. actions may 
quickly change in a wartime scenario as suggested 
by the relatively quick response to GPS jamming 
during the Iraq war.  Additionally, perceived 
redlines for each type of space capability may 
become more clear as more incidents and U.S. 
reactions are able to be analyzed.  Based on my 
research of publicly available data and judging 
what may be perceived by a foreign actor that 
analyzes U.S. actions, I would suggest the 
following possible U.S. redlines in space. 
The United States may be tolerant of deployed 
foreign counterspace capabilities and 
temporary loss of most types of U.S. space 
capabilities—except C2—but not tolerant of 
the permanent loss of GPS; commercial 
satellites hosting U.S. Government  payloads; 
communications and possibly ISR or weather 
capabilities; launch facilities and ground 
stations; or intentional creation of permanent 
orbital debris. 
 
SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER 
RESEARCH 
Some important and perhaps urgent questions 
remain after this review of open source 
information.  For example, what about missile 
early warning capabilities?  DSP is usually 
thought of as an important strategic asset, but 
where is it in current space policy doctrine?  Does 
the United States believe early warning enhances 
stability – is that well known?  Is it just assumed 
that DSP will only be targeted before nuclear war?   
How long is a “temporary” degradation of U.S. 
space capabilities?  Satellite hackers in Brazil 
illegally used a U.S. military communications 
satellite for years without attribution, but 
diplomatic protests were quickly delivered to 
Cuba after the 2003 jamming incident.  The 
United States may react differently to temporary 
disruptions if they happen during a military crisis.  
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Foreign disruptions of GPS were very quickly 
resolved at the start of the Iraq war, but that was 
only one capability and the threat was ground-
based.  How would the United States react if 
multiple space capabilities were temporarily lost 
from a space-based threat? 
Also, what about commercial satellites without 
U.S. Government hosted payloads?  They appear 
to be part of the backup plan for the possible loss 
of national space capabilities, but how will the 
United States react if a farmer cannot get an 
overhead picture of his crops; Google Earth 
cannot be updated in a timely fashion; or U.S. 
citizens are denied the ability to watch the Super 
Bowl? 
Finally, what about scientific and weather 
satellites?  They generally have low visibility 
despite how much money has been spent on these 
capabilities throughout the decades.  One notable 
aspect these satellites have is their unfortunate 
selection as past ASAT targets for the United 
States and China.72  Have military agencies 
inadvertently supported the perception that these 
capabilities are disposable and could be used as 
ASAT targets for strategic warning? 
72 “ASM-135 ASAT”, Wikipedia, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ASM-135_ASAT; 
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The geopolitical influence of countries is most 
often measured by their economic strength, 
government stability, technological achievements, 
defense capabilities and overall international 
standing. For the United States and other select 
countries, space offers major strategic advantages 
and many nations are now competing to derive 
greater civilian, commercial, and military benefits 
from their presence in space. Protection of space 
assets and ensuring a stable and safe space 
environment are the responsibility of those that 
operate them, as well as those that formulate 
space policies. The quest for a workable space 
regime is appearing more often on the agendas of 
national and international security gatherings, and 
misconduct in space could have profound 
implications for terrestrial geopolitics. The reverse 
is also true, and the most likely threats to space, at 
least in our time, will be connected to heightened 
terrestrial tensions or conflict.  
One of the operational and political challenges is 
the ability to assess accurately situations in space, 
and to respond effectively to emergencies and 
disruptive activities there. In this sense, space 
presents a unique challenge for crisis management. 
This article will explore the status of the security 
debate as it pertains to collaborative space crisis 
prevention and management as well as specific 
actions to avoid disruptive incidents or conflicts in 
space.  It will first seek to define space crisis 
management, review potential causes or catalysts, 
compare the approaches of the United States and 
the EU, and provide achievable policy 
recommendations. This conceptual analysis of the 
fundamental issues at play will hopefully 
contribute to ever-more effective space crisis 
management.  
This paper stems from cooperation between the 
European Space Policy Institute (ESPI) and the 
Department of Political Science at the Faculty of 
Social Sciences’ Institute of Political Studies (IPS) 
at Charles University in Prague. It is part of a 
broader ESPI project on Space Crisis 
Management, which, in turn, originated from a 
major international conference entitled “Space 
Security through the Transatlantic Partnership”, 
co-organized by ESPI and the Prague Security 
Studies Institute (PSSI) in June 2011.1 As part of 
the Space Crisis Management project, ESPI 
convened a roundtable in March 2012 to: 1) 
identify available tools for space crisis prevention; 
2) delineate essential ingredients of effective 
space crisis management; and 3) provide realistic 
scenarios that could trigger crisis management 
responses.2 
 
THE SPACE CRISIS MANAGEMENT 
REQUIREMENT 
The growing volume of orbital debris, increasing 
number of space-faring nations and aspirants, new 
and emerging space technologies, and their 
proliferation to a large number of state and non-
state actors all point to an increasing potential for 
a space-related crises. At the same time, 
management of such a crisis is a complex 
endeavor requiring a well-crafted vision and 
architecture for global space security as well as a 
1 More information about the conference can be found 
at the following link: http://www.pssi.cz/conferences-
and-roundtables/1 . 
2 More information about the roundtable can be found 
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strategic approach to contextualizing and 
responding to challenges in this environment. 
It is useful to note that there are two broad 
categories of space-related crises: natural and 
man-made. The public perception of the negative 
effects caused by the first type of crisis would 
likely be fundamentally different than the second. 
While the public response to a terrestrial natural 
catastrophe is generally positive and generous, the 
reaction in case of man-made space trauma would 
probably be swift and harsh, especially as the 
harmful knock-on effects were calculated. Such 
complex and uncertain situations could be 
manipulated, rather than controlled, by certain 
political elites and public opinion. The unexpected 
outbreak of World War I in 1914, in reaction to a 
political crisis, serves as a sober reminder of 
unintended escalatory spirals.        
Beyond natural hazards (e.g., space debris, space 
weather), the growing dependence on space assets 
and the limited capability to protect them, 
compounded by the problem of verifying 
activities in space, all present daunting challenges 
to managing a space crisis. The high level of 
integration of space assets into military operations, 
particularly in the cases of the United States and 
Russia, make these assets tempting targets. Indeed, 
any meaningful disruption of essential space 
functions or operations would likely require 
extensive political and technical damage control. 
While the United States is, without question, the 
most advanced space power, several other space-
faring nations are seeking to increase their 
influence in world affairs via space. This 
competitive, and increasingly contested, 
environment is not particularly conducive to 
efforts to establish rules of the road for space and 
new forms of cooperation. In short, space is still 
perceived as an ideal arena for demonstrating a 
nation’s pride, independence, and capabilities. 
Accordingly, the ability of Washington and its 
allies (e.g., the EU) to be accepted as the “rule-
maker” is diminished and often regarded as 
suspect by those space actors that view space as a 
sphere of opportunity to enhance their strength 
and even challenge U.S. primacy. Communication 
among these actors, and achieving consensus 
among them, under such circumstances is difficult, 
if not impossible. 
In tackling these challenges, it is helpful to 
examine some of the key causes of a possible 
space crisis. Patrick Lin, Associate Professor at 
the California Polytechnic State University, for 
example, reflected on a seemingly remote aspect 
of a potential space crisis. In his 2006 article on 
“space ethics”, he pointed out: “… relevant 
lessons from history may include our recent 
development of cyberspace, or the Internet 
frontier. Without planning ahead for related 
intellectual property issues as well as online sales 
tax, Internet crimes, and other areas, the rush into 
cyberspace has been messy at best.”3   
With regard to space exploration and exploitation 
he added: “What is to prevent problems on Earth 
from following us into outer space, if we have not 
evolved the attitudes, and ethics, which have 
contributed to those problems? ... We have 
already littered the orbital environment in space 
with floating debris that we need to track so that 
spacecraft and satellites navigate around, not to 
mention abandoned equipment on the Moon and 
Mars.”4  The intention of several countries to 
exploit lunar elements and minerals may also one 
day lead to a crisis should the legal status of the 
celestial bodies not be adequately clarified.5  
In the United States, the Department of Defense 
(DOD) views the space environment as having 
fundamentally changed and describes it with the 
so-called “three Cs” (i.e. congested, contested and 
competitive). Space is increasingly congested due 
primarily to space debris, contested by a growing 
array of foreign counterspace capabilities, and 
competitive as more and more countries and 
companies operate in space. 
If one accepts that the space backdrop is shaped 
by the “3 Cs”, an issue becomes how to best 
delineate the “international relations” arena where 
all actors in a potential conflict should be involved 
in its resolution. Another well-known category of 
“3 Cs” -- cooperative, competitive and 
3 Patrick Lin, “Viewpoint: Look before Taking another 
Leap for Mankind – Ethical and Social Considerations 
in Rebuilding Society in Space,” Astropolitics Vol. 4 
(2006): 281-294. 
4 Ibid.: 285. 
5 Andrew Brearley, “Mining the Moon: Owning the 
Night Sky?“ Astropolitics Vol. 4 (2006): 43-67. 
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confrontational -- has also been used to describe 
world affairs more generally and assumes that 
each stage of a potential conflict involves 
different behavior on the part of rational actors. 
That said, it is currently difficult to anticipate the 
reactions of many members of the international 
community to a crisis in space, as different actors 
attach varying levels of importance to space 
capabilities. 
 
Terrestrial Crisis Management 
The concept of terrestrial crisis management has 
largely been associated with the U.S. – USSR 
Cold War competition and prominently involved 
ensuring the non-use of nuclear weapons and 
supporting technologies (e.g. strategic bombers, 
ballistic missiles, etc.). “Nuclear” crisis 
management consists of structuring nuclear forces 
to provide a sufficient deterrent against their use 
by a rival (including via arms control 
arrangements) as well as advancing strict control 
of nuclear forces in a crisis to prevent 
unauthorized or accidental use of nuclear 
weaponry.  
The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis is considered one 
of the most acute Cold War clashes that involved 
intense interaction between the two powers and 
careful policy decision-making. This crisis 
represented “a period of acute tension between 
states that threatened the prospect of major war”.6 
Three conceptual models of Graham Allison from 
the 1960s, using the Cuban Missile Crisis as a 
case study, have been widely applied to address 
terrestrial crisis management solutions. These 
models were “rational policy” (I), “organizational 
process” (II), and “bureaucratic politics” (III). 
Model I portrays a state as a single rational policy 
decision-maker. According to Model II, the sub-
units of the government follow established 
procedures and produce a policy option consistent 
with these pre-determined steps. In Model III, a 
policy decision is a negotiated bargain between 
individuals in charge of various responsibilities 
within the Executive Branch of government (e.g. 
6 Carnes Lord, "Crisis Management : A Primer," 
Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies, 
IASPS Research Papers in Strategy No.7 (August 
1998): http://www.iasps.org/strategic7/crisis.htm.  
Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, etc.) 
which often concentrate on different angles of the 
same issue.7 
After the Cuban Missile Crisis, unilateral and 
bilateral measures were adopted to assist in 
streamlining political processes and prevent a 
dangerous escalatory spiral between the two 
powers that could ultimately result in a large-scale 
military conflict. These measures included, for 
example, improved nuclear command and control 
arrangements, the U.S. – Soviet Hotline, and the 
1972 Agreements on Measures to Reduce the 
Risks of Nuclear War. 
Today, crisis management focuses on strategic 
questions involving a variety of international 
actors. Accordingly, the connection between a 
crisis and the use of force is more subtle. In this 
environment, the term “crisis” can be defined as 
“a perception by the highest level decision-makers 
of a threat to one or more basic values, along with 
an awareness of finite time for response to the 
value threat, and a heightened probability of 
involvement in military hostilities”.8  
In the post-Cold War era, an example of crisis 
prevention was the June 2000 Memorandum of 
Agreement between the United States and the 
Russian Federation on the Establishment of a 
Joint Center for the Exchange of Data from Early 
Warning Systems and Notifications of Missile 
Launches. In the Memorandum, the United States 
and Russia agreed, for the first time, to a 
permanent joint operation involving U.S. and 
Russian military personnel to enhance strategic 
stability between the two counties. It established a 
Joint Data Exchange Center (JDEC) in Moscow 
for the sharing of information derived from each 
side’s missile launch warning systems on the 
launches of ballistic missiles and space launch 
vehicles. In December 2000, the United States and 
USSR signed a Memorandum of Understanding 
establishing a Pre- and Post-Launch Notification 
System (PLNS) for ballistic and space launch 
vehicles launches. It is envisioned to be an 
Internet-based system operated as part of the 
JDEC. Both JDEC and PLNS make provisions for 
7 Graham Allison, “Conceptual models and the Cuban 
Missile Crisis.” American Political Science Review Vol. 
63, No. 3 (September 1969): 689-718. 
8 Lord (1998).  
 
                                                                                                                    
 Robinson and Romancov/Space Crisis Management 38 
voluntary notifications of satellites diverted from 
their orbit and space experiments that could 
adversely influence the operation of early warning 
radars. These agreements represent a rare example 
of detailed and comprehensive space-related 
confidence-building measures designed to 
enhance stability through transparency.9 
In a crisis, difficult trade-offs between various 
response options need to be made at the highest-
levels of government. Crisis management 
considerations involve, besides diplomacy and use 
of force, the adequacy of available intelligence 
and how much is secret versus public. This 
calculus can have both important domestic and 
international implications, including economic, 
financial, legal and command and control 
dimensions. Successful crisis management seeks 
to minimize damage/costs and maximize 
stability/benefits. The challenge lies in the ability 
to react correctly and quickly when the crisis 
arrives.  
 
Defining Space Crisis Management 
In defining space crisis management, the main 
focus is on efforts to identify those situations that 
are produced by threats to space assets and related 
services. In this sense, the goal of space crisis 
management is to preserve a peaceful and stable 
space environment. There are clear space-related 
implications stemming from heightened terrestrial 
tensions or mishaps. Those terrestrial 
circumstances that can result in damage to, or 
disruption of, space-based and ground-based 
assets have not been fully explored. For example, 
many satellites are dual use, making it difficult to 
differentiate between friend and foe.10 Unlike 
space safety and sustainability, which have 
received significant attention in various venues, 
9 Peter Hays, “Military Space Cooperation: 
Opportunities and Challenges.” Monterey Institute of 
International Studies (July 2002): 37. 
10 An interesting question is, for example, who would 
be responsible for space tourists – citizens of certain 
states – if those individuals would be forced to stay in 
space for a longer period of time because a commercial 
spaceport, located for example in the United Arab 
Emirates, would be unable to recive them back due to 
political/military crisis tensions or conflict in the 
Persian Gulf.  
including the United Nations Committee on the 
Peaceful Use of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS), 
space stability and deterrence is a more sensitive 
challenge and requires closer examination.  
In an actual crisis, it is unlikely that Allison’s 
above-mentioned Model I alone, where 
happenings are a result of “purposive acts of 
unified national government”11, will apply. Model 
II, where a multiplicity of organizations follow 
standard operating procedures (SOP) appears to 
be the best solution. However, the limited number 
of incidents and crises involving space has not yet 
catalyzed the establishment of such procedures, 
perhaps with the exception of the U.S.-Russian 
relationship. It may well take a future crisis to 
persuade the international community to 
implement suitable processes, organizations and 
understandings regarding space security. 
Accordingly, Model III may also apply, as was the 
case during the Cuban Missile crisis, and 
individuals within the involved governments will 
divine the outcome. 
In addition to obstacles connected with 
configuring domestic space crisis decision-making 
procedures, crisis prevention on an international 
level represents an even more challenging task 
given the limited exercise of space “rules of 
engagement”. This undertaking should involve the 
promotion of behavior that maximizes the utility 
and stability of space and minimizes the prospects 
for misconduct and misperceptions. This process 
has been underway via seeking to advance codes 
of conduct/rules of the road, debris mitigation, 
transparency and confidence-building measures 
(TCBMs), and other modalities. Reducing the 
incentives and stepping up the disincentives 
associated with space-faring nations taking 
destabilizing actions is the proverbial “name of 
the game”. 
This task is becoming increasingly complex with 
the growing number of space-faring nations and 
the nature of their ambitions. As democratic 
countries face periodic changes of leadership, it is 
crucial that well-defined national priorities and 
procedures are firmly in place to achieve 
successful international negotiation and/or action 
(military or otherwise). This has proven elusive 
11 Allison (1969: 690). 
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even among allies, much less all active members 
of space community. The connectivity between 
terrestrial military hostilities and space is likely 
the most problematic (e.g., GPS signals jamming 
during the Iraqi conflict and other such 
circumstances).  
To conclude, there is a marked difference in 
behavioral norms when dealing with peacetime 
versus crisis and conflict. A key objective of an 
effective space crisis management regime should 
be preventing crises before they mature, in part 
through the ability to gain international agreement 
on a set of rules governing responsible space 
behavior, along with effective verification and 
enforcement measures. 
 
POTENTIAL SPACE CRISES 
Crises in space could be triggered by natural 
causes (e.g., space weather and debris), technical 
issues (e.g., satellite malfunction, unintentional 
interference, inaccurate orbital prediction) or 
intentional disruption of satellite services and 
even the attack of space assets. Space Situational 
Awareness (SSA), a fundamental element of 
space operations, is required to detect various 
anomalies, including those connected with a 
satellite’s designated flight path. Due to the gaps 
in SSA capabilities, it can be difficult to detect 
and attribute potentially irresponsible or hostile 
actions in space. This makes space crisis 
management more complex than the terrestrial 
variety. Although space crises caused by natural 
hazards or technical issues are of high concern, 
the intentional disruption of, or damage to, space 
assets will generally involve larger – sometimes 
far larger – geopolitical stakes. 
 
Natural Hazards, Uncontrolled Re-Entries, 
Collisions and Unintentional Radiofrequency 
Interference 
Space debris, the main contributor to “congested 
space”, has received substantial attention from the 
space community at national as well as 
international levels. A number of space-faring 
nations have adopted strict space debris mitigation 
guidelines, including the United States, Russia, 
Japan, and a number of European nations. The 
need for steps beyond debris mitigation, such as 
active debris removal (ADR), have also been 
acknowledged and pursued. Large damage to, or 
destruction of, a significant space asset (e.g., the 
International Space Station) would not only 
trigger an immediate need for crisis management 
steps, but would also have a potentially 
debilitating effect on the near-term pursuit of 
human space exploration. 
Effects from space weather (i.e., the Sun and the 
solar wind) are also considered significant threats 
to space operations. Although satellite 
components are partially protected against high 
total doses of radiation, it is nearly impossible 
(and costly) to design and manufacture a satellite 
completely immune from space weather variations. 
Solar activity, occurring during all phases of the 
solar cycle, needs proper monitoring and 
assessment, especially given the lack of an ability 
to predict accurately space weather. 
The re-entry of shut-down or malfunctioning 
satellites, such as the U.S. Upper Atmosphere 
Research Satellite (UARS), Germany’s ROentgen 
SATellite (ROSAT), or Russia’s Phobos-Grunt, 
have not been considered high-level risk events, 
but have drawn attention to the need for better 
communication between all involved parties, as 
well as with the public.  
The UARS, decommissioned in 2005, re-entered 
the atmosphere while tracked by the U.S. Joint 
Space Operations Center (JSpOC). The process 
was managed by the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration (NASA). Besides the 
United States, other space-faring nations were 
also monitoring the satellite’s descent in the last 
two hours as the natural forces affecting the 
satellite made the prediction of re-entry difficult.12 
The ROSAT’s re-entry, handled by the German 
Space Agency (DLR), followed a similar re-entry 
procedure and ROSAT underwent an uncontrolled 
re-entry into the atmosphere in October 2011.  
The case of Russia’s Mars probe, Phobos-Grunt, 
was somewhat different from the previous two 
examples as Russia failed to provide timely 
information concerning issues it was experiencing 
with the satellite. After the Russian side finally 
12 http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/uars/ 
index.html.   
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announced technical problems, the United States 
set up a task force to assist the management of the 
re-entry. The whole process, as well as the 
Russian explanation of the cause of the failure, 
lacked the desired level of accuracy and 
transparency.13 
Although thus far the only one of its kind, the 
2009 collision between Iridium 33 and Cosmos 
2251 also demonstrated the existence of a real 
threat of collision between two intact satellites. In 
short, although there have not, as yet, been any 
serious injuries (i.e., at least confirmed reports) 
resulting from the re-entries of the above-
mentioned satellites, or other space objects, these 
events have highlighted the need for not only 
establishing domestic, national procedures, but 
also diplomatic processes that would facilitate the 
smooth and efficient management of these types 
of events internationally, including adequate 
public reporting.  
Radiofrequency interference can undermine key 
functions of a satellite (i.e., telemetry, tracking, 
and command information, or TT&C) and 
compromise the satellite’s altitude control system 
and propulsion system, leading to deterioration of 
orbit, loss of core mission capability, or complete 
loss of communication. Unintentional radio 
frequency interference can originate from faulty 
equipment, the reduction of orbital spacing 
between satellites, and the unauthorized use of 
satellite space segments by carriers. Intelsat’s 
Chief Technical Officer, Thierry Guillemin, noted: 
“in our experience, episodes of signals from 
unauthorized carriers and of cross-polarization 
make up 70 percent to 75 percent of radio 
frequency interference cases plaguing satellite 
operations…to this number you should add a 15 
percent to 20 percent of cases caused by adjacent 




13 James Oberg, “Open Issues with the Official Phobos-
Grunt Accident Report,” The Space Review (February 
27, 2012): 
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2035/1. 
14 Giovanni Verlini, “New Efforts to Mitigate Satellite 
Interference,” Satellite Today (March 1, 2010). 
Intentional Disruption/Attack 
As satellites (travelling in predictable orbits) 
collect, transport and deliver critical information 
and services to users on Earth, including national 
militaries, intentional disruption of the 
information/services they provide is an attractive 
option to some. Add to that the physical 
disruption of space infrastructure (e.g., satellites 
or ground-based facilities).  
Intentional jamming (e.g., active jamming of radar 
imaging satellites, GPS location and timing 
information, etc.) could bring damaging military 
implications as well as potential political 
estrangement.  Jamming the uplink for 
commercial and communications satellites is 
easier than military satellites due to their tendency 
to receive a broad range of signals for multitudes 
of users over a large geographic area.  As 
commercial communications satellites are used 
heavily by the U.S. military (as well as the 
militaries of some other countries), this 
vulnerability is relevant to the security community 
and allied collaboration efforts.   
Besides the challenge of GEO-locating the source 
of interference in an area covering hundreds of 
thousands of kilometers, satellite operators are 
sometimes confronted with a policy challenge, 
such as the case of the jamming of a Eutelsat 
satellite by a source located on Iranian territory. In 
2009, several major broadcast stations were 
jammed for many months by systems based in 
Iran, raising significantly the costs to the 
broadcasters and satellite owner-operators 
involved. Although formal complaints were filed 
with the International Telecommunication Union 
(ITU), the situation has not been resolved, and the 
Government of Iran has made no 
acknowledgement of this issue. 
The incidence of intentional jamming has 
increased in recent years due to its utility in 
accomplishing military, political, and even social 
objectives.  As state-sponsored jamming becomes 
increasingly prevalent, there is likely to be 
increased interest internationally in scripting 
appropriate responses to these kinds of 
“temporary” actions.  At present, this is an 
underdeveloped area of security policy as well as 
economic policy and diplomacy. 
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A crisis could also be caused by: directed energy 
(laser or microwave) attack (e.g., using an Earth-
based laser to dazzle the optical arrays of an 
electro-optical imaging reconnaissance satellite; 
or use of satellites with active, high-powered 
radars to degrade the electronics of an adversary 
satellite); kinetic energy anti-satellite (ASAT) 
attack (e.g., direct-ascent, co-orbital); or cyber 
attacks (e.g., capturing or corrupting the data 
streams to or from a competitor’s satellite).   
Cyber attacks against satellites and ground 
stations are a growing problem and stand out as a 
key vulnerability that can be added to the current 
array of political and budgetary obstacles to 
enhanced cyber security and space security. Cyber 
attacks permit anonymity and can be far lower 
cost with regard to spying, denial of service, or 
otherwise incapacitating an adversary’s satellites.  
There are already a number of known examples of 
cyber attacks against satellites resulting in 
degradation or loss of control. 
 
COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT: THE 
UNITED STATES AND THE EU 
United States 
The United States is the leading space power and, 
arguably, the most reliant on highly-integrated 
space capabilities. Given the vulnerability of these 
assets, the country is active both in promoting the 
responsible use of space (e.g., collision prevention, 
engagement in International Space Code of 
Conduct negotiations, etc.), and in research and 
development related to the protection of these 
assets (including counterspace measures). The 
U.S. Air Force (USAF) is responsible for military 
space activities and charged with ensuring 
“freedom of action and from action in space” as 
well as denying, if necessary, those same 
freedoms to an adversary.15 
Beyond promoting norms of responsible behavior, 
the United States pursues other deterrence-related 
efforts. They include: the threat of retaliatory 
measures (although not limited to a response in 
kind); escalation; redundancy and quick 
15 Maj. Wallace Turnbull, “Moving Beyond SSA: An 
Attribution Architecture for Space Control,“ High 
Frontier Vol. 5, No. 1 (November 2008): 25-27.   
replacement capability; ability to operate in a 
degraded environment/resilience; robust Space 
Situational Awareness (SSA) and space-related 
intelligence capabilities that enhance attribution16; 
and a healthy level of strategic ambiguity over its 
response to any intentional disruption/attack on 
U.S. or allied space capabilities. Declaratory 
policies also come into play, when deemed 
appropriate (e.g., an attack on U.S. space assets as 
part of a regional conflict is declared to be a 
broader attack on the United States). 
The National Security Space Strategy (NSSS), 
published by the Obama Administration in 
January 2011, forthrightly acknowledges the 
relevance of a contested space operating 
environment, not only to the security of the 
United States, but also to U.S. relations with key 
allies and partners.  In addition, the National 
Space Policy, issued in June 2010, instructed the 
Secretary of Defense and Director of National 
Intelligence to “assure critical national security 
space-enabled missions” through options, such as 
“leveraging allied, foreign, and/or commercial 
space and non-space capabilities to help perform 
the mission” and augmenting “U.S. capabilities by 
leveraging [the] existing and planned space 
capabilities of allies and space partners.”17 
The outreach of the United States to the 
international community on these issues includes 
participation in negotiations on an International 
Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities, 
meetings with a UN-established Group of 
Government Experts on Outer Space 
Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures 
(TCBMs)18, and work with the Scientific and 
Technical Subcommittee of the UN Committee on 
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS) 
on the “Long Term Sustainability of Outer Space 
Activities.” These and other efforts seek to 
mitigate space debris, reduce the likelihood of 
16 In a military engagement, the less that is known 
about the identity, motives, and scale of the threat (due 
primarily to the inability to detect and classify), the 
greater freedom of action that is required to protect the 
force/assets involved. 
17 “National Space Policy of the United States of 
America,”  President of the United States of America, 
June 28, 2010. 
18 The GGE on Outer Space TCBMs was established 
by UN General Assembly Resolution 65/68. 
 
                                                          
                                                          
 Robinson and Romancov/Space Crisis Management 42 
collisions, prevent incidents, minimize the risks of 
potentially harmful interference, and develop 
“best practices guidelines” for space activities.19  
SSA is essential to managing space traffic, 
identifying out-of-the-ordinary activities, 
irresponsible behavior, and any attack on space 
assets. The United States collects its SSA data 
through the Space Surveillance Network (SSN). 
The SSN, however, cannot continuously track 
every space object, and it uses the computed orbit 
to predict an object’s future position, which is 
periodically updated. Still, an object can be 
unexpectedly “lost” between the updates, and it 
can take days, or even weeks, to re-establish 
contact. This operational constraint could be 
exploited by potential adversaries.20 Accordingly, 
the United States seeks to build a more robust 
SSA capability in coordination with its allies.   
In its 2011 NSSS, the United States asserted, as a 
leader in the SSA field, it “can use its knowledge 
to foster cooperative SSA relationships, support 
safe space operations, and protect U.S. and allied 
space capabilities and operations”.21 The 
partnerships are to be “consistent with U.S. policy 
and international commitments and consider cost, 
protection of sources and methods, and effects on 
the U.S. industrial base.”22 The United States has 
shared SSA information since the late 1950s 
through NASA’s Orbital Information Group 
(OIG). SSA data-sharing data outside of the U.S. 
government (USG) was originally administered 
by a pilot program of the USAF Space Command, 
the Commercial and Foreign Entities (CFE) Pilot 
Program (launched in 2004). There now exists a 
permanent SSA Sharing Program operated by the 
U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM).23  
19 Frank Rose, “2012 Will Be a Defining Year for 
Space Security,” Remarks at the 15th Annual FFA 
Commercial Space Transportation Conference, 
Washington DC (16 Feb 2012): 
http://geneva.usmission.gov/2012/02/17/space-
security-2/, accessed October 23, 2012. 
20 Turnbull (2008). 
21 U.S. Department of Defense, National Security 
Space Strategy (January 2011): 6. 
22 Ibid.: 8. 
23 Jana Robinson, “The Role of Transparency and 
Confidence-Building Measures in Advancing Space 
Security.” ESPI Report No. 28 (27 March 2011). 
Standing agreements with commercial partners 
enable cooperation with these entities on a day-to-
day basis as well as in case of emergencies. The 
United States also seeks cooperative partnerships 
with foreign governments. Besides SSA 
collaboration with Australia and Canada, the 
United States has held discussions on SSA with 
the European Space Agency (ESA), the EU, and 
individual countries (mainly France and 
Germany), as well as in Asia (e.g., Japan). 
Another partnering potential is represented by the 
U.S. Air Force’s Wideband Global Satellite 
Communication system in which five allies 
already participate (i.e., Canada, Denmark, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and New Zealand). 
The system currently involves three satellites in 
orbit and six additional satellites are planned to be 
launched in the period 2012 -2018. The United 
States carries the burden of the development, 
fielding, and operational aspects of eight satellites. 
The ninth will be a product of this consortium and 
will be launched and operated by the United 
States.24 
Moreover, the U.S. Strategic Command 
(USSTRATCOM) is in the process of 
reconfiguring the Joint Space Operations Center at 
Vandenberg Air Force Base to become a 
Combined Space Operations Center with the goal 
of also integrating the capabilities of its allies to 
better leverage shared information.  
The primary venue for advanced collaboration 
with allies has been the Schriever Wargame, 
coordinated by the United States annually or bi-
annually.  The Schriever Wargame consists of a 
series of exercises that starts with an attack on 
critical space assets and/or cyber infrastructure. 
The seventh Schriever Wargame for space, which 
took place in April 2012, was the first 
international game to combine the regular 
participation of Australia, Canada, and the United 
Kingdom with other NATO allies. The war game, 
involving combined space operations, focused on 
ways to boost SSA, improve intelligence-
gathering, enhance surveillance and 
24 Tech. Sgt. Chris Powell, “U.S. Coalition Nations 
Form Wideband Global Satellite Partnership”. U.S. 
Airforce Website, 
http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123286621, 
accessed August 23, 2012.  
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reconnaissance, and increase communications 
bandwidth while countering space-related 
challenges, including debris and the anti-satellite 
capabilities of adversaries.25 
In sum, the United States, guided by its 2011 
National Security Space Strategy (NSSS), focuses 
on how the changing space environment can 
influence national security. Strengthening safety, 
stability, and security in space is one of three 
broad objectives clearly defined in the NSSS. 
Crises could not only reduce the ability to protect 
benefits that countries derive from space; the 
stability of the domain itself could be adversely 
affected. Accordingly, the United States seeks to 
anticipate the actions and reaction of actors to 
prevent negative contingencies or crises, as well 
as promote the responsible use of space via 
building international partnerships and putting in 
place effective deterrence measures.  
 
The European Union (EU) 
The structure responsible for the EU’s Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is the 
European External Action Service (EEAS), 
established by the Lisbon Treaty in December 
2009. The EU has a “terrestrial” Crisis Platform 
under its EEAS, involving various crisis 
response/management mechanisms (i.e., Crisis 
Management and Planning Directorate, Crisis 
Response Department, EU Military Staff, Civilian 
Planning and Conduct Capability, Situation 
Centre, EU Situation Room and other relevant 
EEAS Departments), the EU Military Committee 
(EUMC), and relevant European Commission 
services (see Figure 1). 
The development and utilization of space assets 
for terrestrial crisis management is being 
supervised by the European Commission (EC), in 
close collaboration with the Member States, the 
25 Amb. Gregory Schulte, “Protecting Global Security 
in Space,” Presentation at the S. Rajaratnam School of 
International Studies, Nanyang Technological 





accessed October 23, 2012. 
EU and ESA.  The EEAS, which defines the 
coordination and resourcing mechanisms 
associated with the use of space for terrestrial 
crisis management and “external action”, has not, 
as yet, systematically integrated space crisis 
management into its operations.  
Institutions that coordinate European space policy 
include the Space Council (periodic meetings of 
the Council of the EU and the Council of ESA at 
the ministerial level), the Joint Secretariat, and the 
High-Level Space Policy Group (the two latter of 
which assist the Space Council). The EU’s 
security-related space activities are primarily 
managed by the European Commission (EC), the 
European Defence Agency (EDA), and the 
European Union Satellite Centre (EUSC). The 
European Space Agency (ESA) acts as the 
program coordinator and procurement authority 
for most of these projects.26 The EU’s principal 
security-related programs, all dual-use in nature, 
are the Galileo global navigation and positioning 
satellite constellation, the Global Monitoring for 
Environment and Security (GMES) and the Space 
Situational Awareness (SSA) project.  
In 2007, the 4th Space Council endorsed 
unanimously the European Space Policy, 
demonstrating support for a comprehensive, 
common way forward. The Fifth Space Council 
named “space security” among its four priority 
areas. The EU recognizes its increasing reliance 
on space-based systems as well as the 
proliferation of threats to these systems and aims 
at developing a “European space monitoring 
capability”.27  The 2008 Space Council resolution, 
as well as subsequent resolutions, emphasized the 
need for “a European capability for the 
monitoring and surveillance of its space 
infrastructure and of space debris”.28 To develop a 
pan-European SSA system, the EU recognizes the 
need to cooperate with ESA and Member States, 
26 Kai-Uwe Schrogl, et al., Yearbook on Space Policy – 
2009/2010: Space for Society (Vienna, Austria: 
SpringerWienNewYork, 2011), pp. 100-101. 
27http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/space/esp/secur
ity/assets/index_en.htm 
28 5th Space Council Resolution (September 26, 2008): 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/st13/st135
69.en08.pdf, p. 13. 
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as well as develop proper governance and data 
policy to manage highly sensitive SSA data.29  
The EC’s most recent space strategy document 
entitled “Toward a Space Strategy of the 
European Union that Benefits its Citizens”, 
acknowledged that space infrastructure is both “an 
instrument” which can serve the EU’s security 
and defense needs (e.g., GMES, MUSIS), but also 
as “an asset” requiring protection. The main 
threats outlined in the document were natural 
phenomena, collision, and electromagnetic 
interference.30 
The current European agenda on space security is 
dominated by the discussion, debate and 
diplomacy associated with the proposed Space 
Code of Conduct referenced above. The Code has 
also attracted priority attention internationally 
over the past few years.  Although the EU is a 
relatively recent space actor at a global level, it is 
striving to establish policies and procedures that 
protect Europe’s space assets, especially at a time 
when current EU policy heavily emphasizes the 
development of independent European access to, 
and use of, space (including Europe’s next-
generation launching capability, Galileo, space-
based crisis response infrastructure, and SSA).  
The implications of increasingly sophisticated 
counterspace systems in the hands of less-
responsible actors have not been acted upon to a 
sufficient degree in Europe. There exists an 
obstinate political and cultural barrier that, often 
mistakenly, confuses the defense of space assets 
with the debates on space “weaponization”. 
Accordingly, the individual Member States are 
currently better positioned to contribute actual 
capability as well as political value-added with 
regard to space crisis management planning. 
Politically, there are also fewer obstacles to 
making security-oriented decisions with regard to 
cooperation in militarily-sensitive space situations. 
Among them, France is a leader in developing 
national critical space capabilities, including 
communications, Earth observation, and space 





pdf, p. 5. 
In short, the public space security (sometimes 
labeled “security of space“) debate in a European 
setting consistently gravitates back toward the 
challenges posed by incidental or naturally-
occurring phenomena, which are less challenging 
issues to grapple with politically.  Movement 
away from these non-intentional issues as the 
central agenda items on space security continues 
to prove difficult, demonstrating the pushback 
over more formalized and deeper discussions 
between the United States and Europe on the 
intentional acts that could jeopardize space 
stability systemically. 
 
COLLABORATIVE SPACE CRISIS 
PREVENTION AND MANAGEMENT 
The purposeful loss of important space 
capabilities (both civilian and military) could have 
a debilitating impact on the world economy and 
global security as well as exacerbate various 
terrestrial crises, whether they be humanitarian or 
military. Advancing the responsible and safe use 
of space should be the foundation of a more 
cooperative, predictable environment which 
enhances national security and discourages 
destabilizing behavior.  
TCBMs, introduced in various venues (e.g., UN 
General Assembly resolutions; the U.S. 2010 
National Space Policy; the draft International 
Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities, etc.) 
are an important element of this effort. They 
include the sharing of data and information 
relevant for conjunction analysis, pre-notification 
of launches, building international partnerships, 
and creating a common understanding of what 
constitutes “responsible behavior.” While 
acknowledging their various limitations, including 
the issue of verification and compliance, TCBMs, 
in the right circumstances, can go a long way 
towards preventing space-related crisis. TCBM-
related space diplomacy needs to be underpinned 
by an advanced understanding and commitment to 
international law.  
With the development of sophisticated 
counterspace capabilities by some countries, the 
concept of deterrence has also gained traction in 
debates related to space crisis management. As 
referenced in the previous section, the U.S. 
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Defense Department includes the following four 
objectives in its deterrence strategy: the 
development of responsible norms of behavior; 
the establishment of international partnerships; 
increasing the resilience and capacity to operate in 
a degraded environment; and the readiness and 
capability to respond in self-defense (not 
necessarily in kind). It has yet to be thoroughly 
tested how a robust space posture can deter 
terrestrial conflict and, conversely, how 
vulnerabilities in space can cause instability in a 
terrestrial crisis.  
SSA is an important contributor to advancing the 
responsible use of space and there are broader 
discussions underway on the need to create a more 
comprehensive SSA picture and share data and 
information internationally. With regard to 
America‘s SSA, although it is the largest system 
with comprehensive coverage of traceable items 
in low Earth orbit (LEO), it does have coverage 
gaps, especially in equatorial orbits.31 Europe has 
only one dedicated radar system for space 
surveillance, but has reasonably well-developed 
optical coverage in medium to high orbits. A 
multilateral system of sharing the burden of 
tracking space objects would offer improved 
performance (i.e., higher detection frequency, 
reduced workload for a single system, and better 
geographical diversity for better coverage), 
reduced costs for additional surveillance 
capabilities, superior management of existing 
redundancies, and improved collision warning 
against multiple sources.32 
Should preventive measures fail, the response to 
any particular crisis will depend on what type of 
space asset is involved and whether the crisis is 
connected to military activities. It will also be 
important to understand if the asset is part of an 
international partnership (or is supporting 
coalition activities) and whether the crisis is 
isolated or occurring among a number of assets.  
All of these factors will affect how a crisis is 
31 The Russian Space Surveillance System is well-
developed for LEO but is strictly military. Higher 
orbits are covered by the Russian-sponsored ISON 
network that relies on collaborative sharing among 
scientific telescopes around the world (source: 
www.emmetfletcher.com). 
32 Emmet Fletcher at www.emmetfletcher.com. 
managed, by whom, and through what 
institutional mechanisms. Naturally, the dual-use 
nature of satellites, and the use of civilian and 
commercial assets for military operations (thus 
making them important for national security 
purposes) compounds the difficulty in configuring 
the right kind of response.   
Not surprisingly, contingency planning is 
fundamental to effective management of a space 
crisis. As with responses to major natural disasters, 
terrestrial accidents (e.g., toxic spills, etc.), or 
terrorist incidents, allies will need to be able to 
react flexibly in space. Commercial and military 
operators deal regularly with space environment-
related contingencies involving practical 
operational procedures. Space crisis procedures 
are best developed when concentrating on realistic 
scenarios and case studies.  
The U.S. Schriever Wargame described above, or 
similar allied wargames, could improve 
understanding with regard to how institutions and 
technologies will interact in a crisis that requires 
quick decision-making and to possible interaction 
of groups that have not worked together before. 
The 2012 Schriever Wargame, the first 
international exercise in this series (including 
some nine NATO nations and Australia, as well as 
representatives of the commercial space industry) 
was a step in this direction. Information-sharing 
has been identified as a critical area for effective 
combined operations in space.33 As with terrestrial 
military exercises, practicing reactions to a crisis 
scenario should be accompanied by TCBM 
formulation to prevent dangerous misperceptions.  
The U.S. Combined Space Operations Centre is 
positioning itself to share operational command 
and control (C2) of space forces with allies, 
including accepting data from a wide variety of 
sources, processing it in an environment that 
enables maximum foreign participation, and 
providing SSA and command and control 
products to a select international community.34  
33 For more information, see 
http://www.act.nato.int/images/stories/events/2012/sw1
2i/sw12i_report.pdf. 
34 Maj. Michael Morton and Timothy Roberts, “Joint 
Space Operations Center (JSpOC) Mission System 
(JSM),” Technical Paper introduced at the 2011 AMOS 
Conference, 
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The establishment of such a Centre, however, will 
likely prove challenging as governments are 
concerned about the inappropriate release of data. 
Nonetheless, it would facilitate crisis management 
as allied governments and the commercial sector 
would share basic information on space object 
location and potential interference to prevent, or 
manage, a crisis. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The asymmetric advantages and vulnerabilities of 
space stand out:  Even a small satellite off course 
or an incident of neglect/misconduct -- let alone 
intentional disruption of, or an attack on, space 
assets -- can cause disproportionate damage. 
Space crisis management needs to be underpinned 
by strong and persistent diplomacy aimed at 
preventing crises, encouraging the accelerated 
development of the operational and technical 
capabilities to manage a crisis already underway, 
and ensuring the availability of effective 
organizational structures to facilitate sound crisis 
management. Indeed, it is not difficult to imagine 
a time when a number of responsible space-faring 
nations appoint their own Ambassador-at–Large 
for Space to reinforce this new and more urgent 
brand of space diplomacy. 
Collaborative space crisis management needs to 
embody several methods of crisis prevention; 
rapid detection and reporting of a threat/attack; 
accurate assessments of the threat; and high-
tempo policy responses. Political will is an 
essential component of this task at an international 
level. Present discussions concerning the 
expansion of coordinated allied counterspace 
defense arrangements, for example, are still at a 
fairly early stage of development. 
Accordingly, the next few years will be especially 
important in not only establishing responsible 
norms of space behavior, but also gaining 
agreement on clear procedures to deal with 
escalatory spirals and other unexpected 
contingencies, particularly of the man-made 
variety. An actual space crisis will likely elude 
abstract models and even a set of universal rules, 
http://www.amostech.com/TechnicalPapers/2011/SSA/
MORTON.pdf, accessed August 23, 2012.  
and rather require a tailor-made solution by those 
actors and individuals involved. That said, there is 
far more that can be done in the area of pre-crisis 
planning and closer, more security-minded 
discussions among key allies. Space, in its many 
facets, has simply become too important for day-
to-day life on Earth; it merits nothing less than the 
sustained engagement of the highest levels of 
government, NGOs, and the private sector.
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Figure 1: the EEAS Crisis Platform (source: EEAS website)351
351“The EEAS Crisis Platform.” EEAS website, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/foreign-policy/crisis-
response/eeas-crisis-platform, accessed August 23, 2012.  
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The United States poured over fifty-two billion 
dollars of aid, ten years of operations, and 1,854 
military members’ lives into war-torn Afghanistan, 
but these investments did not create a stable state.1 
The successful recovery of the country and its 
long-term stability depend on the Afghan state’s 
ability to mature in capability and permanency. 
Although many factors influence political 
development, education remains a dynamic part of 
long-term development, and in Afghanistan’s case, 
can reduce the populace’s support of radicalism. 
Education allows political participation, 
increasing political development and improving 
the probability of state survival. 
Lack of political development and continued state 
instability would force the United States to 
continue to provide financial and military aid long 
after the official transfer of responsibility to the 
Afghan government, and would arguably prevent 
the region from further progress. Instability in 
Afghanistan translates to unaffordable regional 
volatility, exacerbated by neighbor states like 
Pakistan and Iran. Their real or potential nuclear 
capabilities paired with insurgency create a 
perilous possibility in an already unsteady region. 
In order to avoid such a bleak outcome to over a 
decade of conflict and aid, it is in the United 
States’ interest to understand what kind of 
political development is realistic in Afghanistan, 
how education affects that development, and 
consequently what changes to enact in its 
approach to Afghan education.  
Although foreign aid from the United States, 
United Kingdom, and others has been the primary 
source of state funding since 2001, only nine 
1Tarnoff, Curt. “Afghanistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance,” 
Congressional Research Service (August, 2010). 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40699.pdf (accessed 
23 April 2012).  
percent of that aid is used for education.2 
However, nine percent is an improvement from a 
nonexistent formal educational system under the 
Taliban.3 Since the fall of the Taliban in 2001, 
over 600 schools have been built, upwards of 
50,000 teachers have been trained, and literacy 
programs are being implemented nation-wide.4 
These improvements are consistent with the 
Western democratic ideal of a population reaching 
the highest level of education possible, but are 
they truly conducive to Afghanistan’s further 
political development? If education in general is 
not the answer, then how much and what kind of 
education will influence political development? 
Should the ideal type and method of education be 
determined for Afghanistan, and political 
development advance as a result of achieving it, 
the United States could safely and confidently 
withdraw from Afghanistan, leaving an improved 
country and more stable region as a consequence. 
In order to determine these specifics concerning 
education, the end state of political development 
must be clearly defined and understood.  
 
THE DEBATE ON POLITICAL 
DEVELOPMENT 
In his article “An Idea of Political Development: 
From Dignity to Efficiency,” Harry Eckstein 
outlines a list of questions that address the idea of 
political development. For the purpose of this 
paper, only three of his six questions will be 
addressed. First, what conception of continuous 
2 Integrated Regional Information Networks. 
“AFGHANISTAN: Money well spent?”. IRIN. 
http://www.irinnews.org/Report/88502/AFGHANISTA
N-Money-well-spent (accessed 23 April 2012). 
3 School is Open. “Afghanistan Education History”. 
http://www.schoolisopen.org/sio/index.php?option=co
m_content&view=article&id=53&Itemid=62 (accessed 
23 April 2012). 
4 Tarnoff 
                                                          
                                                          
49 Space & Defense  
growth plausibly describes the passage from 
primal to advanced policies?  
Eckstein points out that the concept of 
democratization has only recently become the 
explicit goal of political development.5 He 
suggests that the best way to characterize the 
continuum of political development is through the 
growth of the political domain of society.6 This is 
interpreted to mean that more political actions 
begin to take the place of nonpolitical actions. 
Eckstein proposes that one end of the spectrum is 
“social polity”, and the other is “political 
society”.7 
“Social polity” refers to a “princely domain” in 
which there is an institution of headship, but the 
society is dominant, while the polity remains 
negligible.8 On the other hand, “political society” 
refers to the society in which private relations 
have been preempted by public institutions which 
permeate social life.9 The movement from social 
polity to political society is induced by the power 
holders of a social polity realizing their power 
resources and converting their headship to 
primacy, then to actual power.10 This process 
creates momentum, which blurs the line between 
polity and society.11 Eckstein stresses that, “[This 
state is not an end], but itself a stage in the 
continuing process.”12  
The second question Eckstein poses is this: what 
is the essential nature of polity in its “primitive 
and simple” form? He begins by asserting that a 
society’s occupants and practices are built around 
the concept of society.13 The symbolic politics of 
primal societies does not stand for real politics, 
but instead for society itself. Eckstein cites the 
example of sub-Saharan tribes identifying almost 
5 Eckstein, Harry. “The Idea of Political Development: 
From Dignity to Efficiency,” World Politics XXXIV 4 
(Jul, 1982): 451-486. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2010330 (accessed 18 
January 2012), 469. 
6 Eckstein, 469. 
7 Eckstein, 470. 
8 Eckstein, 470. 
9 Eckstein, 470. 
10 Eckstein, 471. 
11 Eckstein, 471. 
12 Eckstein, 471. 
13 Eckstein, 472. 
solely with their chief, rather than with territory or 
kinship. These tribes saw the chief as their 
mouthpiece and as the exemplification of their 
personal and social identity.14 He extends this 
model of primitive and simple polity to Anglo-
Saxon society. The transition from the king 
independently making decisions concerning war, 
to the incorporation of increasingly large councils 
to aid him, show the arrangement of the king 
embodying the society, and the council protecting 
the society’s moral customs.15  
Eckstein’s final question concerning political 
development asks what forces make the 
advancement of primal polities toward higher 
forms highly probable. Making a society real and 
tangible in order to fulfill the needs of personal 
identity, safety, and the satisfaction of material 
needs is key in moving a primal polity towards a 
higher form.16 In addition, in order “to exist, and 
to carry out collective enterprises, societies 
must…be harmonious in some degree”.17 The 
natural desire for justice is a function instinctively 
attributed to society, linking justice to 
chieftaincy.18 Eckstein argues that the domain that 
stands for society itself has the potential to 
become a monopoly of legitimate power.19  
He details the process of moving through the 
iterative stages of political development by 
outlining distinct stages that societies have 
historically demonstrated. These stages are the 
politics of primacy, the “prophylactic” polity, the 
polity of interests, and the polity of incorporation 
and of incumbency.20 Eckstein maintains that each 
stage is a precondition for those that follow, and 
the force that propels a society from stage to stage 
is primarily the desire to reap the direct and 
indirect benefits of social elevation and primacy.21 
In addition to desire for primacy, the force of 
greed and the “forces generated by collective 
functional needs” influence the progression of 
political development. These forces stem from the 
14 Eckstein, 473. 
15 Eckstein, 474. 
16 Eckstein, 474. 
17 Eckstein, 475. 
18 Eckstein, 475. 
19 Eckstein, 476. 
20 Eckstein, 482. 
21 Eckstein, 484. 
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need to efficiently manage the “machinery of the 
government”.22 “These themes of politics – 
primacy-seeking, power-seeking, greed, and 
integration – are familiar,” Eckstein writes. “What 
is not familiar is the special roles they play at 
different stages of political development.” If 
movement along Eckstein’s spectrum of 
development is driven by primacy-seeking and 
desire for social elevation, then because education 
allows for social elevation, it consequently affects 
political development. However, the specific way 
that education interacts with development is still 
unclear. 
Samuel Huntington clarifies the mechanics of 
political development. In his article, “Political 
Development and Political Decay,” he uses the 
phrase, “the art of associating together,” to refer to 
the idea of nurturing political institutions in order 
to spur political development.23 Huntington makes 
certain to differentiate between political 
development and modernization because, he 
argues, rapid modernization actually produces 
political decay.24 He lists rationalization, 
integration, and democratization as commonly 
used terms in defining political development, but 
maintains that mobilization and participation 
remain the most emphasized aspects of such 
development.25 Karl Deutsch argues that, 
“Increases in literacy, urbanization, exposure 
to mass media, industrialization, and per 
capita income expand the ‘politically relevant 
strata of the population’, multiply the 
demands for government services, and thus 
stimulate an increased political participation, 
and shifts in attention from the local level to 
the national level”. 
Daniel Lerner, a scholar who studies the effect of 
education on development, echoes Deutsch’s 
thesis by asserting that participation distinguishes 
modern politics from traditional politics.26 While 
Huntington credits all definitions of political 
22 Eckstein, 485. 
23 Huntington, Samuel P. “Political Development and 
Political Decay,” World Politics XVII 3 (Apr, 1965): 
386-430. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2009286 
(accessed 18 January 2012), 386. 
24 Huntington, 386. 
25 Huntington, 388. 
26 Huntington, 388. 
development, he points out three issues with given 
approaches. First, the causal relationship between 
modernization and political development limits 
the applicability of the concept. Development 
should be a quality rather than a certain type of 
system.27 This elimination of stark limitation 
would allow the concept to reach beyond its 
“limited identification…with the Western, 
constitutional, democratic nation-state”.28  
Second, Huntington points out the flaw in 
associating political development with all “good 
things” like literacy, urbanization, media 
participation, and political participation. This flaw 
differs from the first because it does not peg 
political development on modernization, but 
instead on all positive but possibly unrelated 
factors. Huntington critiques this view for its 
vague nature. “Development becomes an 
omnipresent first cause,” he writes, “which 
explains everything but distinguishes nothing.”29  
Third, Huntington reviews the opinion that all 
events taking place in “developing” areas are in 
fact intertwined with current or future political 
development. This kind of wishful thinking blurs 
the line between actuality and aspiration.30 
Huntington’s final assertion is that rationalization, 
competitiveness, and nation-building are all 
unrealistic, and only the concept of mobilization 
and participation are relevant to a timeless 
definition of political development. He also calls 
attention to the fact that people can be 
demobilized out of politics just as they are 
mobilized into politics.31 Thus, the idea of 
political development is reversible, and he calls 
the reverse “political decay”. 
Huntington goes on to address the idea of political 
development as institutionalism. He argues that 
the longer an organization has been in existence, 
the higher the level of institutionalism, and the 
older an organization is, the more likely it will 
continue to exist into the future.32 Additionally, 
the peaceful succession of organizational 
leadership generations indicates high 
27 Huntington, 389. 
28 Huntington, 390. 
29 Huntington, 390. 
30 Huntington, 391. 
31 Huntington, 392. 
32 Huntington, 395. 
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institutionalization.33 Finally, the ability of an 
organization to adapt its functions to changing 
demands is highly institutionalized. More 
complicated or multi-institutional political 
systems are more likely to survive than simple 
ones.34 Plato and Aristotle, for example, believed 
that a polity combining the institutions of 
democracy and oligarchy was most practical.35 
Complex institutions lend themselves to survival.  
According to Huntington, institutions must also 
have integrity and thus be somewhat autonomous 
from outside influences.36 Political groups cannot 
be the instrument of the social group if they mean 
to maintain their autonomy and 
institutionalization.37 Coherence also plays a part 
in autonomy, since “autonomy becomes a means 
to coherence… [And] prevents the intrusion of 
disruptive external forces…”38 Coherence also 
translates to the capacity for coordination and 
discipline, and by extension, to war and politics. 
Huntington says that societies that have been 
proficient at one have proved to be adept at the 
other. Thus, “discipline and development go hand 
in hand”.39 
While Eckstein and Huntington do not define the 
end goal of political development as political 
freedom, many scholars do. In his article “On the 
Decline of Contemporary Political Development 
Studies”, Robert Bartlett decries the view that 
liberal democracy trumps all other forms of 
government.40 He argues that the purpose of 
government is to maximize people’s freedom, and 
suggests that comparative politics focus on 
describing rather than prescribing as its principal 
task.41 Bartlett agrees with Huntington’s 
assertions in his article on political development 
33 Huntington, 396. 
34 Huntington, 400. 
35 Huntington, 400. 
36 Huntington, 401. 
37 Huntington, 401. 
38 Huntington, 403. 
39 Huntington, 404. 
40 Bartlett, Robert C. “On the Decline of Contemporary 
Political Development Studies,” The Review of Politics 
LVIII 2 (Spring, 1996): 269-298. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1408431 (accessed 18 
January 2012), 269. 
41 Bartlett, 274. 
concerning the differentiation between 
modernization and development.42 
Prominent economist Amartya Sen addresses the 
goals of political development in his article 
“Development as Freedom: An Indian 
Perspective”. He argues that freedom (economic 
empowerment, political freedoms, social 
opportunities, protective security, and 
transparency) is the primary objective and 
principle means of development.43 While Sen’s 
economically centered discussion on development 
as a whole is compelling, he focuses only on 
democracy as the goal of development. 
 
THE DEBATE ON EDUCATION 
Huntington suggests that rapid economic growth 
breeds political instability, and political 
mobilization results from a “revolution of rising 
frustrations” instigated by increased 
communication. He writes, “Increases in literacy 
and education may bring more political 
instability”.44 Calling on the examples of Burma, 
Ceylon, and the Republic of Korea, he refers to 
their high literacy rates and concurrent political 
instability. Daniel Lerner argues that “[literacy] 
may be dysfunctional – indeed a serious 
impediment – to modernization in societies now 
seeking (all too rapidly) to transform their 
institutions”.45  
Rapid embracing of communication may in fact 
produce a return to traditional or anti-modern 
sentiments. Huntington warns that such a 
movement may “mobilize minority ethnic groups 
who have been indifferent to politics but who now 
acquire self-consciousness and divide the political 
system along ethnic lines.” This concept of 
communication and education leading to a 
disintegration of the body politic is possible with 
respect to voting as well. Huntington refers to 
America’s experience in the 1930’s with allowing 
42 Bartlett, 278. 
43 Sen, Amartya. “Development as Freedom: An India 
Perspective,” Indian Journal of Industrial  
Relations  XLII  2 (Oct, 2006): 157-169. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/27768063 (accessed 23 
April 2012), 157. 
44 Huntington, 406. 
45 Huntington, 406. 
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unschooled millions to vote. He writes that their 
rapid and uncontrolled integration into the 
political system resulted in political parties’ 
inability to absorb them, and their own lack of 
knowledge about the existing system deterring 
them from interacting in it.46 It is important to 
distinguish between education in terms of 
spreading knowledge of just political rights and 
that of spreading literacy. Most scholars agree that 
literacy has a distinct positive effect on political 
participation and development. The following 
scholars confirm the relationship between 
education and political development. 
In his article “A Critique of Recent Models for the 
Improvement of Education in Developing 
Countries”, John Chilcott evaluates how 
educational systems are implemented and run in 
third-world countries. He explains that it is 
important to examine why an organization wants 
to educate a population. They could hope to create 
literate soldiers, participating political party 
members, or a more productive economy.47 How 
education is approached is important as well. Who 
writes the curriculum, how teachers are trained, 
and what they say about the curriculum to 
motivate students to become literate is key in 
understanding how a population perceives 
education.48 Chilcott indicates his disappointment 
in most developing nations’ educational systems 
due to their seeming disinterest in developing, 
maintaining, and evaluating educational 
systems.49 
Evaluating the state’s approach is key, but 
sometimes formal education is not the answer. 
Michelle Kuenzi examines the effect of nonformal 
education on political participation in her article 
“Nonformal Education, Political Participation, and 
Democracy: Findings from Senegal.” Her research 
found that nonformal education had a positive 
46 Huntington, 407. 
47 Chilcott, John H. “A Critique of Recent Models for 
the Improvement of Education in Developing 
Countries,” Anthropology & Education 
Quarterly XVIII 3 (Sep, 1987): 241-245. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3216593 (accessed 23 April 
2012), 244. 
48 Chilcott, 244. 
49 Chilcott, 245. 
impact on political participation.50 Nonformal 
education refers to basic literacy and numeracy 
skills. Kuenzi suggests that education in general 
leads to greater participation in organizations, 
which in turn affects civic skills.51 Her study also 
found that nonformal education increases 
community involvement and leadership.52 
Supporting the theory of increased education leads 
to political participation and political development, 
Cindy Kam and Carl Palmer determine that 
education does positively affect political 
participation in the United States but only until the 
college level. They suggest an alternative to the 
conventional view that education is a causal agent 
for political participation by proposing that 
education confers participation-enhancing benefits 
to the individual.53 They assert that the 
relationship between education past the high 
school level and political participation “might not 
reflect higher education conveying participation-
enhancing benefits, but rather, higher education 
serving as a proxy for pre-adult characteristics.”54 
However, these findings do not discount the 
theory that lower level education does imply 
political participation. 
Finally, the Council on Foreign Relations report 
“Evaluating U.S. Foreign Aid to Afghanistan”, 
published in 2011, points out the influence of 
education on reducing radicalism. “In a recent 
study of the drivers of political violence,” the 
report states, “USAID found limited evidence 
linking poverty and low education to support for 
radical groups.”55 The Council criticizes the 
50 Kuenzi, Michelle T. “Nonformal Education, Political 
Participation, and Democracy: Findings From Senegal,” 
Political Behavior  XXVIII 1 (Mar, 2006): 1-31. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4500208 (accessed 23 April 
2012), 1. 
51 Kuenzi, 3. 
52 Keunzi, 12. 
53 Kam, Cindy D. and Palmer, Carl L. “Reconsidering 
the Effects of Education on Political Participation,” 
The Journal of Politics (Jul, 2008): 612-631. 
http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fr
omPage=online&aid=1927220 (accessed 23 April 
2012), 613. 
54 Kam, 614. 
55 Committee on Foreign Relations. “Evaluating U.S. 
Foreign Assistance to Afghanistan”. U.S. Senate. 
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tendency of donors to hire advisors to complete 
jobs for exorbitant prices rather than invest in 
higher education and vocational training for 
Afghan people.56 Donors’ aid strategies are 
frustrating for the government when applied to 
education. Each donor wants to begin their own 
program, which means many separate projects fail, 
rather than working together to create one 
successful project.57  
 
COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY 
Because the relationship between education and 
political participation, and by extension, political 
development, has been determined to be positive, 
a qualitative assessment of Afghanistan’s 
educational system as compared with Bangladesh 
will be conducted. Bangladesh was chosen as the 
comparative case study for its similarity to 
Afghanistan in violent and relatively short 
histories, a colonial experience, a Muslim society, 
aid-assisted hamlet societies, corruption, domestic 
terrorism, tense relations with neighbors, and 
poverty. 
In an article written shortly after Bangladesh’s 
independence in 1972, Brian Arthur and Geoffrey 
McNicoll outlined Bangladesh’s challenges to 
growth and suggested actions to encourage future 
development.58 Less than 15% of its population 
was literate and over half of Bangladeshis were 
living on insufficient nutrition.59 Inflation, 
political instability, and labor unrest threatened to 
compromise the nascent state’s survival.60 Arthur 
and McNicoll pointed out the mobilizing effect of 
education by allowing any person to escape 
traditional hierarchical systems through 
knowledge.61 They proposed that the creation of a 
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html 
(accessed 23 April 2012), 9. 
56 Committee on Foreign Relations, 21. 
57 Committee on Foreign Relations, 28. 
58 Arthur, W. Brian and McNicoll, Geoffrey. “An 
Analytical Survey of Population and Development in 
Bangladesh,” Population and Development Review  IV 
1 (Mar, 1978): 23-80. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1972147 (accessed 23 April 
2012), 24. 
59 Arthur, 24. 
60 Arthur, 33. 
61 Arthur, 62. 
strong local administrative system was integral in 
generating any lasting political change in 
Bangladesh.62  
Much like Afghanistan, aid donors questioned the 
recoverability of the Bangladeshi state. Poor 
accountability, transparency, and responsibility on 
all levels threatened to topple the fragile polity.63 
Bangladesh’s current parliamentary representative 
democratic republic is a product of a series of 
various political frameworks and coups.   
Bangladesh has become a kind of development 
success story, due to its quick recovery from a 
turbulent independence, and its subsequent 
economic and political development. The 
Bangladeshi government made education a 
priority from its inception. By 1986, the literacy 
rate was 23.8%.64 Bangladesh now has a 47.9% 
literacy rate while just 28.1% Afghanis are 
literate.65 Bangladesh has three levels of education, 
totaling 12 years, as well as offered vocational 
and technical courses. As a predominantly 
Muslim culture, madrasah education was 
introduced centuries ago in 1780, and is still 
offered in conjunction with general education.66 
This madrasah and general education combination 
calls to mind the American Catholic school model 
of religious education paired with general 
education. Such a system offered in Afghanistan 
62 Arthur, 65. 
63 Kochanek, Stanley A. “Governance, Patronage 
Politics, and Democratic Transition in Bangladesh,” 
Asian Survery XL 3 (May-June, 2000): 530-550. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3021160 (accessed 13 
February 2012), 530. 
64 Wallace, Ben J. and Harris, Michael. “Anthropology 
And Development In Bangladesh,” Urban 
Anthropology and Studies of Cultural Systems and 
World Economic Development , XVIII 3/4, (FALL-
WINTER, 1989): 241-264. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40553163 (accessed 23 
April 2012), 246. 
65 CIA World Factbook. “Afghanistan: People and 
Society” and “Bangladesh: People and Society”. 
Central Intelligence Agency. 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/af.html (accessed 23 April 2012). 
66 Bangladesh Bureau of Educational Information and 
Statistics. “Description of the Current Educational 
System in Bangladesh”. 
http://www.banbeis.gov.bd/es_bd.htm (accessed 23 
April 2012). 
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would likely be met with more acceptance than a 
strictly secular educational system. In addition to 
religious accommodations, Bangladesh made 
education a constitutional right. 
Bangladesh’s constitution guarantees children to 
free and compulsory primary education. This 
commitment means that the government is 
committed to providing a mass-oriented system of 
education, relating that need to the requirements 
of society, and eradicating literacy.67 Systematic 
change took place over the course of years, as the 
government moved to fully implement a quality 
educational system. Creating a long-term, iterative 
plan for continued improvement was a key factor 
in Bangladesh’s education reform.68 Another 
factor of progress was the involvement of non-
governmental organizations in the growth of 
nonformal education. By investing in nonformal 
education at all levels, NGO’s helped socially 
prepare the population for formal education.69  
 
CONCLUSION 
Afghanistan is moving along Eckstein’s spectrum 
of political development, making its way from 
social polity to political society. In order to 
become a more mature state, Afghanistan must 
become a state that stands for society itself. If a 
desire for primacy and social elevation propels a 
society to move further along the spectrum of 
development, then education can only help in this 
process. Additionally, distinguishing between 
modernization and political development, 
mobilization and participation remain the goal of 
political development, and education encourages 
political participation. 
While Huntington would argue that literacy – or 
education – should not be correlated with political 
development due to the unrelated nature of all 
“good things”, and too much education in an 
under-developed society can cause political decay, 
the positive effects of education on economic, 
social, and political development cannot be 
overlooked. Examining the government’s 
67 Ibrahim, Muhammad. Providing Education for Out-
Of-School Youth in Bangladesh. London, U.K.: 
Commonwealth Secretariat, 2002, 2. 
68 Ibrahim, 3. 
69 Ibrahim, 4. 
approach to education is important to 
understanding the effectiveness and availability of 
education. Additionally, carefully monitoring aid 
and supporting nonformal education have proven 
to be vital in the advancement of educational 
systems. Such educational advancement in a 
developing state can be seen in Bangladesh’s 
example.  
Bangladesh is a valuable example of a state’s 
successful transition from social polity to political 
society through the lens of education. The 
similarities between Bangladesh and Afghanistan 
make it an appropriate comparison. Afghanistan 
can learn from Bangladesh’s process of 
educational reform through a systematic, iterative 
process that sought to educate its population 
through formal and nonformal education. A direct 
mentorship relationship between Bangladesh and 
Afghanistan could be beneficial to Afghanistan’s 
further development. Focusing NGO aid to 
appropriate areas was a key factor in 
Bangladesh’s educational jumpstart. Afghanistan 
should pay attention to how it directs the 
educational aid it receives and make a concerted 
effort to develop its nonformal education program.  
Overcoming many challenges to political 
development like insurgency, corruption, drug 
trade, ethnic fractionalization, and widespread 
poverty will not be an easy task for the Afghan 
state, but encouraging the progression of its 
educational system will increase political 
participation and political development in the 
pursuit of a stable Afghanistan.  
This assessment of the relationship 
between education and political development is 
limited by a lack of quantitative analysis and data. 
Qualitative relationships are valuable but not 
conclusive. More quantitative research should be 
conducted on the factors that influence 
state/regime survival in Afghanistan. 
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If tourism were proportional to political stability 
in the sense that more people would want to travel 
to destinations in which they are ensured some 
semblance of security, then Thailand would 
indeed be one of the most stable and secure 
countries in the world, particularly in 2011 
according to Forbes and Lonely Planet travel 
blogs.  The truth, however, is that Thailand is 
simply a country that has done well to mask its 
political turmoil with the exception of the 
Bangkok riots of 2006.  In reality, Thailand is a 
whirlpool of political deception, monarchical 
clandestine operations, and military intervention.  
Stability is the appealing white sheet draped over 
these problems by none other than Thailand’s 
beloved King, Bhumibol Adulyadej, the world’s 
longest reigning, living monarch, ascending to the 
throne in 1946.  With his death comes the risk of 
political disorder in Thailand should its political 
trajectory remain so uncertain.   
The political trajectory of Thailand is important 
not only to the United States, but to its Southeast 
Asian neighbors.  Thailand is one of the 
wealthiest countries in the region and boasts one 
of the strongest militaries, and therefore, its 
stability is integral in maintaining security in the 
region.  With the rising threat of China in areas 
such as the South China Sea, the Association of 
South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) must stand 
united and strong, which would be difficult should 
its leader succumb to domestic turmoil.  Since 
2009, Thailand’s king has been hospitalized and 
the hollow stability he had constructed through a 
network of officials, be they political or military, 
is crumbling, along with his country.  What will 
happen following King Adulyadej’s inevitable 
passing, and who are the actors that will decide 
the future of the country?  The purpose of this 
paper is to predict the political outcome of this 
scenario while identifying the key variables. 
These variables will be derived from historical 
background and used to create four separate 
scenarios, the second of which will be proven the 
most likely to occur. 
The second scenario describes the death of King 
Adulyadej and the rise of his son, the Crown 
Prince Maha Vajiralongkorn, who will be unable 
to maintain his father’s growing amount of 
authority, resulting in a power vacuum that the 
military will position itself to fill.  The 
constitutional government, to include the prime 
minister, her cabinet, and the national assembly, 
will not be able to assume democratic control due 
to its lack of support from Thai citizens which has 
resulted from mismanagement, inefficiencies, and 
monarchical intervention throughout the king’s 
rule.  The military will, therefore, be able to use 
the remaining legitimacy of the monarchy to 
operate autonomously against the democratic 
government without provoking resistance from 
Thai citizens who will continue to recognize the 
power of the monarchy. 
 
BACKGROUND 
In order to look forward, one must first look back:  
to identify the actors who will determine 
Thailand’s future, one must establish who has 
been influential in the past.  Until 1932, Thailand 
had been an absolute monarchy which was 
characterized by drastic fluctuations in the quality 
and competency of royal leadership.  This cycle 
reached its lowest point in the 1930s and change 
was deemed necessary to ensure Thailand’s 
growth and prosperity.  As a result, Thailand’s 
monarch was captured and exiled, though not 
eliminated, and a constitutional monarchy was 
established.  Unfortunately for this newly formed 
quasi-democratic system, those that executed the 
revolution held tight military bonds that resulted 
in strong military leadership over the coming 
decades, making the new system feel more like a 
junta than a constitutionally bound parliamentary 
system.  However, this alternative worked well for 
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the Thai people, who rioted approximately once a 
decade until the military held elections and a 
civilian military-friendly prime minister was 
elected.  Thai citizens had lived under a 
monarchical system for hundreds of years and 
with little education on democratic ideals, an 
individually led military junta did not seem much 
different.1   
Everything changed in 1953 when the newly 
crowned king of Thailand returned after eight 
years of ruling from afar.  The military junta in 
charge of Thailand at the time was led by Field 
Marshal Sarit Thanarat, who was experiencing yet 
another period of civilian opposition to military 
oppression.  Thanarat, in a tactful political move, 
decided to end the king’s banishment and promote 
him as the spiritual and national figurehead of 
Thailand who would then give Thanarat’s regime 
a sense of legitimacy.2  For the first two decades, 
his plan worked marvelously.  King Adulyadej 
was sent to almost every province in Thailand and 
even abroad to promote his beautiful nation.  He 
became shrouded in rituals to give the appearance 
of spiritual knowledge and power.  Unfortunately 
for Thanarat, both the King Adulyadej and the 
people began believing in the king’s spiritual 
wisdom to the point where the king was able to 
remove Thanarat’s regime from power in 1973.3  
The king’s power was cemented after another 
intervention between civilian and military forces 
in 1992, when he quietly reprimanded each party, 
telling them to stop the senseless violence 
between them which, shortly after his demand, 
came to an abrupt end.   
It was later discovered that the King Adulyadej 
had been constructing a network monarchy since 
his ascension to the throne, comprised of political 
and military officials that could protect the king 
from any negative publicity and step aside in 
1 Baker, Christopher John, and Pasuk Phongpaichit, 
2005, A History of Thailand, New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 231. 
2 Sakuna, Saeree, "Military Intervention and the Return 
of Absolute Monarchy: An Impediment to Political 
Security in Thailand," Peace & Conflict 
Monitor (November 2010): 5.  
3 Baker, 188. 
order to allow him to solidify his divine image.4  
Children were taught from a very young age to 
revere the king and love him for the sacrifices he 
had made.  In the eyes of the Thais, he was a 
dhammaraja, one who has reached enlightenment 
but has chosen to remain on the earthly plain and 
use his wisdom for the benefit of all.5  For this 
reason, the king never smiles; to smile or frown 
shows signs of earthly attachments, humanizing a 
divine being.6  To the Thai people, their king is 
perfect, wise, intelligent, kind, and on his 
deathbed.  His son, Crown Prince Maha 
Vajiralongkorn, does not share the qualities of his 
father and even practices the opposite.  He is 
arrogant, misogynistic, and ruthless.7  Since 1974, 
Thailand’s constitution has held that a female may 
become monarch, which would allow the much 
loved and popular Princess Chakkri Sirinthon to 
take the thrown; however, the crown title has not 
shifted hands thus far.8   
King Adulyadej’s network monarchy’s success 
can be attributed to Harry Eckstein’s stages of 
political time, primarily the fourth step of 
incorporation and incumbency.  While his 
network monarchy exploited the discontents in 
society and usurped power from both the military 
and constitutional government, King Adulyadej’s 
network remained open, allowing military officers 
and government officials to become a part of his 
privileged group and enjoy its spoils, increasing 
the monarchy’s authority over the government and 
its legitimacy among the people.9     
King Adulyadej used the military to create 
instability within Thailand’s political institutions 
so that he could intervene and act the people’s 
4 McCargo, Duncan, "Network Monarchy and 
Legitimacy Crises in Thailand," Pacific Review 18, no. 
4: 2005, 503-504. 
5 Handley, Paul M, The King Never Smiles: A 
Biography of Thailand's Bhumibol Adulyadej, New  
Haven: Yale University Press, 2006, 8. 
6 Ibid., 5. 
7 "As Father Fades, His Children 
Fight," Economist 394, no. 8674 (March 20, 2010): 
26,  MasterFILE Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed 
May 2, 2012),  26. 
8 “As Father Fades…”, 26. 
9 Eckstein, Harry, "The Idea of Political Development: 
From Dignity to  
Efficiency," World Politics 34, no. 4 (July 1982): 482.  
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hero.10  The most recent example of the King’s 
interventions is the military led coup of Thaksin 
Shinawatra in 2006, which resulted in his 
banishment and riots in the streets of Bangkok 
between the red and yellow shirts.  The red shirts 
supported Thaksin and his social policies that 
redistributed the wealth in favor of the poorer 
Northeastern provinces, overlooking his corrupt 
tendencies that made him billions of dollars while 
in office.11  The yellow shirts supported the 
Bangkokian middle and upper classes, and the 
royal family (yellow being the monarchy’s color).  
When tensions were at their highest in 2008, the 
King stepped in and called for an end to the 
violence, remaining publicly neutral.  Needless to 
say, this only enhanced his profile among Thai 
citizens. 
Over the past decades, Thailand has undoubtedly 
undergone a non-democratization process.  Since 
the 1950s, the monarchy increased its legitimacy 
over every other aspect of Thailand’s government, 
utilizing not only its constitutional powers but its 
authority among the people.  According to many 
political scientists, after the Cold War, global 
democratization could be characterized by the 
rational choice model: if the political elite of a 
country deemed it in their best interest to establish 
a democracy, they would, whether or not they 
believed in democratic principles.12  This can be 
used to explain King Adulyadej’s behavior during 
his reign.  Democracy was not in his best interests 
because it took away power and authority from 
the monarchy; he therefore spent his entire period 
as king attempting to undermine the democratic 
institutions in Thailand and revert power back to 
the throne, which he did with much success.  
Since he and his network monarchy became the 
political elite in the 1970s, the king had the power 
to influence this transition. 
10 Ockey, James, "Monarch, Monarchy, Succession and 
Stability in Thailand," Asia Pacific  
Viewpoint 46, no. 2: 2005, 116. 
11 Chachavalpongpun, Pavin, “Diplomacy under Siege: 
Thailand’s Political Crisis and the Impact on Foreign 
Policy,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 31, no. 3 
(September 2009): 453. 
12 Drogus, Carol Ann, and Stephen Walter Orvis, 
Introducing Comparative Politics: Concepts and Cases 
in Context, Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2009, 360. 
 
SCENARIOS 
Based on this brief historical background, four 
primary variables stand out as the ones most likely 
to influence Thailand’s trajectory after King 
Adulyadej’s death:  the constitutional government, 
the monarchy, the military, and the people.  Using 
these variables, four possible scenarios can be 
constructed for post-Bhumibol Adulyadej 
Thailand; each will be described and considered 
as potential outcomes.   
In the first scenario, the Crown Prince, Maha 
Vajiralongkorn, will assume the thrown and be 
rejected by the people, thus ruining the intricate 
network monarchy his father spent decades 
constructing.  In this scenario, the monarchy will 
be eliminated as a future actor in Thailand’s 
political spectrum, leaving a bipolar feud between 
the democratic government with constitutional 
authority (however illegitimate) and the military, 
whose authority comes from brute strength and 
historical precedence.  Since Thaksin’s sister, 
Yingluck Shinawatra, was elected as Prime 
Minister in November of 2011, the people in this 
scenario will have to choose between a 
Shinawatra-led regime and the historically pro-
Bangkokian military, which will inevitably result 
in riots similar to those between the red and 
yellow shirts.  One group of Thais will support the 
constitutional government and demand the return 
of Thaksin since there is no longer a monarch to 
prevent his return. The other group will support 
the military who will maintain the previous 
system with the support of the wealthy upper class 
centered in Bangkok.  This scenario would 
conclude in the military violently displacing the 
Shinawatra regime and forcibly holding elections 
until a military friendly Prime Minister is voted 
into office.  Riots would continue until the 
country essentially collapses into chaos and 
marshal law is instated.  In this scenario, the 
centripetal forces holding the country together 
will weaken to the point where the country falls 
apart according to the Hartshorne Functional 
Theory.13  
This is the worst case scenario and also follows 
the typical democratization models: an 
13 Gallaher, Carolyn, Key Concepts in Political 
Geography, London: SAGE, 2009, 95. 
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authoritarian based regime against political 
liberalization advocates.  According to Samuel 
Huntington, these types of conflicts usually 
resulted in soft-liners and moderates on each side 
making concessions until a pact was created 
allowing for a limited democracy to be 
constructed, entering the nation into a transitional 
democratic period.14  This, however, is not the 
case of Thailand due to the third actor present in 
the conflict: the monarchy, which holds much of 
the legitimacy in the country and, in all likelihood, 
will not see its demise following the kings death, 
leading to the second scenario.   
In the second scenario, the Crown Prince will 
assume power and the people, who have grown 
accustomed to a strong monarchy, will support 
him.  The newly crowned king will not be able to 
maintain the network monarchy his father created 
and will, instead, drag the monarchy back into the 
role from which it had grown: a figurehead 
sustained only as a source of legitimacy for the 
military.  A slight variation of this model would 
be the Princess, Sirinthon, assuming power over 
her brother.  Similarly, however, she will not be 
able to hold together the monarchical regime, and 
the royal family will again become simply a 
source of legitimacy.  The military, who had 
strong ties to the network monarchy before King 
Adulyadej’s passing, will assume control over the 
former king’s network while nominally accepting 
the monarchy’s superiority to prevent public 
outcry.  The monarchy and military will remain 
united against the democratic government and the 
Shinawatra regime, much like the current alliance.   
Third, the princess, Sirinthon, will assume power 
over her brother and take her place as head of the 
network monarchy.  The people will undoubtedly 
support her reign since she currently commands 
an immense amount of respect among Thai 
citizens.  In this scenario, the Princess will 
maintain her father’s network and take it through 
a reformation in which ties to the military would 
be severed and new ones would be made with the 
Shinawatra regime in attempts to bridge the 
financial and developmental gap between 
14 Huntington, Samuel P., The Third Wave: 
Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, 
Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991. 
 
Bangkok citizens and Thais from the Northeastern 
Provinces.  This scenario would not occur with 
the Crown Prince as head of the network due to 
the Prince’s strong military ties.15 The military 
will see its budget significantly reduced along 
with its influence over Thai policies.  In this 
scenario, power will transfer from the network 
monarchy to the parliamentary government in 
Princess Sirinthon’s attempt to democratize 
Thailand to prevent further instability.   
Fourth, the Crown Prince or the Princess will 
assume power, maintain the network monarchy, 
garner the people’s support, and continue their 
father’s policies of expanding Thailand’s 
monarchical power.  In this scenario, very little 
would change and Thailand’s political trajectory 
would follow its current path.  This scenario, 
however, is not likely.   
 
ANALYSES 
So which of these four is most probable? For the 
remainder of the paper, scenario two with the 
Crown Prince assuming power will be argued as 
the most likely to occur.  To prove this, let us 
again examine the four variables.  First, the 
government: Due to the constitutional restrictions 
of the parliamentary system, the government of 
Thailand can do very little following the king’s 
death in terms of positioning itself into a more 
powerful and influential position.  To strengthen 
his network monarchy, King Adulyadej has taken 
every opportunity to enervate the political 
institutions established in Thailand’s political 
system.  Under Thailand’s constitutional 
monarchy, it has had fourteen different 
constitutions and tens of re-elections of prime 
ministers.  Thailand’s government is comprised of 
dozens of political parties and new ones are 
created almost every year.  Parties join and break 
from coalitions to win important governmental 
positions resulting in compromises and 
inefficiencies that have created a bureaucratic 
nightmare for Thai citizens. The people have little 
faith in the political system and turn to their king, 
who has outlived all previous constitutions and 
prime ministers, for solidarity and efficiency.16  
15 “As Father Fades…”, 26. 
16 Sakuna, 3. 
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The current Prime Minister, Yingluck Shinawatra, 
has yet to prove herself and has even weakened 
the government’s image in the eyes of the Thais 
after poor governmental oversight and 
mismanagement during the November flooding in 
2011.17   Perhaps someday the Shinawatra 
administration will command enough authority 
and legitimacy to influence the makeup of 
Thailand’s political spectrum; however, this 
increase in legitimacy is not conceivably 
attainable before King Adulyadej’s death.  
Therefore, the government is negligible as a 
variable in predicting the future of Thailand’s 
political trajectory.   
The second variable to consider is the monarchy.  
The first issue to address with regards to this 
variable is succession:  Will the Crown Prince or 
the beloved princess take control after their 
father’s death?  While a law was passed allowing 
for a female monarch, there has yet to be any 
evidence to suggest this law would be executed 
and enforced before the king’s death.  As a result, 
the most likely scenarios would be those in which 
the Crown Prince will assume power, which 
include numbers one, two, and four.  The second 
issue to address within this variable would be the 
effectiveness of Prince Vajiralongkorn’s accession.  
Will he acquire the people’s support and maintain 
his father’s powerful network, or will he become a 
figurehead for the military?  Both of these 
potential outcomes depend on the remaining two 
variables: the military and the people. 
The military and the Thai people have shared an 
interesting relationship due to the military’s 
constant political involvement in Thailand.  As 
previously stated, the military junta of the 1930s, 
40s and 50s seemed to be an easy transition from 
an absolute monarchy for the under-educated Thai 
populace.  Since the 1970’s, however, the military 
has been denied absolute control because of the 
increased authority of King Adulyadej, which 
may pose problems for the military if it attempts 
to regain power after the king’s death.  The coup 
d’état of Thaksin Shinawatra in 2006 provided the 
military an opportunity to determine the level of 
support it could expect from the Thai people 
17 “Thailand’s Floods: Rising Damp,” The Economist, 
(Nov 5, 2011), Accessed May 2, 2012,  
<http://www.economist.com/node/21536652>. 
should it decide to pursue an aggressive stance 
against the democratic government.  The coup 
revealed that the military still garnered support 
should it be guided under the monarchical 
umbrella in the eyes of Thailand’s citizens due to 
the overwhelming support and legitimacy the 
King received from his people.18   
However, is a dictatorship over Thailand the 
military’s objective? Historical data shows 
otherwise and instead suggests that the military’s 
overall goal in terms of political power is 
autonomy: the ability to act without restrictions 
should it feel obliged to do so and to remain free 
from budget or legal restrictions from the 
government.  At every stage of military rule in 
Thailand’s history, control was always given back 
to the people and the constitutional government 
even after years of direct military control.  
Whenever a prime minister threatened the 
military’s autonomy, whether it was through 
budgetary or legal measures, a coup was launched 
until a military-friendly prime minister was 
elected.19  This behavior aligns closely with the 
predictions of Morris Janowitz, a prominent 
sociologist that worked extensively with Samuel 
Huntington in the area of civil-military relations.  
He hypothesized that when civilian governments 
do not sufficiently consider the military’s needs, 
the military may choose to interfere in an attempt 
to better their own position.20 Examples of this 
behavior abound in Thailand’s modern history, 
such as the election of Thanom Kittikhachon after 
the death of Field Marshall Sarit Thanarat in 1963, 
the election of Anand Panyarachanand after a 
military coup removing Chatichai Choonhavan in 
1991, and even the election of Thaksin Shinawatra 
in 2001.21 The relationship between civilian and 
military officials can be characterized as an 
alliance of convenience: so long as the 
constitutional government supported the military, 
18 Chambers, Paul, "Thailand on the Brink: Resurgent 
Military, Eroded Democracy," Asian  
Survey 50, no. 5 (September 1, 2010): 841. 
19 Sakuna, 3. 
20 Janowitz, Morris, The Military in the Political 
Development of New Nations: An Essay in 
Comparative Analysis, Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1964. 
21 Baker, xvii. 
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peace was maintained.22 As support for King 
Adulyadej grew over the last six decades, 
however, Thailand’s military gradually lost this 
autonomy until its actions could only be 
legitimized by the King, himself.   
If the military were to receive the King’s approval 
for direct military action (or intervention), Thai 
citizens would perceive it as necessary for 
preserving national unity and monarchical glory; 
such is the love for their king.  Should 
monarchical legitimacy in the eyes of the Thai 
people transfer to the Crown Prince, the military 
could use it as a source for their autonomy while 
shedding the chains of the monarch’s authority.  It 
is therefore in the military’s best interest to pursue 
scenario two in terms of restoring and maintaining 
their historical autonomy.  However, it all comes 
down to the final variable. 
The Thai people control the fate of Thailand’s 
political trajectory primarily because they 
determine who has legitimacy of rule between the 
government, the monarchy, and the military.  
Historically, they have allowed the military to 
intervene and replace prime ministers so long as 
direct military control was never too long or 
aggressive; however, much has changed since the 
1930s, and Thais now are far more educated in 
democratic ideals than previous generations and 
may not stand for a junta as they once did.23  The 
contemporary monarchy has also changed 
significantly, wielding the greatest amount of 
legitimacy; however, is that legitimacy centered 
on the institution or the individual?  As previously 
stated, the government has done very little in 
garnering Thai support and has been repeatedly 
undermined by the king and the military, leaving 
the conflict for political power in Thailand 
between the military and monarchy in which only 
the people can decide the victor.   
Thailand’s monarchy is in no threat of 
extermination following the king’s death for two 
reasons: first, democracy in Thailand is not strong 
enough to warrant the complete rejection of a 
22 Chambers, 840. 
23 “The 2010 National Survey of the Thai Electorate,” 
The Asia Foundation, 2011, Accessed May 2,  
2012, 
<http://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/ThailandNati
onalSurvey2010.pdf>, 35, 130. 
monarch, as proven by the coup in 2006 where a 
majority of Thais sided with the king and military 
than with the constitutional government.  
Satisfaction for democracy in Thailand has 
actually decreased in recent years, leaving the 
monarchy to fill the vacuum.24  This 
dissatisfaction can be attributed to the numerous 
coups and constitutions Thai people have seen 
come and go in the past century as opposed to the 
single king that has maneuvered himself as a 
beacon of efficiency and stability.25  According to 
Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, democracy 
can only thrive in countries where its citizens 
participate and are willing to defer to elected 
officials to effectively govern while in office.26  
This does not happen in Thailand as a result of the 
king’s interventions which have caused Thai 
citizens to instead defer to him instead of the 
prime minister. So long as the monarchy 
maintains “efficiency primacy” over the military 
and government, it will continue to have the 
people’s support.27 Second, the monarchy in 
Thailand is a historic institution dating back 
almost a thousand years with important 
ceremonial functions.  Under King Adulyadej, the 
institution has flourished into a political actor that 
holds the largest portion of legitimacy in the 
perceptions of Thai citizens as seen during the 
king’s public interventions in 1973, 1992, and 
2006.  What separates the monarch from the 
monarchy is the distinction between authority and 
legitimacy, terms which have been distinguished 
throughout this paper.  King Adulyadej’s network 
monarchy not only possesses legitimacy, but 
astounding amounts of authority over the military 
and government that the king has surreptitiously 
acquired during his rule.  With the death of the 
king comes the death of that authority, but not the 
legitimacy the king has gained in the eyes of Thai 
citizens. Due to the enforcement of the lese 
majeste laws in Thailand that prevent any and all 
criticisms of the monarch, no surveys have been 
conducted to measure the legitimacy and support 
24 “The 2010 National Survey…”, 41. 
25 Ockey, 116. 
26 Almond, Gabriel A., and Sidney Verba, The Civic 
Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five  
Nations, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
1963. 
27 Eckstein, 484. 
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the monarch has.  It is safe to say, however, that 
the Crown Prince will lose a large portion of it 
after his father’s death.  Prince Vajiralongkorn is 
despised by the Thai people and seen as arrogant, 
selfish, and immoral.28  It is likely, then, to see a 
decline in monarchical support, but not an end. 
The military has seen an increase in support from 
the Thai people due to the fact that it has been 
used for decades as an instrument for the king.  
Thai people do not wish to see the size of the 
military reduced and, in general, have perceived it 
as an important institution that helps to stabilize 
and safeguard the country.29  However, a military 
junta or dictatorship will not be well received by 
the people due to their increased understanding 
and desire for democratic ideals such as freedom 
of speech and opinion, fairness, and unity, 
expressed not only since the 1930s but even as 
recently as 2010.30  Should the military in their 
efforts to protect their autonomy choose to 
establish a junta or dictatorship following the 
king’s death, renouncing monarchical authority 
and competing directly with the constitutional 
government for power, the people would become 
divided and scenario one would ensue.   
Samuel Huntington argues that in the absence of 
traditional institutions, neither military juntas nor 
charismatic leaders can effectively build a 
sustainable, modern, political institution and that 
the only political entity that can do so is the 
political party.31  Why are Thailand’s political 
parties unsuccessful in doing this and military 
juntas so effective? The key lies in the monarchy, 
Thailand’s most traditional and increasingly 
powerful institution.  According to Huntington, 
“the importance of the political party in providing 
legitimacy and stability in a modernizing political 
system varies inversely with the institutional 
inheritance of the system from traditional 
society.”32 Therefore, through the highly 
legitimate yet authority weakened monarchy, the 
military will be able to rule.   
28 “As Father Fades…”, 26. 
29 “The 2010 National Survey…”, 95-96. 
30 Ibid., 37. 
31 Huntington, Samuel P., “Political Development and 
Political Decay,” World Politics 17, no. 3  
(April 1965): 424. 
32Huntington, “Political Development…”, 424. 
Taking into consideration all of the variables—
government, monarchy, military, and people—the 
most likely scenario in Thailand following the 
king’s death must be the second: the monarchy 
will remain an influential institution with Prince 
Vajiralongkorn at its head and used by the 
military as a tool for legitimacy in its efforts to 
maintain its autonomy.  The government will 
continue to act in accordance with the military’s 
objectives under threat of a coup to replace an 
uncooperative regime.  This scenario is most 
likely for the following reasons:  the prince cannot 
inherit his father’s authority over the military and 
government due to his inexperience and poor 
reputation but will still maintain some legitimacy 
as a result of his father’s efforts in increasing 
appeal and reverence of the monarchical 
institution as a whole.33  The military will respect 
the monarchy’s legitimacy publicly and build up 
the hated prince’s image much like it did to King 
Adulyadej in the 1950s; the difference would be 
that the poor existing image the prince has with 
the public would allow the military to check the 
prince’s popularity growth to prevent him from 
reconstructing his father’s authority.  As a result, 
the nation’s power will fall in the hands of the 
military, who can act under the legitimacy 
umbrella of the monarchy against the 
constitutional government should it act against 
military interests.  The people will continue to 
acknowledge the ceremonial importance of the 
monarchy as a tool for national unity while 
recognizing its decline in authority and will, 
therefore allowing if not actively promoting 
autonomy of the military through the monarchy.  
The transition will appear smooth to the public 
while the struggle for authority rages behind the 
clouded curtain of the lese majeste laws, much 
like it does now. 
 
CONCLUSION 
A military controlled government would not mean 
the end for Thailand.  The land of a thousand 
smiles has fared well under previous military 
authorities, experiencing enormous amounts of 
33 Fong, Jack, "Sacred Nationalism: The Thai 
Monarchy and Primordial Nation 
Construction," Journal Of Contemporary Asia 39, no. 
4: 2009, 679. 
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economic growth and increased political freedoms 
of its citizens.  Scenario two provides the greatest 
amount of stability because it panders to the 
military’s desires for autonomy.  Should the 
military become truly threatened by an alliance 
between the monarchy and the government, it may 
react in a way that would destabilize the country, 
whether through coups or assassinations.  One of 
the keys to King Adulyadej’s success was his 
ability to work with the military until his power 
was great enough to circumvent it, and even still, 
he kept military officials in his close circle.  With 
the rise of China’s influence in Southeast Asia, 
particularly regarding the Spratly Islands in the 
South China Sea, the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations and the United States need a strong 
Thailand to act as a shield against Chinese 
expansion.  While a military run constitutional 
government is not the most ideal in terms of 
democracy, it is a necessary evil for the time 
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Sean N. Kalic has provided a useful history of U.S. 
militarization of space under Presidents 
Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson and the 
combination of ideals, bureaucratic jostling, and 
Cold War tensions that formed the foundations of 
U.S. space policy.  His theme is the continuity 
through the administrations of these three 
presidents of a space policy built around the “non-
aggressive military uses of space,” a policy which 
effectively ruled out weapons in orbit.  There 
were, of course, many in the military and 
scientific community with a more hawkish view 
on weaponization, and space policy has vacillated 
between an altruistic Ying and atavistic Yang ever 
since.  The fact that the bulk of resources were 
devoted in these early years to peaceful striving 
rather than weaponization  (to Apollo rather than a 
Fractional Orbital Bombardment System) was due, 
Kalic convincingly argues, to decisions made by 
the three Presidents whose administrations he 
describes.  Thanks to them, prudence, the desire 
for the world’s admiration, and scientific curiosity 
carried the day. 
Fans of bureaucratic politics will find much to 
admire in Kalic’s description of how the Air Force 
maneuvered, usually without success, to outflank 
NASA, the Army, and the Navy to become the 
principle agent for space.  Part of this effort 
involved a narrative of space as a simple 
continuation of the atmosphere, part of an 
“indivisible field of operation” and therefore an 
extension of the responsibilities a newly 
independent Air Force should naturally assume.   
Space emerges in this campaign for the first time 
as the “high ground” which must be seized (by the 
Air Force) to prevail in the military confrontation 
with the Soviet Union.  The Army, Navy, and 
NASA all had a different idea, and the Air Force 
push was frustrated (as it has been frustrated many 
times since) not just by technical failures and cost 
overruns in key programs but by its own tendency 
to focus resources on airplanes (strategic bombers 
then, air superiority fighters now) rather than 
things that fly invisibly through the cosmos.   
Kalic recites a long list of unsuccessful space 
weapons projects, like SAINT (an early orbiting  
ASAT concept), BAMBI  and SPAD (both 
orbiting boost phase ICBM interceptors), and 
FOBS, or fractional orbital bombardment system,  
a version of which was actually tested by the  
Soviet Union.  The nuclear warheads in the FOBS 
concept would circle the Earth in low Earth orbit 
and then be deorbited over the intended target.  
That would have allowed orbiting Soviet 
warheads to approach the United States from the 
south, bypassing defenses oriented northward 
toward Soviet land-based missile fields.  Soviet 
moves toward an operational FOBS system were 
the impetus, the author argues, for President 
Kennedy’s authorizing the development of a U.S. 
ASAT interceptor; but Kennedy’s aversion to 
weapons in space ensured that the ASAT system 
would be ground- rather than space-based.  Both 
the Soviet and the United States eventually (and 
unilaterally) abandoned ground-based ASAT 
systems, although the Chinese broke that norm 
with an ASAT test in 2007, a test that, fortunately, 
has not been repeated.   
Kalic’s book also traces the rise of partisan 
political divisions on space policy, initially caused, 
he argues, by concerns among Republican 
lawmakers about resources being devoted to 
peaceful rather than military uses of outer space.  
The success of Apollo silenced the partisan 
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criticism, which is now largely forgotten.  But 
Kalic’s book reminds us that among the 
achievements of the Apollo program, and the Cold 
War competition to be first on the moon, was to 
help prevent a military arms race in space by 
starving it of resources. 
This is a short book, made shorter still by a host of 
redundancies.  The initial chapters are 
summarized again at the end, perhaps to flesh out 
what would have been a longish journal article to 
book length.  The author is not a master of style.  
Still, it is very useful to be reminded that 
successive presidents favored the “non-aggressive 
military use of space” and shared what seems to 
have been an instinctual aversion to orbiting space 
weapons.  Weapons programs seldom die.  
Usually they return every generation or so in a 
new form.  German imaginings, in the 1920’s, of 
an orbiting “sun gun” morphed into orbiting laser 
platforms, nuclear missile platforms, and finally 
“rods from gods.”  But these have remained on the 
level of Popular Mechanics cover art rather than 
becoming weapons in orbit.    
The common sense of Eisenhower, Kennedy, and 
Johnson, particularly regarding weapons in space, 
turned out not to be as common as one might have 
hoped.  This is one lesson to be drawn from 
Securing Outer Space, the reissue in paperback of 
a 2009 compendium of essays by social scientists 
about space.  One question always raised by 
compendia like this is why certain essays were 
included and others not.  The title does not help; 
only some of these essays concern themselves 
directly with space security.  The introduction 
does not help much either.  The editors tell us 
their goal was to “articulate an understanding of, 
and critically engage with, the effects of particular 
manifestations of space policies.”  This is hardly a 
sentence to whet the intellectual appetite, but it 
does prepare the reader for a tendency toward the 
obscurantist in many of the articles that follow.  It 
may well be, as one of these authors claims, that 
the U.S. space policy discourse is based on, 
“...important  performances of gendered identity 
construction specific, tacitly gendered, 
rationalizations of exploration and colonization in 
particular ways…”  On the other hand, it may not 
be.  It is hard to tell.  Still, what the collection 
lacks in coherence, and some of the authors in 
elegance or clarity of language, is made up for in 
part by variety, and a degree of heterodoxy – both 
good things when much contemporary writing 
about space tends toward the stale, the clichéd , 
and the self-interested.  
Names which appear often in these pages are 
Everett Dolman, Steven Lambakis, Alfred Thayer 
Mahan and – oddly enough – the French 
philosopher Michael Foucault (who is mentioned 
as often as Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson 
together).  The former two are the chief 
proponents of the concept of space as an 
inevitable theater of war and the consequent need 
for the United States to weaponize and dominate 
the space domain. Mahan is present in these 
articles mostly to solidify the analogy of space 
control to control of sea lines of communication 
(in spite of obvious differences between the two 
realms), and also because any anthology with 
even a hint of geo-politics is bound to include him.  
But what is Foucault doing here?   
It turns out that “discourse analysis” (the 
exploration of how power relationships are 
reflected in language) is a very useful tool in 
unpacking space discourse, the often feckless, 
self-interested, posturing combination of 
sweeping generalizations, misplaced metaphors, 
empty slogans, bureaucratic point-scoring and 
magical thinking that has characterized official 
and semi-official proclamations about space since 
Werner Van Braun announced that human destiny 
lay in the cosmos.  None of our great spiritual or 
philosophical traditions (if one excludes 
Scientology) had noticed this, but suddenly it 
seemed persuasive.  In the event, while human 
beings have been rare and transient visitors to 
space, ideologues have virtually colonized the 
cosmos, creating what David Grodin (“The Power 
Politics of Space”) describes in these pages as a 
“strategic discourse that hinders the possibilities 
of cooperation and increases the likelihood of 
conflicts in space.”  Space, as Van Braun knew, is 
all about narrative (about the sizzle rather than the 
steak), and that narrative has been, and to a degree 
still is, dominated by the devotees of “inevitable 
war” and space control. Common sense hasn’t 
much appeal for ideologues, especially when their 
blood is up – as it always seems to be.  After all, if 
ideology did not contradict common sense, what 
would be the point? 
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There are also articles here on space from the 
perspective of small powers, particularly Canada 
(by Wade Huntley), and the impact of science 
fiction on space policy by Mark Hamilton.   The 
latter contains the mother of all power point slides 
which I am still puzzling through.  But it is fun to 
consider how science fiction allows us to examine 
our follies by bestowing them on aliens who turn 
out to be anything but alien. 
In sum, those looking for novel and creative 
thinking about space, and willing to plough 
through some head-scratching prose to find it, 
need look no further.  What they will also find, 
unfortunately, is a certain datedness of material.  
This is the editors’ rather than the authors’ fault.  
A lot has happened in the decade or so since many 
of these articles were written, and a more 
fastidious editor would have asked for rewrites or 
epilogues.  This is not a problem for more 
theoretical and/or historical chapters, like C. 
Peoples’ exploration of what might be called the 
original sin of space – that later pioneers stood, 
willingly or not, on shoulders of Nazi scientists 
who were, at the very least, morally obtuse, and 
often much worse than that.  But it is a serious 
issue in more prosaic articles like David Webb’s 
on space weaponry.  This seems to have been 
written in the middle of the last decade (no 
copyright date is given), before some of the 
weapon programs Dr. Webb describes were 
abandoned and also before the Chinese ASAT test 
of 2007.  In this same vein, the specter of orbiting 
weapons platforms haunts the imagination of 
some of these authors.  Such platforms receded in 
the interim even further into the realm of 
improbability. Talk of “space control” was once 
robustly cutting edge, but the technological and 
budgetary obstacles proved formidable, and the 
accompanying rhetoric, with its fatal tendency to 
strut off the page, alienated allies whose 
cooperation would have been a necessary 
ingredient.  That trust once lost has been hard to 
regain.  Likewise, the debate about the 
implications for space of a “unipolar world” (the 
subject of I.R. Ballantyne Bolton’s chapter) now 
seems as quaint as debates about world 
government.  The unipolar interlude in space, if it 
ever existed, was brief and has yielded to hand-
wringing about America’s decline, to talk of an 
eroding space infrastructure, and to worries about 
an aging space workforce.  The new catch phrase 
is the “three C’s” – competitive, congested, and 
contested space.  It is not yet clear what 
“contested” space is but it is certainly not space 
control.  Meanwhile, commercial satellite 
operators are forcing the pace toward a more 
regulated and transparent space environment; 
China is on the rise; and private space launch is 
now a reality.  The space policy of the Obama 
Administration differs sharply in both tone and 
substance from its Bush-era predecessor, with 
more emphasis on cooperation and only a residual 
mention of space control.  And cyber might now 
be a more likely vector of attack on space 
capabilities than a crushingly expensive armada of 
space or even ground-based engines of space war.  
None of this is reflected in these pages.    
Although Securing Outer Space is, therefore, less 
up to date than might be wished, there are some 
very good things in it.  My personal favorite is the 
aforesaid piece by David Grodin.  The writing is 
awkward in places, but the core idea – that space 
policy is informed by narrative, which actively 
produces imaginary future problems that self-
interested bureaucracies then compete for 
resources to solve – is a valuable insight.  The Air 
Force professes that space will inevitably become 
not only a battlefield but the central battlefield of 
future war.  This vision, not incidentally, makes 
the Air Force itself the most important line of 
defense.  Unfortunately, it turns the actual 
situation on its head.  Space has no strategic value 
apart from the services it supplies to warfighters 
within the atmosphere, where power is 
denominated and battles are lost or won.  The Air 
Force does acknowledge this – in fact if not in 
theory – by regularly shorting space of resources 
in favor of air-breathing systems like the F-22, the 
F-35, and more recently (when they became 
unavoidable) remotely piloted vehicles.  If you 
want to know what bureaucracies really think, 
don’t read their vision statements; read their 
budget submissions. 
Space, to be sure, is important – even vital – in the 
same way that communications and logistics are.  
But when we speak of winning the war of 
logistics, or of communications, or of space, we 
are speaking metaphorically.  Mistaking metaphor 
for reality has been characteristic of space strategy 
from the beginning, exemplified by phrases like 
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“high ground” and “high frontier.”  Taken 
together, the articles in Securing Outer Space 
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